Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion In International ConflictHow is trust built in international politics? In this book, Aaron M. Hoffman argues that conventional arguments fail to account for two factors governments fear and wish to protect themselves from: domination by outside parties and political competition from internal parties. He argues that trusting relationships emerge in response to agreements that insulate governments from these worst-case scenarios by guaranteeing them voice in collective decisions and offering them concessions designed to mollify potential internal opposition. Using case studies that explore the formation of the United States, the development of the European Community, and negotiations over water resources in the Middle East, Hoffman shows that trusting relationships can only be built with the development of institutional mechanisms designed to reduce the consequences of betrayal. |
Contents
The Problem of Trust in International Relations | 1 |
A Conceptual Analysis | 16 |
Three Theories | 37 |
The Evolution of Trusting Relationships Among | 55 |
Institutional Design | 81 |
Trusting Relationships Scarce Resources and | 110 |
Overcoming Suspicion in International Relations | 136 |
Notes | 155 |
| 183 | |
| 203 | |
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Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict Aaron M. Hoffman No preview available - 2006 |
Common terms and phrases
actors American argue Articles of Confederation behavior chapter coal and steel Commission conflict Congress congressional Constitution convention cooperation Council counterparts created delegate control discretion disputes domestic political ECSC edited effective voice efforts entrust their interests European Council example exploitation Farrand favor fear federal framers France Germany group decisions Hardin High Authority identity-based implement important incremental institutions interactions international relations Israel and Jordan Israeli Israeli and Palestinian Israeli-Jordanian issues Jordan River Jordanian leaders member-states Middle East monitoring negotiations nontrusting Oslo oversight Palestinian peace process potential trustees Prisoner's Dilemma problem proportional representation proposals protect rely risk rivals rules self-interest shared Single European Act Social strategies suspicion suspicious parties theory tion tional Treaty of Paris trusting relations trusting relationships trustors trustworthiness United University Press veto voice in group voting water agreement water resources West Bank Yarmouk Yarmouk Rivers York