2 NORTHCROSS v. MEMPHIS CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION

In

Section 718 tracks the wording of § 204 (b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3 (b), which provides that, in an action seeking to enforce Title II of that Act, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400 (1968), we held that, under $ 204 (b). "one who succeeds in obtaining an injunction under that Title should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id., at 402. The similarity of language in § 718 and § 204 (b) is, of course, a strong indication that the two statutes should be interpreted pari passu. Moreover, "the two provisions share a common raison d'etre. The plaintiffs in school cases are 'private attorneys general' vindicating national policy in the same sense as are plaintiffs in Title II actions. The enactment of both provisions was for the same purpose-'to encourage individuals injured. by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief. . . Johnson v. Combs, F. 2d (CA5 1972). quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.. supra, at 402. We therefore conclude that, as with § 204 (b), if other requirements of $ 718 are satisfied, the successful plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Since it is impossible for us to determine whether the Court of Appeals applied this standard and, if so, whether it did so correctly, we grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment below msofar as it relates to the denial of costs and attorneys' fees, and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent

·

is clear that the petitions for rehearing en banc were denied as untimely, there is no indication that the bill of costs was filed out of time, or that costs and attorney's fees were demed for that reason

24-626 O-74-34

NORTHCROSS v. MEMPHIS CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION 3

with this opinion. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U. S. 191 (1972); cf. California v. Krivda, 409 U. S. 33 (1972).

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL did not participate in the consideration or disposition of this case.

2 We need not, and therefore do not, decide whether § 718 authorizes an award of attorneys' fees insofar as those expenses were incurred prior to the date that that section came into effect. We also do not decide whether, and under what circumstances, an award of attorneys' fees is permissible in suits brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the absence of specific statutory authorization for such an award. See Knight v. Auciello, 453 F 2d 852, (CA1 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F 2d 143 (CA5 1971).

CASES ADJUDGED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 1972

HALL ET AL. v. COLE

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 72-630. Argued March 21, 1973-Decided May 21, 1973

Respondent, expelled from his union for deliberate and malicious vilification of union management following his resolutions unsuccessfully condemning that management's alleged undemocratic actions and shortsighted policies, regained his union membership in a suit under § 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and was awarded $5,500 in legal fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held:

1. Respondent's suit under § 102 of the LMRDA vindicated not only his own rights of free speech guaranteed by the statute but furthered the interests of the union and its members as well. As a result, the award to respondent of attorneys' fees under these circumstances comported with the trial court's inherent equitable power of making such an award whenever "overriding considerations indicate the need for such a recovery." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 391–392. Pp. 4-9.

2. The allowance of counsel fees to the successful plaintiff in a suit brought under § 102 is not precluded by that statutory provision and, indeed, is supported by the legislative history of the LMRDA. Pp. 9-14.

3. Under all the facts of the case, the District Court did not

1

2

OCTOBER TERM, 1972

Opinion of the Court

412 U.S.

abuse its discretion in awarding counsel fees to respondent. Pp. 1+15.

462 F. 2d 777, affirmed.

BRENNAN. J.. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and DOUGLAS. STEWART, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. WHITE, J.. filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST. J., joined, post, p. 16. MARSHALL. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Howard Schulman argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.

Burton H. Hall argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.*

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to consider the propriety of an award of counsel fees to a successful plaintiff in a suit brought under § 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 523, 29 U. S. C. § 412. On August 6. 1962. at a regular meeting of the membership of petitioner Seafarers International Union of North America-Atlantic. Gulf. Lakes and Inland Waters District. respondent introduced a set of resolutions alleging various instances of undemocratic actions and shortsighted policies on the part of union officers.

*J. Albert Wol. Laurence Goid, and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urgmg reversal.

Melvin L. Wu and Sanjord J. Rosen filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

1 Section 102 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. S 412, provides in pertinent part:

"Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate."

1

HALL v. COLE

Opinion of the Court

3

The resolutions were defeated and, on November 26, 1962, respondent was expelled from the union on the ground that his presentation of the resolutions violated a union rule proscribing "deliberate or malicious vilification with regard to the execution or the duties of any office or job." After exhausting his intra-union remedies, respondent filed this suit under § 102 of the LMRDA, claiming that his expulsion under these circumstances violated his right of free speech as secured by § 101 (a)(2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 411 (a)(2).2

On May 27, 1964, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a temporary injunction restoring respondent's membership in the union, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 339 F. 2d 881 (1965). Some five years later, the case came on for trial and the District Court, finding a violation of respondent's rights under 101 (a)(2), ordered him permanently reinstated to membership in the union and, although denying respondent's damages claims.' granted him counsel fees in * the sum of $5,500 against the union. The Court of

2 Section 101 (a) (2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 411 (a) (2), provides: "Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions: and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertainmg to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations."

In its unreported opinion, the District Court found that respondent "suffered no loss of wages as a result of his expulsion from the union." And although respondent "was deprived of his right