The Emergence of NormsEdna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. The problems are such that they inhere in the structure (in the game-theoretical sense of structure) of the situations concerned. Three types of paradigmatic situations are dealt with. They are referred to as Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations; co-ordination situations; and inequality (or partiality) situations. Each of them, it is claimed, poses a basic difficulty, to some or all of the individuals involved in them. Three types of norms, respectively, are offered as solutions to these situational problems. It is shown how, and in what sense, the adoption of these norms of social behaviour can indeed resolve the specified problems. |
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Page 81
... agent would have gained had he alone acted differently . A proper equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium in the strong sense . That is , it is a combination of the agents ' chosen actions such that each agent would have lost — and not ...
... agent would have gained had he alone acted differently . A proper equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium in the strong sense . That is , it is a combination of the agents ' chosen actions such that each agent would have lost — and not ...
Page 130
... agents , is a goal G such that ( 1 ) it is in the interest of each agent that G be attained ; ( 2 ) G is attainable by none of the agents alone ; 20 In the general , n - person case , the situation turns in fact into a sequence of n - 1 ...
... agents , is a goal G such that ( 1 ) it is in the interest of each agent that G be attained ; ( 2 ) G is attainable by none of the agents alone ; 20 In the general , n - person case , the situation turns in fact into a sequence of n - 1 ...
Page 131
Edna Ullmann-Margalit. ( 3 ) G is attainable by all the agents together , given appro- priate planning and division of roles among them . An attempt by a group of agents to take joint action so as to attain a co - operative goal will be ...
Edna Ullmann-Margalit. ( 3 ) G is attainable by all the agents together , given appro- priate planning and division of roles among them . An attempt by a group of agents to take joint action so as to attain a co - operative goal will be ...
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absolute position achieved affairs agents alternative argument autarkic behaviour cell cerned choice of action choose co-operation co-operative goal co-ordination equilibrium co-ordination norms coercion Column-Chooser Column-Chooser's concept concerned condition confess conflict conformity considered contexts covenant Dahrendorf desert deviance deviate dilemma discussion disfavourably placed party dominant envy example existence expectations explained explicit agreement fact favoured party function game theory game-theoretical equilibrium Gauthier hence Hobbes Hobbes's Hobbesian individual interaction situation interests involved means Methodological Individualism moral mortarmen mutual non-A norms of partiality oligopolists one's ordination outcome participants pay-off PD norms PD problem PD-structured situations possible preference present Prisoners question quo of inequality Ralf Dahrendorf rational reconstruction reason recurrent co-ordination problem regard relative position represented Row-Chooser sanctions Schelling sense social choice social norms society solution solving stability stag-hunt status quo strategic move structure supposed threat tion types of norms unilateral violation W. G. Runciman zero-sum