sentiments of the demerit of sin, that accompany different degrees of wickedness on the one hand, or different degrees of holiness and purity on the other. It was observed already, that we ourselves, guilty and corrupt as we are, can see a great deal of evil in the sins of others, when passion or self-interest gives us no bias in their favours; but that, where self-love influences us, our views change, though the objects be the same. Besides this, it is useful to observe, how some extraordinary outrageous sinners, (as the most cruel murderers, and the like,) can make the most atrocious crimes so familiar to them by custom, that they seem scarce sensible of any evil demerit in these monstrous actions, which other ordinary men, (though guilty and corrupt likewise, but in an inferior degree,) can scarce think of without horror and detestation. An ordinary unconverted person has very indifferent thoughts of daily sinful omissions, which a converted person (though he be not perfectly free from sin himself) would regret with the bitterest remorse. The further any man advanceth in holiness and purity, the clearer is his view, and the quicker his sense of the evil of sin. With parity of reason, it may be conceived, that the greatest saint on earth does not see the evil of sin so clearly as an angel; and if this reasoning be carried higher, an infinitely holy and excellent Being will discern incomparably more evil in sin, and hate it more, (and that with the most perfect reason and justice,) than the holiest man on earth, or the most glorious angel in heaven. It is plain, God, by being the purest and most holy of all rational beings, is the fittest to judge of the evil of sin.

Nothing is more reasonable than that all these considerations should, on the one hand, make us believe that sin deserves indeed what God threatens, because God is infinitely just, and holy; and, on the other hand, if our hearts murmur against these threatenings, we should look upon that, not as the native result of sound reason, but of unreasonable corruption. We should believe, that if our sense of the evil of sin is not suitable to God's threatenings against it, it is because our hearts are not yet free from the stain, and infection of it. Let men talk what they please when they are in a humour for speculation, yet there is no man, when his mind is under a lively impression of some atrocious crime that he has seen or heard of, but will be convinced of a high degree of evil demerit in sin. All men are sensible of this in high degrees of wickedness; the reason why it is otherwise in ordinary sins, is, because men have made these familiar to themselves by custom...

One of the most ingenious libertines that I have read, objects against the doctrine of vindictive justice in God, as if it could not be maintained without clothing the Deity with human frailties and passions, anger, provocation, revenge, and the like; of which, he says, we might be so well acquainted with our own nature, as to reflect that these are human infirmities, and not divine perfections.

If this objection prove any thing, it proves by far too much; if it has any force at all, it confutes experience: for experience shows, that sinners suffer a great many pains and troubles in this life, besides the pains of death. Almighty power could hinder

these pains. Infinite goodness would hinder them, if they were not merited by the sins of men, and agreeable to the justice of God.

If God can, and does inflict manifold pains for sin in this life, without any thing like human frailty or passion, surely there is no reason why the same may not be done in as perfect a manner in the next world.

It is the observation of the wisest of men, that because sentence is not speedily executed on an evil work, therefore men's hearts are hardened with false hopes of impunity. These are the flattering thoughts of sinners at ease. But the heavy and dismal disasters of life, and the exquisite pains of sickness, give them generally a new light. While the minds of men are intoxicated with prosperity, they may make a shift to delude themselves with such false notions of God's goodness, as may banish for a time all dread of his justice. But surely, arguing against experience is the most extravagant arguing in the world. These speculations will not argue away all the public and private calamities with which the world is overspread, and from which no age, no rank, or condition of men, is exempted. It is vain to object that these troubles flow from natural causes: justice can use natural causes in punishing sin. God is the Author of nature, and Ruler of the world. And surely it is not the way to extol his goodness, to say, that though his creatures suffer various pains or troubles, yet that they do not deserve it, or that it is not on account of their sins.

They that maintain vindictive justice, zealously assert, (according to the Scriptures,) that there is

nothing of passion, of anger, or revenge in it, in the proper sense; but on the contrary, that it is perfectly serene, and exercised, so to speak, with infinite calmness. The chief abettors of this doctrine (perhaps all of them) affirm, that in the matter of vindictive justice, God is to be considered, not merely as a private person, or offended party, but as a public person, or supreme magistrate, who himself alone is capable of judging what are those measures, in the punishment of sin, that are absolutely best, in order to the most perfect and most excellent way of governing the world. It is goodness, as well as justice in a supreme magistrate, to make laws that are for his own honour, and the good of his subjects. It is goodness to give force to these laws by a suitable sanction or penalty annexed to them. And it is plain, the same goodness that requires such laws should be made, requires the authority of them should be maintained; which is done by putting them in execution. Every body knows that the honour of the magistrate, and the interest of society, suffers by it, when excellent laws are neglected, and their authority destroyed. These, and the like considerations, satisfy men as to human government, that true justice and true goodness are so far from being inconsistent, that they are inseparable; and there is no reason why the same may not be acknowledged in the divine government.

It is evident, that none can be inconsistent with themselves, in acknowledging that there is such a thing as a law of nature, without acknowledging, at the same time, vindictive justice to punish the violations of it. A law without a penalty annexed

to it, is not a law, but an advice.

And a sanction or penalty that is no way put in execution, is not a sanction, but a bugbear. All which, if duly considered, might satisfy men that God's vindictive justice may be conceived, without any the least resemblance of human passions.

But not to insist on this further: another consideration, that may be of use on this subject, is, That whereas men may pass by and neglect a criminal, so as neither to do good nor ill to him, neither to reward nor punish him, neither to bestow favours nor to inflict deserved punishment on him; yet, with respect to God it is otherwise. There is no medium between his heaping very great favours on a criminal, and leaving him in very great misery, (unless he be supposed to annihilate him.) For though God should inflict no positive punishment on a sinner, but only withdraw from him all the benefits and favours he has abused, and leave him to his own natural emptiness, to outrageous desires, and a vehement thirst after happiness, without any kind of enjoyment to gratify that thirst in the least, that alone would cause such a direful eternal melancholy, as cannot well be conceived. Death separates a sinner from all the outward earthly benefits which he had from God; and an impenitent sinner, who can expect after death new benefits and favours to abuse in the next life, as he did in this, must have very strange ideas of God, and of the end for which he created rational creatures.

To this we may add, that sin and wickedness, by its very nature, incapacitates a man for the only true happiness of his soul, which consists in union with