The Emergence of NormsEdna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. The problems are such that they inhere in the structure (in the game-theoretical sense of structure) of the situations concerned. Three types of paradigmatic situations are dealt with. They are referred to as Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations; co-ordination situations; and inequality (or partiality) situations. Each of them, it is claimed, poses a basic difficulty, to some or all of the individuals involved in them. Three types of norms, respectively, are offered as solutions to these situational problems. It is shown how, and in what sense, the adoption of these norms of social behaviour can indeed resolve the specified problems. |
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Page viii
... further cases turned up by further work are more likely to fall somewhere between two of the three paradigmatic cases than outside their range . There are many people to whom I am happy to acknowledge my debt of gratitude . While ...
... further cases turned up by further work are more likely to fall somewhere between two of the three paradigmatic cases than outside their range . There are many people to whom I am happy to acknowledge my debt of gratitude . While ...
Page 27
... further refinement is conceived as being along the following lines : Let the community of participants be denoted by C. Then , with regard to any occurrences of the dilemma in C , there is some maximal sub - set of C , say D ( for ...
... further refinement is conceived as being along the following lines : Let the community of participants be denoted by C. Then , with regard to any occurrences of the dilemma in C , there is some maximal sub - set of C , say D ( for ...
Page 102
... Further , since a state of proper equilibrium is achieved , through conformity to the norm , every one stands to lose were he to deviate alone ( i.e. were he not to conform to the norm ) . Further still , since this state is a proper co ...
... Further , since a state of proper equilibrium is achieved , through conformity to the norm , every one stands to lose were he to deviate alone ( i.e. were he not to conform to the norm ) . Further still , since this state is a proper co ...
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Common terms and phrases
absolute position achieved affairs agents alternative argument autarkic behaviour cell cerned choice of action choose co-operation co-operative goal co-ordination equilibrium co-ordination norms coercion Column-Chooser Column-Chooser's concept concerned condition confess conflict conformity considered contexts covenant Dahrendorf desert deviance deviate dilemma discussion disfavourably placed party dominant envy example existence expectations explained explicit agreement fact favoured party function game theory game-theoretical equilibrium Gauthier hence Hobbes Hobbes's Hobbesian individual interaction situation interests involved means Methodological Individualism moral mortarmen mutual non-A norms of partiality oligopolists one's ordination outcome participants pay-off PD norms PD problem PD-structured situations possible preference present Prisoners question quo of inequality Ralf Dahrendorf rational reconstruction reason recurrent co-ordination problem regard relative position represented Row-Chooser sanctions Schelling sense social choice social norms society solution solving stability stag-hunt status quo strategic move structure supposed threat tion types of norms unilateral violation W. G. Runciman zero-sum