U.S. Army Combat Readiness, Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee ... 89-2, May 3 and 4, 19661968 - 68 pages |
Common terms and phrases
101st Airborne Division 173d Airborne Brigade 7th Army 90 days 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION Active Army additional Admiral Sharp Airborne answer battalions believe brigades buildup cadres call the Reserves callup capability Chairman chart Chiefs of Staff CINCPAC civilian committee COMUSMACV CONARC Continental Army Command continuing Conus deleted deployed deployment enlistments Europe expansion force structure Fort Benning Fort Campbell Fort Devens FREEMAN gentlemen give going increase inductees JOHNSON Joint Chiefs KENDALL meet ment military months operations personnel priority problems question recommended replacements requested Reserve components Reserve forces Reserve units responsibility schedule Senator SALTONSTALL Senator STENNIS Senator SYMINGTON Senator THURMOND service support skills soldier South Vietnam specific statement STRAF Strategic Army Force Strategic Reserve strength subcommittee support increment support units Thank things tion train-and-retain trained manpower training centers troops U.S. Army Vietnamese Westmoreland yesterday
Popular passages
Page 43 - COMMAND Senator SALTONSTALL. Admiral, or perhaps I had better address this to Mr. Nitze: these, as far as I have come in contact, are the first CincPac orders that have come down in the new regime through the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the CincPac commander. How has it worked? Secretary NITZE. This has been the practice for some period of time. Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, we organized that, as I remember it, 2 years ago; isn't that correct? Secretary NITZE. I think so. Admiral...
Page 30 - Mr. KENDALL. General, Senator Cannon asked me to ask you whether or not it was still your recommendation that the Army Reserve units or any portion thereof be called to active duty. General JOHNSON. Not at the present time. The reason is that we are now over the low hump of shortage of units, and are restoring units at a rapid rate because of the availability of trained manpower. I should qualify that and say that we could use some special skills that exist in the Reserves, technical skills, such...
Page 59 - What did it feel was the best course to pursue ? General JOHNSON. I have in the record yesterday, sir, that I have recommended and have been a party to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations that the Reserves be called. I also pointed out yesterday, however, that the calling of the Reserves, which would have reduced the turbulance in the Active Army, would have transferred that turbulence to the civilian sector of the society, with the disruption of the Reserve officers and men from their civilian...
Page 23 - Yes, sir. General, back to one statement you made. Did I understand you to say that we have enough strength and mobility in Vietnam to keep the enemy from concentrating strength enough to be a threat to our major units? General JOHNSON. In my judgment we can. By major units I mean forces of battalion size and larger. Xow there are going to be cases when there will be smaller units, such as companies perhaps operating independently, and one of them could get into trouble. But I believe that our battalions...
Page 18 - ... identified here. What is your pleasure in handling this? General JOHNSON. I would be prepared to take the list of units and to provide for the record the information as to when they were provided in relation to the time that they were requested. Mr. KENDALL. Secretary McNamara has already provided us with that information. [Deleted.] Is that accurate ? Mr. Smith? Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir. General JOHNSON. Then I fail to see the purpose of the question. Mr. KENDALL. The question is simply this, General....
Page 57 - ... has come to pass. Senator SYMINGTON. Are you saying that if you took a man who had experience in the Reserves in the military, that you would not have a better unit than if you drafted a man off the streets and put him into the unit? General JOHNSON. We have not drafted a man off the streets and put him into a unit for the purpose of functioning in that unit until he has completed his training. The individuals that we would get from the Reserves in a high proportion of the cases and in the units...
Page 30 - Berlin callup, the man who was out of the active service longest was the first called back, and frequently an individual with appreciable service came back in, whereas the individual who may have served only 6 months was not called up. Because of the after effects of the Berlin callup, our present plan is to call up the man who has the last service first. Unfortunately least service equates with less skill, so that we wouldn't gain a whole lot with a proviso that we call up the least skilled man...
Page 24 - When he hasn't got an assurance of success he fades away and avoids contact. Mr. KENDALL. Going back to the STRAF forces, General, it is true, isn't it, that in order to meet the requirements for combat, combat support and service support personnel needed in Vietnam without calling Reserves, substantial numbers of personnel had to be taken from existing combat units of STRAF ? General JOHNSON. Yes, sir. DEPLOYABILITY OF FORCES PEACETIME VERSUS EMERGENCY Mr. KENDALL. How many divisions do you feel...
Page 17 - December 31 of this year 1,193,000 trained men." That is your buildup. Now, if you have 230,000 men over in Vietnam, that leaves you a trained force elsewhere in the world of 963,000 men. In your opinion, General Johnson, is that sufficient trained manpower in our Army to take care of all our needs that you can foresee? General JOHNSON. In my judgment, as best I can foresee the international climate, that is adequate to meet our force requirements worldwide at the present time. Senator SALTONSTALL.
Page 24 - Airborne, for example, can get out in that jungle and stay for [deleted] days without anybody coming near them. They carry their water and they carry their supplies on their backs. And they are operating I think very, very well ; but it is a game of hide and seek to an appreciable degree. When you go back to the Communist doctrine, this is his doctrine. When he hasn't got an assurance of success he fades away and avoids contact.