INDEX. ACTION. When a party has two remedies, inconsistent with each other, any decisive act by him, done with knowledge of his rights and of the facts, determines his election of the remedy. Robb v. Vos, 13. ADMIRALTY. 1. In view of the large number of ferry-boats plying between New York and the opposite shores, steamers running up and down the river should keep a sufficient distance from the docks, and hold themselves under such control as to enable them to avoid ferry-boats leaving their slips upon their usual schedules of time. The Breakwater, 252. 2. Rule 19, (Rev. Stat. § 4233,) requiring, in the case of crossing steamers, that the one having the other on her starboard side should keep out of the way of the other, is applicable to an ocean steamer meeting a ferry-boat in the harbor of New York on her starboard side. Ib. 3. Exceptions to the operation of the rule should be admitted with great caution, and only when imperatively required by the special circumstances mentioned in rule 24. Ib. 4. The Pavonia was a ferry-boat, running at regular intervals between a slip at the foot of Chambers Street, New York, and the Erie Railway Station, on the opposite Jersey shore, northwesterly from Chambers Street. As she was leaving her slip on the afternoon of December 16, 1887, the steamer Breakwater, arriving from sea, was proceeding northward along the line of the New York docks and about four hundred feet distant therefrom, and had arrived opposite Barclay Street, which is distant about 880 feet to the southward from Chambers Street. The Breakwater was on her way to her dock, at the foot of Beach Street, in New York, a short distance northerly from Chambers Street. She was then moving at the rate of about six miles an hour. The tide was strong ebb, the wind northwest, and the weather clear. As the Pavonia moved slowly out under a hard-a-port wheel, her bow was swung southerly down the river by the force of wind and tide. She sounded a single whistle, and the Breakwater replied with the same. The Pavonia then put her engine to full speed, and made another single whistle, to which the Breakwater made the same reply. Mean 703 while the Pavonia had recovered from her downward swing, and swung up the river on her course. When the Breakwater sounded her first whistle, her engines were immediately stopped: when she sounded her second, they were put full speed astern. Notwithstanding this, the stem of the Breakwater struck the Pavonia on her port side, and seriously damaged her. Held, (1) That when the Pavonia sounded a single whistle, the statutory rules became operative, and it was the duty of the Breakwater to keep out of the way; (2) that no fault could be imputed to the Pavonia for leaving when she did, or for her failure to stop and reverse; (3) that the Breakwater was alone in fault. Ib. APPEAL. See JURISDICTION, A, 15; ATTORNEY AT LAW. See EQUITY, 1; BANK. In June, 1887, the Fidelity Bank of Cincinnati had a contract with the German-American Bank of Peoria "to credit sight items on any point in the United States east of Illinois, where there are banks, at par; and to make collections on same points" and "to credit the same at par when collected." At that time there also existed an arrangement between the Fidelity Bank and the Bank of Evansville in Indiana for mutual and reciprocal collection business. On the 14th of that month the German-American Bank sent to the Fidelity Bank for collection a sight draft on a firm in Terre Haute, endorsed "for collection." On the 16th this draft was forwarded to the Evansville Bank for collection. On the 18th the draft was sent by the Evansville Bank to a bank in Terre Haute for collection, and was collected by the latter bank on the 20th of June. On the morning of the 21st, before banking hours, the Evansville Bank received news of the collection, and after crediting the Fidelity Bank with it, as of June 20th, notified the Fidelity Bank of the payment and of the entry to credit by a letter which was received there on the 22d. On the 20th the Fidelity Bank was, and for ten days before it had been, insolvent. It was not open for business after the 20th, and on the 27th passed into the hands of a receiver. Held, that the Fidelity Bank, though it acquired the mere legal title to the draft, never became its equitable owner; that the notice on the draft that it was for collection bound all parties into whose hands it came; that the Evansville Bank could not by its entry of credit to the Fidelity Bank release itself of its obligation to the German-American Bank; and CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED. 1. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, affirmed and followed. Bobb v. Jamison, 416. 2. Horne v. George H. Hammond Co., 155 U. S. 393, affirmed and applied. Cooper v. Newell, 532. Commercial Bank of Pennsylvania v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, shown not to conflict with this decision. Evansville Bank v. German-American Bank, 556. CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS. CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. CIRCUIT COURT COMMISSIONER. 1. A commissioner of a Circuit Court is an officer of the court, authorized by law, and is entitled to his fees in the following cases when certified by the court as correct: (1) For entering on warrant the judgment of final disposition of a case, when required by rule of court; (2) for making transcripts of proceedings, when required by rule of court, to be sent up to court; (3) for making and certifying copies of subpoenas for marshal to serve on witnesses, when required by rule of court; (4) for making report to clerk of court and commissioner of internal revenue of cases heard and disposed of under the internal revenue laws, when required by rule of court; (5) for making entries on the docket in various cases of the name of an affiant, his official position, if any, date of issuing warrant, name of defendant and witnesses, and final disposition of the case, when required by rule of court. United States v. Allred, 591. VOL. CLV-45 2. He is also entitled to his fees for administering oaths to deputy marshals to verify their accounts of service, when the regulations of the Department of Justice require such officers to certify on oath that their accounts rendered to the marshal are correct. lb. CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. G. was a shipping commissioner at Mobile from June, 1889, to February, 1890. In November, 1889, the Secretary of the Treasury notified him that his compensation would thereafter be at a sum not exceeding $100 in any one month, and that no pay additional to that compensation would be allowed him for his services. In December, 1889, January, 1890, and February, 1890, each, he rendered an account claiming $25 in each month for salary of a clerk, payment of which being refused, he brought this action. Held, that he was not entitled to recover. United States v. Gunnison, 389. See CIRCUIT COURT COMMISSIONER; SUPERVISORS OF ELECTIONS; POSTMASTER GENERAL; COMMON CARRIER. See RAILROAD. CONFLICT OF LAWS. See HABEAS CORPUS, 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 1. P. being arrested in Texas on a requisition from the governor of Alabama for his extradition for trial in Alabama on an indictment for embezzlement and larceny, sought his discharge through a writ of habeas corpus on the ground of the invalidity of the indictment under the laws of Alabama. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas decided that, as it appeared that P. was charged by an indictment in Alabama with the commission of an offence there, and that all the other prerequisites for his extradition had been complied with, he should be extradited, leaving the courts of Alabama to decide whether the indictment was sufficient, and whether the statute of that State was in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Held, that this decision did not deny to P. any right secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and did not erroneously dispose of a Federal question. Pearce v. Texas, 311. 2. The act of August 2, 1886, c. 840, 24 Stat. 209, does not give authority to those who pay the taxes prescribed by it, to engage in the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine in any State which lawfully forbids such manufacture or sale, or to disregard any regulations which a State may lawfully prescribe in reference to that article; and that act was |