Personal IdentityPersonal Identity is a comprehensive introduction to the nature of the self and its relation to the body. Harold Noonan places the problem of personal identity in the context of more general puzzles about identity, discussing the major historical theories and more recent debates. The second edition of Personal Identity contains a new chapter on 'animalism' and a new section on vagueness. |
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Contents
1 An Initial Survey | 1 |
2 Locke | 24 |
3 Leibniz Butler and Reid | 46 |
4 Hume | 63 |
5 Identity and Personal Identity | 84 |
6 Identity and Determinacy | 103 |
7 The Reduplication Problem | 125 |
8 QuasiMemory | 141 |
9 Parfit and What Matters in Survival | 160 |
10 The Self and the Future | 175 |
11 Persons Animals and Human Beings | 192 |
12 Against the Closest Continuer Theory | 210 |
228 | |
233 | |
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Common terms and phrases
A-body person accept according account of personal animal apparent memory argues best candidate biological theorist Bodily Criterion body brain transplant brain zap Brown Brownson cerebrum chapter claim closest continuer theory Complex View concept concern consciousness course criterion of personal defender definitely true denotation deny determinately diachronic identity distinct entity Essay existence explain fact fission fission products four-dimensional Fregean Hume Hume’s idea imagine indeterminacy Locke Locke’s M-type causal chain matters in survival Mekon merely Methuselah Nozick one’s original person Parfit Parfit’s thesis Parfitian survivor past action perceptions person-stages personal identity persons perdure philosophers plank-hoarder’s ship possible present principle problem proponent Psychological Continuity Criterion psychologically identical puzzle quasi-memory quasi-remembering question Reductionism Reduplication Argument regard reject relation remember seems sense ship of Theseus Shoemaker Shoemaker’s Simple View situation someone statements sufficient condition suppose teletransportation temporal things thinking substance thought Transplant Intuition want my dinner Williams Williams’s argument xxvii