conforms to the decree of the Court of Private Land Claims and can issue no patent save in conformance to the approved survey.

The land in question was part of the territory purchased by the United States from Mexico by the Gadsden Treaty. The Court of Private Land Claims, created by the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 854) to adjudicate titles of private land within this territory, found that title to the Santa Teresa Grant was valid, the tract being designated in the decree by area and by recital of three natural boundaries, one being the Rio Grande as it ran in 1853. A survey was made which was approved by the court on June 14, 1904. The survey purported to designate the course of the Rio Grande as of 1853, and thereby included an area of land subsequently determined to be in Texas (New Mexico v. Texas, 283 U. S. 788; 276 U. S. 558; 276 U. S. 557; 275 U. S. 279), and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Private Land Claims. Other errors involving larger areas are alleged to be apparent in the approved survey which, together with the errors in the location of the river, resulted in a loss of approximately 60 per cent of the area of the original grant as described in the decree. However, over the objection of the State of Texas and at the request of the then claimants to the Santa Teresa Grant, a patent was issued on August 16, 1909, to the land described in the approved survey. No appeal was taken from the decision of the court either as to the decree or as to the approval of the survey.

The land alleged to have been erroneously excluded from the survey is now held as public domain by the Government. The appellant seeks to have a resurvey according to the decree and to have patent issued to it for such land, now in the public domain, which by the resurvey may prove to be part of the Santa Teresa Grant.

In support of its request, the appellant contends:

1. That title vested in the claimants to the Santa Teresa Grant by the decree of the court to the area described in the decree as being within well defined and ascertainable natural boundaries, as against the Government, regardless of any survey;

2. That the survey approved by the court was not in conformance with its decree; and

3. That the General Land Office has authority to correct the alleged errors by making the survey conform to the decree.

This appeal can be disposed of by answering the third contention of the appellant. It is generally true, as contended by the appellant, that the General Land Office has the right to correct Government surveys after patent has been issued, and that courts do not have this right. Stoneroad v. Stoneroad (158 U. S. 240); Russell v. Maxwell Land Grant Co. (158 U. S. 253); Adam v. Norris (103 U. S. 591). However, Congress, in the exercise of its authority over public land, expressly provided the procedure for correcting surveys of

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land within the jurisdiction of the Court of Private Land Claims. Sections 7 and 10 of the act of March 3, 1891, wherein such provisions were made, are in part as follows:

Sec. 7. The said court shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions arising in cases before it relative to the title to the land the subject of such case, the extent, location, and boundaries thereof, and other matters connected therewith fit and proper to be heard and determined, and by a final decree to settle and determine the question of the validity of the title and the boundaries of the grant or claim presented for adjudication,

*

Sec. 10. That whenever any decision of confirmation shall become final, the clerk of the court in which the final decision shall be had shall certify that fact to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, with a copy of the decree of confirmation, which shall plainly state the location, boundaries, and area of the tract confirmed. The said Commissioner shall thereupon without delay cause the tract so confirmed to be surveyed at the cost of the United States. * and the said court shall thereupon determine if the said survey is in substantial accordance with the decree of confirmation. If found to be correct, the court shall direct its clerk to indorse upon the face of the plat its approval. If found to be incorrect, the court shall return the same for correction in such particulars as it shall direct. When any survey is finally approved by the court, it shall be returned to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, who shall as soon as may be cause a patent to be issued thereon to the confirmee. (Italics supplied.)

The duties of the Commissioner of the General Land Office under this act were considered in the case of Ely's Administrators v. Magee (34 L. D. 506), where it was held that his sole duty was to issue a patent according to the approved survey. This decision was followed in the Santa Teresa Grant case (37 L. D. 480), which case concerned the grant now in question. It was held that the Commissioner was without authority to pass on the validity and extent of the survey, the sole duty being to issue a patent. That position was urged by the then claimants of the Santa Teresa Grant, who must necessarily have been the appellant's predecessors in interest. The Department, in adopting their contentions, said:

The act of March 3, 1891, invested the Court of Private Land Claims with exclusive jurisdiction, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, to determine as to the validity, extent and boundaries of Mexican and Spanish grants in the States and Territories named in the act, so far as concerns the interest of the United States. (Ainsa v. New Mexico and Arizona Railroad Company, 175 U. S., 76, 80.)

The Commissioner has no power to determine as to the correctness of that survey, or to adjudicate and determine any question whatever. His duties are purely ministerial. He is required to transmit the survey to the court immediately upon the receipt thereof with or without objections thereto, and it is the exclusive province of the court to determine if said survey is in substantial accordance with the decree of confirmation and any objections filed thereto.

This interpretation carries out the manifest intention of the act. The court there created was empowered not only to determine the validity of titles but to determine that the surveys conformed to its decrees. Errors were subject to correction by appeal and no authority was given to the General Land Office to correct or change surveys once approved by the court.

A Federal case, in a situation analogous to the one at hand, supports the conclusion reached by the Department: United States v. Peralta (99 Fed. 618, 102 Fed. 1006). A petition was filed with the court demanding that the Government convey land in accordance with a decree of confirmation of a Spanish and Mexican land grant. A patent had been issued in accordance with a survey approved by the court, but which the petitioner alleged was not in conformance with the court's decree. The court held that the approval of the survey by the court was a final adjudication of the petitioner's right, saying:

In the Fossat or Quicksilver Mine Case, 2 Wall. 649, 712, 17 L. Ed. 739, objections were made to the survey and location on the ground, among others, that the proceedings under the act of 1860 were not judicial, but purely execu tive and ministerial. It was therefore contended that the appeal from the order or the decree of the district court regulating the survey and location ought not to be entertained, because the court could only determine the validity of the grant, leaving its survey and location to the executive department of the government. Mr. Justice Nelson, in delivering the opinion of the court, in reply to these propositions said:

"We need only refer to the opinion of this court in the present case the second time it was before us, as presenting a conclusive refutation of these several positions. The fundamental error in the argument is in assuming that the survey and location of the land confirmed are not proceedings under the control of the court rendering the decree, and hence not a part of the judicial action of the court. These proceedings are simply in execution of the decree, which execution is as much the duty of the court, and as much within its competency, as the hearing of the cause and the rendition of its judgment, as much so as the execution of any other judgment or decree rendered by the court. This power has been exercised by the court ever since the Spanish and French land claims were placed under its jurisdiction.

The statutes empowering the court to approve surveys in that case the act of March 3, 1851, as amended-were less explicit as to the power of the court than was the act of March 3, 1891.

The case of Hugh Stephenson, or Brazito Grant (36 L. D. 117) is not authority for the contention of the appellant that the General Land Office may change an approved survey. All that case held was that the General Land Office could resurvey the boundaries of a Congressional grant which antedated a decree of the Court of Private Land Claims concerning an adjoining tract, where there was a conflict in the boundaries of the two tracts. Inasmuch as the Court of Private Land Claims had no jurisdiction over land

already disposed of by Congress, a resurvey of the Congressional grant was not in derogation of the jurisdiction of that court. See United States v. Baca (184 U. S. 653).

It appears that the Court of Private Land Claims ceased to exist on June 30, 1904, under the act of March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 1144). In accordance with this act, the papers and records of the court were to be returned to the Department of the Interior. From this it might be argued that the Department took over the functions of the court. However, no such provision was made in the statute, nor was any provision made whereby the Department was to act in an appellate capacity as to matters theretofore adjudicated by the court. But granting that the Department had authority either as the court or in an appellate capacity, nevertheless, because no appeal was taken from the approval of the survey, the matter became res judicata. United States v. Peralta, supra.

The two departmental decisions above cited distinctly hold that the Department is without jurisdiction to question a survey approved by the Court of Private Land Claims. These decisions are in line with adjudicated cases, and in the absence of conflicting authorities, the departmental decisions are controlling in this case.

Even if the Department had authority, irrespective of the act of March 3, 1891, to go behind surveys approved by the court, which it has not, it would seem proper to refuse the demands of the appellant because of laches. The survey was approved in 1904; patent was issued in 1909; no objection was made until 1933, although the alleged deficiencies in the area of the survey were apparent on the face of it from the day of its approval. See Williams v. United States (92 U. S. 457). Cf. Peralta v. California (182 Fed. 755).

Nor could the appellant's contention that title was vested in its predecessors in interest irrespective of any survey aid it if such contention could be considered in this appeal. The appellant's predecessors in interest did not appeal from the approval of the survey and were active in seeking issuance of a patent in accordance with that survey, although the facts as to the alleged deficiency in area were then as apparent as now, the patent issued to them stating that it conveyed an area of 8,478.51 acres, whereas the appellant alleges that the area should be 17,755 acres, and the facts as to the location of the Rio Grande as of 1853 were then ascertainable and were then known to be in dispute. Long acquiescence in title or patent effectively bars relief. Williams v. United States (92 U. S. 457) ; United States v. Hancock (133 U. S. 193); Sanchez v. Deering (270 U. S. 227).

In view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office must be and it is hereby Affirmed.

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