The Emergence of NormsEdna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. The problems are such that they inhere in the structure (in the game-theoretical sense of structure) of the situations concerned. Three types of paradigmatic situations are dealt with. They are referred to as Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations; co-ordination situations; and inequality (or partiality) situations. Each of them, it is claimed, poses a basic difficulty, to some or all of the individuals involved in them. Three types of norms, respectively, are offered as solutions to these situational problems. It is shown how, and in what sense, the adoption of these norms of social behaviour can indeed resolve the specified problems. |
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Page 52
... matrices into the ' game''s complete matrix , we get 2.11 . The point to be noted about this matrix is that the outcome ( E , P ) ( bottom - left cell ) is an equilibrium . ( To be sure , its being an equilibrium was to be expected from ...
... matrices into the ' game''s complete matrix , we get 2.11 . The point to be noted about this matrix is that the outcome ( E , P ) ( bottom - left cell ) is an equilibrium . ( To be sure , its being an equilibrium was to be expected from ...
Page 79
... matrix representation of co - ordination problems . The essen- tial feature of co - ordination problems is , as we have seen , the coincidence of the parties ' interests . This feature finds its expression in the pay - off matrix of ...
... matrix representation of co - ordination problems . The essen- tial feature of co - ordination problems is , as we have seen , the coincidence of the parties ' interests . This feature finds its expression in the pay - off matrix of ...
Page 81
... matrix 3.1 , R1 - C2 in matrix 3.2 , R1 - C1 in matrix 3.3 , and R1 - C1 in matrix 3.4 are all proper equilibria . The combination R2 - C2 in matrix 3.4 , though , is an improper equilibrium . ) In general , a proper equili- brium in a ...
... matrix 3.1 , R1 - C2 in matrix 3.2 , R1 - C1 in matrix 3.3 , and R1 - C1 in matrix 3.4 are all proper equilibria . The combination R2 - C2 in matrix 3.4 , though , is an improper equilibrium . ) In general , a proper equili- brium in a ...
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Common terms and phrases
absolute position achieved affairs agents alternative argument autarkic behaviour cell cerned choice of action choose co-operation co-operative goal co-ordination equilibrium co-ordination norms coercion Column-Chooser Column-Chooser's concept concerned condition confess conflict conformity considered contexts covenant Dahrendorf desert deviance deviate dilemma discussion disfavourably placed party dominant envy example existence expectations explained explicit agreement fact favoured party function game theory game-theoretical equilibrium Gauthier hence Hobbes Hobbes's Hobbesian individual interaction situation interests involved means Methodological Individualism moral mortarmen mutual non-A norms of partiality oligopolists one's ordination outcome participants pay-off PD norms PD problem PD-structured situations possible preference present Prisoners question quo of inequality Ralf Dahrendorf rational reconstruction reason recurrent co-ordination problem regard relative position represented Row-Chooser sanctions Schelling sense social choice social norms society solution solving stability stag-hunt status quo strategic move structure supposed threat tion types of norms unilateral violation W. G. Runciman zero-sum