Public reports state that the Council did not approve the latest price increase by the auto industry. The absence of any implied or explicit approval would free the Council and the Administration to take a number of initiatives promptly which would have a salutary impact, if not in the instant case, then for deterring future similar actions. May I suggest three courses:

First, the government should make a public statement detailing the reasons for your afore-mentioned comment in early December and your statement to General Motors executives about "remarkable profitability" making possible an inflationary wage settlement. Such statements are essential for popular understanding of the inflationary process and the powers that beget it. Such communication to the people would contribute much to public awareness and a firmer government commitment to hold down unjustified price increases. Too much cannot be made of the need for the Council to balance private policy of tete-a-tete with big industry with a recognition of a vigorous educational and informative role.

Second, the government should request the auto industry to release its raw cost data and analysis before it attempts to saddle the consumer with inflated prices for alleged safety features. Unless this disclosure is made, the progress toward safer automobiles can be jeopardized by gluttonous price increases. Here lives, not just dollars, are at stake. When it comes to safety, the chrome curtain of secrecy must be swept aside. There is nothing like open facts to instill greater self-restraint in corporate councils.

Third, the government should urge publicly, with ample justification and analysis, the auto companies to roll back their January 1 price increase voluntary. Several foreign manufacturers, with lower relative price increases in September, did not increase prices January 1 and still adhered to the required installation of shoulder harnesses. Why should the most profitable auto industry in the world be permitted to do so without a firm expression of public disapproval and exhortation by the federal government? Is this to much to ask from the representatives of all the people?

Sincerely,

RALPH NADER.

ОСТОВЕР 4, 1967.

Hon. ALAN S. BOYD,

Secretary of Transportation,
Department of Transportation,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SECRETARY BOYD: In the August 27, 1967 issue of the Los Angeles Times, Mr. Lee Iacocca, Vice President of Ford Motor Co., is quoted in an interview as saying "Our 1969 cars are done." Almost 6 weeks later, the National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB) still has not issued its proposed safety standards for the 1969 models on sale next September. Clearly, the Bureau is heading into the same situation as last year when the auto industry "lead time" argument was employed to bludgeon the proposed standards into their final version of largely cosmetic symbols. Whatever may have been the reason for this performance regarding the 1968 models, there is far less reason for a repeat performance this year. The Bureau has had more times, more staff and more experience; yet it has procastinated itself into a time problem similar to last year. The auto companies show no sign of displeasure at this state of affairs. They know that each month of delay by the Bureau means less stringent standards for the next model year.

Mr. Iacocca's statement is representative of similar remarks made by other auto company officials.

The Bureau is facing the prospect of rubberstamping what the industry decides to do. Once again, it appears likely that reasonable safety features will not be adopted because of a delay which seems explainable only by a sheer lack of planning or a poor sense of priorities in the allocation of Bureau manpower and leadership.

These safety features are not exotic or futuristic in nature. Indeed, most of them represent a minor challenge to engineers of a generation ago. Their need is documented; they have long been within the state of the engineering art, but their adoptions have been sacrificed by a manufacturing value system which, hopefully, was to have been overridden when the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act was enacted in September 1966. These features include:

Head restraints (to minimize or prevent neck injuries).

Rupture-resistant fuel tanks able to resist side and rear collisions of substantial impact leading to fire (in addition to front collisions nominally covered by the present ridiculous standard for 1968 models).

Flammability standards for vehicle upholstery and carpentry etc. to reduce the risk of fire, melting and the issuance of toxic gases.

Curbing the fully tinted windshield which decreases light transmittance. Requirements for structural strength of passenger compartments in lateral and roll-over collisions (to end the gross weakness of such structures as embodied in the Volkswagen and hardtop models).

Establishing minimum vehicle handling characteristics.

More stringent and broader braking standards.

Stronger tire standards (Consumers Union has noted that the standards for 1968 vehicles are in some respects weaker even than the industry (Rubber Manufacturers Assn.) standards).

Stronger seat anchorages (permitting seat belts to be part of a unitized seat structure instead of the present situation where the seat cannot take the load of the belt-a fact admitted privately by company engineers).

Installation of rear bumpers (or equivalent performance) on trucks to prevent the shearing off phenomenon when rear-ending cars slide under thereby turning their windshields into bumpers. This simple feature has been neglected for years by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Defroster and defogger for rear windows.

Standardized controls and signals.

A refurbished Standard 201 for interior occupant protection.

Prohibition of hood ornaments and sharp external metal which aggravates tens of thousands of pedestrian injuries annually.

These are a few of the features which people have a right to expect for the 1969 models as a result of government safety administration. There is serious doubt whether these expectations will be met, even substantially met.

The Bureau and its immediate superior, the Federal Highway Administration, could benefit from a closer scrutiny by the office of the Secretary of Transportation. The gravity of the auto safety mission deserves nothing less.

More specifically, I wish to take this opportunity to point out some of the more persistent deficiencies in policy and approach plaguing the FHA and NHSE in the administration and enforcement of the auto safety law. These deficiencies remain the burden of the agencies, notwithstanding the omnipresent representations by the auto companies, their collusive trade association-the Automobile Manufacturers Association-and its Washington law firm of Wilmer Cutler and Pickering. There is far too great a solicitude displayed toward the auto industry whose capability, if suitably spurred, the government continually underestimates in the area of safety. This solicitude comes at the expense of adequate concern for those to be protected by the law-the millions of motorists. In a word, the FHA-NHSB consistently play to the auto industry gallery. FHA-NHSB is eager to accede to auto industry requests that they engage in a private "dialogue" behind closed doors to decide goals and policies toward safety standards, while the dialogue with consumers and the service to consumers remain in abject neglect. A number of illustrations should serve to etch both sides of this deplorable posture more clearly.

1. Repeatedly, the NHSB has refrained from demanding that the auto companies back up their objections to the standards with hard data and reasoning. It goes without saying that the technical input from the companies in the past year has been heavy in tonnage and light in relevant content. The thousands of pages of so-called engineering submissions comprise a massive technical whine conveyed via a powerfully functioning political transmitter. One searches these pages in vain to find solidly grounded determinations of why the standards cannot be met and when they can be met. As if in a self-indictment of incompetence, the auto companies appeared to be trying to surpass one another in walking backwards along the party line that reiterates all that cannot be done and nothing of what can be done. The foreign manufacturers were taught a practical lesson by the domestic companies. It was summed up by one importer: "Why meet the proposed standards when you can beat them?" Apparently, a number of importers were in the process of meeting the more stringent of the proposed standards before the matter was rendered moot.

2. In August, it was revealed that General Motors had sent to the NHSB a film clip showing certain abrasive effects of shoulder harnesses on dummies. This action was hailed with words of praise by safety officials in your Department. The fact that the film was misleading in its use of an experimental, non-standard harness belt loosely fastened, to cite one deception, and that no data or graphs accompanied the film did not deter the accolades. Moreover, at the time GM produced the film, the company was publicly displaying in the lobby of its Detroit headquarters an electrically operated board showing the superiority of the lap and shoulder belt combination under the heading: "Engineering Tests Prove the Value of the GM Lap and Shoulder Belts." Certainly, technical communications from the industry to government should be encouraged, but deceptive and undocumented information designed to defer the mandatory installation of what auto officials contemptuously refer to as "spaghetti" is scarcely deserved of praise. The GM film has done damage to public confidence in these belts whose safety advantages are asserted by a wide variety of specialists, as well as Volvo's and other companies' statistical data from actual accidents. General Motors could have performed a real public service had it transmitted films to the Bureau which showed that the upper door posts and the seats in its cars cannot take the load of seat belts in a crash and, additionally, that its hardtop models give less protection to occupants in side and rollover collisions than four door sedans with upper center posts. Such contributions are not forthcoming. For GM appears to be more willing to undermine the attempts of government to require a major safety feature that the company considers unsightly. How less unsightly would these combination beltharnesses be if GM management permitted its engineers to build an inertial reel system that, among other more important advantages, would have included a safer stowage design, with added convenience.

3. Turning to the consumer information policy of the Bureau, it has done virtually nothing in the areas authorized or permitted by the statute. As the Bureau is nearing its 13th month of operation, there still has been no publication of vehicle defects reported by the manufacturer so that citizens or groups can request a copy for their use. These defect lists should be periodically compiled and issued in a booklet for use by car owners, accident investigators, fleet operators, etc. Simply keeping these defect notifications on open file at the Bureau does little to encourage discussion and use of such information throughout the country.

Nothing has been accomplished to implement Sec. 112(d) of the law authorizing the Bureau to require the manufacturers to inform at the point of sale car buyers of the safety performance levels achieved by their vehicles. Until this is done, the car buyer cannot compare the safety of competing vehicle makes and models. Without such information, the marketplace cannot perform its tasks of rewarding the safer product and providing real incentives for lagging manufacturers to upgrade quickly their less safe features. Putting Sec. 112(d) to work is one of many efforts which require no large staff, or funds, to get underway and maintain.

On another front, an important policy of the law is to make greater utilization of the individual inventive genius than that accorded by an oligopolistic industry. Inventors abound in the automotive field. Many of their creations are quite impracticable, but history has shown us the results when an atmosphere of receptiveness permits the few inventions to find their way to application. And as a recent Department of Commerce report concluded, the lone inventor has played and continues to play a very important role in the development of major innovations-contrary to what corporate brochures would have us believe. Unfortunately, there is no indication that the Bureau has given any thought or planning effort to establishing a section that evaluates inventions which are brought to its attention.

4. The FHA-NHSB have shown little enthusiasm toward a statutory requirement to develop experimental safety cars. After much prodding from Congress, the Bureau finally sent out requests for proposals to design, build and test prototype safety cars. But the lukewarm attitude of FHA-NHSB is shown by its utter failure to appeal the appropriation cut by the House in the funds for auto safety research when the matter came up before the Senate Appropriations Committee. As is well known, New York State has begun a prototype safety car program which is subcontracted to Republic Aviation. The entire project, from design to construction and testing (with all data in the public domain) of some 15 prototype cars, is estimated by state officials to be $5 million. The program has limped

along for two years on a budget of approximately $350,000 a year in state funds, but its published material already qualitatively dwarfs anything produced by the $25 billion auto industry on vehicle design safety.

There are some federal officials who react negatively to government entering the prototype vehicle area (excepting the civilian supersonic transport plane whose budget for next year may be threefold greater than Bureau funds for reducing the 53,000 dead and over 4 million injured on highways every year). These officials distinguish tax funds for the SST and tax funds for prototype electric or safety cars on the grounds that the auto industry is economically and technically capable of doing the latter. I believe the issue is not whether the auto industry is capable of building such cars, but whether it is willing to do so. The issue is also one of non-partisan and non-partial release of technical information to the public arena which can be resolved in the public's favor by a government sponsored technical capability. The past record of the industry's profitable technological stagnation and stylistic mania, coupled with the daily highway toll, forcefully argue for shedding this bias against government in prototype development. Too much is at stake.

5. The language and legislative history of the Act clearly show Congressional concern over the condition of used vehicles. The Bureau has been working on the problem of issuing standards for used cars. But no action appears to be contemplated for recalling older vehicles having defects. This is deplorable. For the next few years, these vehicles will constitute a major portion of the overall vehicle population. Permitting their defects to go uncorrected is obviously just as serious as would be permitting defects in new cars to go uncorrected. The logic behind the latter and former class of vehicles is the same. There is no dearth of such defects already publicly known and a Bureau investigation would uncover others known to their manufacturers. The 1960-1963 Corvairs, with their rearend breakaway tendency, could be recalled and modified for added stability at an estimated cost of labor and materials not exceeding $20 per vehicle. A report by Suspensions International, Inc. (11 Middle Drive, Manhasset, L.I., N.Y. 11030) shows how this could be done. Two vehicle specialists, Derwyn Severy and Thomas Manos, believe these Corvairs place an unreasonable strain on the driving task. The vehicle's instability increases, moreover, with age. Similar need for modification exists for the Volkswagen's instability. Another defect which has gone uncorrected affects the 1963 Ford truck, series 600. A basic design defect existed in the method of holding the wheel to the hub, whereby no provision was made to prevent the relative rotation of the wheels to the hub except the friction that existed between the wheel nuts and the wheel. This type of defect leads to wheel loosening or coming off. (Incidentally, both Ford and General Motors chose to misinterpret Senator Ribicoff's request of April 5, 1966, to furnish his Subcommittee with a list of "product or equipment defect or failure since 1960" as meaning only passenger cars. Consequently, there is no public record of truck and bus defects and recall campaigns.)

6. The FHA-NHSB has been overly solicitous of the economic wails of the industry-whose profit (after taxes) on investment is about double the average of American industry. Lead time can be shortened by candor, (the lack of which accounts for much exaggeration of required lead time) extra effort, and a sliver of those swollen profits. Perhaps the economic sensitivity of the Bureau is nourished by the apparent ease with which the auto companies can increase their prices, then publicly attribute much of it unjustifiably to the safety features (never to the very costly style changes) and exploit a consumer resentment that can be turned against the Government's safety bureau. It is time to clarify the Bureau's policies here and to come out boldly for meaningful safety innovation yearly. This commitment would entail requesting raw cost data from the industry, particularly since auto officials have stated their desire for cost to be taken into account in setting standards that are reasonable. This commitment would also entail paying serious attention to other costs-such as the dead, injured and destruction of property-in deciding the formula for each year's standards.

In this regard, it would be well to recall the recent Federal Aviation Administration's announcement of passenger safety rules. These rules were issued with the full knowledge that total aircraft seat space may be reduced 4% with consequent loss of airline revenue. The Deputy FAA Administrator Clifford Walker is quoted as saying: "I put no dollar sign on this. It's a program to save the lives of passengers." Fewer lives have been lost in U.S. commercial aviation's "survivable accidents" during the past 6 years than are lost in two days on the

highway. How much more necessary is it then for the Bureau to jettison its lurking fear of ever so slightly disturbing the "economics" of the auto industry. How refreshing it would be to hear a FHA official say: "We put no dollar sign on this. It's a program to save the lives of motorists."

7. This brings me to a final point. The entire legislative history of the auto safety law, together with its unanimous passage through Congress, indicate that an important educational and inspirational effort is incumbent upon the leaders of the Bureau and the Federal Highway Administration. (The Food and Drug Commissioner's approach in his first year of activity and the vigor with which NASA's programs are promoted are instructive here.) It is the mission of FHANHSB officials, when delivering addresses around the country, to hold up the auto industry to higher standards of performance, to criticize the industry's laggardness where needed, to begin articulating for the people new values, expectations and roles in their response toward motor vehicle engineering and safety. A more informed consumer is a more discriminating one with a critical ability to reject the wasteful or dangerous designs now confronting him, often at extra cost. A more informed consumer gives new life and momentum to the marketplace's crucial function of disciplining producers toward higher quality performance. The fact that the auto companies have been unwilling to give consumers meaningful product information indicates their interest is greater in a controlled market than a free market whose preconditions are product choice and information on which to make that choice intelligently.

It should be the eager task of FHA-NHSB officials to help describe a scenario of the immediate and more distant engineering innovations for motor vehicle safety. How can people demand and appreciate safety features if they are not appraised of their existence or their ready development? (anti-skid braking systems for example). Manufacturers will feel compelled to respond more quickly to a consuming public of rising expectations and sharper critical faculties. This is an old, basic and non-coercive function of government as evidenced by numerous Government Printing Office publications developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and other agencies.

Instead of devoting portions of their addresses to these themes, FHA-NHSB officials have been peeling forth largely dreary, barren speeches on traffic safety designed to stimulate or discomfort no one and thereby be productive of little more than a string of platitudes. The Administrator of the NHSB has given the same speech so often-it is called the "three phases speech" by the oftafflicted-that one wonders why he has chosen to say so little, such as to insurance audiences about their important role and responsibility for helping to bring about safer cars; to University audiences about the need to inspire students to view traffic safety as an exciting frontier, at least as worthy of their talents on graduation as are space or defense-related jobs; to engineering audiences about their obligation to foster a free and open technical literature unfettered by industry controls and self-imposed anticipatory restraints; to consumer audiences about the need for a consumer constituency which takes an active part in the standards setting process and in monitoring the activities of industry groups by way of balancing the pressures on government. Judging from his statements prior to his appointment, the Administrator is well equipped to be an effective spokesman for these important issues.

I want to thank you for whatever consideration you may give to the above comments.

Sincerely yours,

RALPH NADER. JANUARY 16, 1968.

DEAR MR. BRIDWELL: With the beginning of the New Year, it is appropriate to express candidly some major concerns about the manner in which the auto safety program has been handled or neglected during the first 16 months of its operation.

An important index by which to measure the failure of the auto safety program to take on the urgency of a prime national mission, which the annual death of some 53,000 and injury of over 42 million entitle it tragically to become, is the amount of resources allocated. Last year, the Administration's request