The Emergence of NormsEdna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. The problems are such that they inhere in the structure (in the game-theoretical sense of structure) of the situations concerned. Three types of paradigmatic situations are dealt with. They are referred to as Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations; co-ordination situations; and inequality (or partiality) situations. Each of them, it is claimed, poses a basic difficulty, to some or all of the individuals involved in them. Three types of norms, respectively, are offered as solutions to these situational problems. It is shown how, and in what sense, the adoption of these norms of social behaviour can indeed resolve the specified problems. |
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Page 26
... once a few more tread it each day , the lawn might by now be appreciably damaged , a state of affairs which is assumed , for the sake of the argument , to be repugnant to all . Similarly , one might think of the case of petty shop ...
... once a few more tread it each day , the lawn might by now be appreciably damaged , a state of affairs which is assumed , for the sake of the argument , to be repugnant to all . Similarly , one might think of the case of petty shop ...
Page 91
... once they clash , or once the need for projection arises , a rather acute and sharply defined co - ordination problem might present itself , as from a quite specific point of time and extending into the CO - ORDINATION NORMS 91.
... once they clash , or once the need for projection arises , a rather acute and sharply defined co - ordination problem might present itself , as from a quite specific point of time and extending into the CO - ORDINATION NORMS 91.
Page 170
... once it is in some sense normatively required that the status quo endure , the nature of the possible calculations and considerations of deviance funda- mentally changes : it is no longer evaluated only in terms of being ' costly ' or ...
... once it is in some sense normatively required that the status quo endure , the nature of the possible calculations and considerations of deviance funda- mentally changes : it is no longer evaluated only in terms of being ' costly ' or ...
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Common terms and phrases
absolute position achieved affairs agents alternative argument autarkic behaviour cell cerned choice of action choose co-operation co-operative goal co-ordination equilibrium co-ordination norms coercion Column-Chooser Column-Chooser's concept concerned condition confess conflict conformity considered contexts covenant Dahrendorf desert deviance deviate dilemma discussion disfavourably placed party dominant envy example existence expectations explained explicit agreement fact favoured party function game theory game-theoretical equilibrium Gauthier hence Hobbes Hobbes's Hobbesian individual interaction situation interests involved means Methodological Individualism moral mortarmen mutual non-A norms of partiality oligopolists one's ordination outcome participants pay-off PD norms PD problem PD-structured situations possible preference present Prisoners question quo of inequality Ralf Dahrendorf rational reconstruction reason recurrent co-ordination problem regard relative position represented Row-Chooser sanctions Schelling sense social choice social norms society solution solving stability stag-hunt status quo strategic move structure supposed threat tion types of norms unilateral violation W. G. Runciman zero-sum