Mr. O'NEAL. Then where do we find the provision with regard to food?

Mr. SMITH. It is the last item under (a).

Mr. O'NEAL. Now, as to the question of services, I wonder whether that might not be very important? I merely wanted to call that to the attention of the committee. It is not necessary to answer it now, but it can be considered.

DISPOSITION OF MATERIAL AFTER DEFENSE EFFORT HAS CEASED

(See p. 43)

Mr. JOHNSON of West Virginia. Mr. Secretary, under this lendlease bill, suppose we should turn over to England a great number of guns, tanks, and maybe ships. Does that mean that after the war is over, if those ships are still in existence, they will be returned to us?

Secretary STIMSON. I think you can judge of that fairly by what has been done in the past in the disposal of the spare stocks of weapons which were transferred and sold to Great Britain before the drafting of this bill. In all those cases there was an effort made to obtain a substantial and fair quid pro quo.

Under the Lease Lend Act the terms and considerations for the transfer are made broader and more flexible, but I think you can count upon the interests of the United States being fully protected.

Mr. JOHNSON of West Virginia. In other words, if we send a lot of tanks and a lot of guns and even some ships over there, and this war results in favor of Great Britain, and they have all our material over there, then is it your understanding that that material is to come back to this country, or as much of it as possible?

Secretary STIMSON. I think you will find as full an answer as can be made to that question was forecast in the President's speech when he originally proposed this method of transaction.

Mr. JOHNSON of West Virginia. This is a pretty big undertaking, and sometimes when these materials get across the water it may not be convenient, for some reason, to send them back. Now, I want this stuff returned if it is in existence when they get through with it. If you lend a thing, you want it returned when the borrower is through with it.

Mr. WOODRUM. Try to get all of it back that you can, Mr. Secretary.

NEW PLANT FACILITIES

(See pp. 37, 58)

Mr. TABER. With reference to these major items in this Budget estimate that is up here, are you able to segregate for us as to each one the portion thereof that could be currently procured from existing facilities over the period that will be required for delivery and what proportion would require the creation of additional facilities?

Secretary STIMSON. I think it would be a rather difficult question to answer in extenso; details are very difficult to present. It would necessarily be subject to change as other changes come from the war. Mr. TABER. There are $752,000,000 set up here for additional facilities. I can see why there might be some special items that would require some small amount of facilities. On the other hand it is

rather difficult to follow the provision for a lot of additional facilities superimposed upon the facilities that have already been provided for or appropriated for for the Army and the Navy, especially in view of the fact that months are required for the setting up of some of the facilities; on some of them production comes in quantities months later, and that means a long time before some of these things can begin to be produced. I would like to have some kind of a comment from both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy on that subject if I could get it.

Mr. WOODRUM. Secretary Stimson.

Secretary STIMSON. I am not sure that I understand Mr. Taber's request; I do not know that I understand how much he is asking for details. I can say this, to guide us as to what my feeling is as to it: I think that it would not be in the interest of this country, or this country's defense, to indicate what weapons or what munitions are going to what countries.

Mr. TABER. I was not asking for that at all; that is not what I was getting at. I will try to repeat the question.

Secretary STIMSON. I may have misunderstood it.

Mr. TABER. We have a set-up of $750,000,000 for proposed additional facilities.

Now, considering the fact that it takes months to provide some of these facilities, and considering the fact that we have already provided probably $2,000,000,000 for that sort of thing in previous bills for the Army and the Navy, and considering the fact that those facilities require months in some cases to come into production, are we not getting to a point where we are providing for facilities, to the point where the provision for facilities is delaying this defense program rather than a means of accelerating it?

Secretary STIMSON. I think not, sir. But I cannot go into details here now. I do not have them before me.

I know this, however; I know that every effort has been made both in the Department and in the Office of Production Management to keep going at the fastest possible production the facilities which we have now, and without impairing the production of those we now have to bring into production as rapidly as possible the facilities which we have contemplated or under construction. In other words, that we are going as fast as we can in regard to the creation of these facilities. I think nothing is included in this—although I should like to have the opportunity to correct myself if I find afterward I am wrong— I think nothing is included in this which will not come into production in the time stated in the bill, and have its effect on the defense of these other countries to whom the weapons are intended before that time. General Marshall tells me that he can add to the details of that if you care for him to do so.

Mr. TABER. Will someone later on give us more of a break-down of what actually will have to go into new facilities?

General MARSHALL. If I may interject this statement: This has been very carefully calculated against the time element, having in mind what we already have in the way of facilities, what has already been authorized, and money provided for, and what would be required to produce the mass of matériel on the British list, to produce the facilities for the requirement of the list. There is also the necessity

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for facilities against the possibility of emasculation or destruction of existing facilities of Great Britain. That is very important in this matter. They have these standing plants that this week are in full production and next week cease to exist, and some facilities in this country to meet that possibility, that may in some cases be a probability, would be in here as one of the corrective measures.

This data on production cost of certain facilities being presented for appropriation was only composed after a careful investigation by the Office of Production Management, under Mr. Knudsen, and other similar officers, to see what was going to be required, also having in mind the time element, and that it has to be gotten out as quickly as we can. If it were not for the time element it would be more economical to allow the existing plants to turn out the matériel over a long period of time, but time is the costly item in this particular, with the necessity of having certain plant facilities provided against the possibility of British plants being destroyed.

PERIOD OF USE OF FUNDS

(See p. 17)

Mr. TABER. Within what time is it anticipated that this fund will be used?

General MARSHALL. It has to be used before June 30, 1943.

Mr. TABER. I understand that, but has it been laid out so that it is expected that this fund will last until June 30, 1943? Would anyone of you be able to answer that; and I would rather ask that for the moment of either of the Secretaries.

Secretary STIMSON. Will you repeat your question?

Mr. TABER. Has the program of getting these things been laid out, to get the things you have in mind, or is it expected that you will have to supplement this later?

Secretary STIMSON. That is subject, Mr. Taber, to so many contingencies of war that it is almost impossible to answer it exactly.

Mr. TABER. I appreciate it. Let me frame the question in this way: Has this estimate been prepared with the idea of covering what the British needs are, as you can envisage them at this time, without taking into consideration contingencies that might result as the progress of the war develops. Can you answer that?

Secretary STIMSON. We think that can be answered "yes."

BRITISH FINANCES
(See p. 65)

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. I will address this question to Secretary Stimson. In the testimony on the lend-lease bill, by Secretary Morgenthau, it was indicated that the gold and dollar exchange assets of the United Kingdom as of August 31, 1939, amounted to $4,483,000,000; as of December 31, last, $2,167,000,000.

Are those dollar exchange assets considered in any way in determining the total of the request before us or is that something entirely for the future as defense weapons are provided?

Secretary STIMSON. I do not think those estimates were taken into consideration in the preparation of these requirements.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. In other words, that is a matter for negotiation in the future.

Secretary STIMSON. Yes.

PERIOD OF USE OF FUNDS

(See p. 16)

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. I assume that you contemplate that the production covered by this $7,000,000,000 appropriation can in fact, if necessary, be produced prior to July 1, 1943?

Secretary STIMSON. That is the fact.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. Can you say what proportion of that $7,000,000,000 would be necessary for expenditure?

Secretary STIMSON. May I interpose this statement?-that I have been speaking not as to the whole of the $7,000,000,000, but merely as to the War Department's share. And I think that is true as regards the Navy.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. May I ask Secretary Knox if that is true as to his Department?

Secretary KNOX. I think so.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. Is it possible to state what portion of this $7,000,000,000 under the contemplated program would be actually required for expenditure in the fiscal year 1942?

Mr. WOODRUM. You mean contract authorizations or cash, Mr. Wigglesworth.

Secretary STIMSON. I was going to say that question involves contract authorizations.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. If there is no objection I would like it to cover both.

Secretary STIMSON. Then you mean, is it susceptible of being covered completely, when you take in both cash payments and contracts?

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. I mean how much of the $7,000,000,000 which is before us will be required for (a) cash payments, and (b) obligations in the fiscal year 1942 under the contemplated program?

Secretary KNOX. I do not think anyone could answer that question until the contracts have been negotiated.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. You do not plan to expend or obligate all of this $7,000,000,000 in the fiscal year 1942, do you?

Secretary STIMSON. I think I can say that it is intended, so far as the War Department's share is concerned, it would be under contract or completed by that time.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. And is that also true, Mr. Secretary, of your Department?

Secretary KNOx. With respect to the allocation of the $7,000,000,000 for expenditure by the Navy Department, the obligations will be incurred very soon, as soon as possible.

CONTRACT AUTHORIZATION FOR PART OF NEEDS

Mr. POWERS. Mr. Secretary of War, my first question has been fairly well covered by Mr. Taber and Mr. Wigglesworth. From January 3, when Congress convened, until the present time, the Appropriations Committee of the House has been appropriating at the rate of about a billion and a half a week. This seven billion, of course, will raise the average considerably. I am just wondering, in view of Mr. Taber's question, and in view of Mr. Wigglesworth's question, whether it would be advisable, instead of appropriating

$7,000,000,000 at this time, to cut this down to a much lower figure and allow you to pay out in cash what you can for the fiscal year 1942, and then come back again for another appropriation, or to have the balance on a contractual basis. What would you think of that?

Secretary STIMSON. For reasons that have already been given by others here, I think it would not be.

Mr. POWERS. It would not make a particle of difference in the ultimate result, would it?

Secretary STIMSON. Yes; it would have a great effect on morale and probably would make a great difference in the negotiations and in the planning. The more you can plan for, the more cheaply and more quickly you can procure, and in that way you cannot plan.

Mr. POWERS. Yes; if you had contractual authority, you could still make your plans, could you not?

Secretary STIMSON. Under your question, I would say that would be limited. However, I believe the Director of the Budget can answer that question more completely than I.

Mr. POWERS. Well, the contractual authority would allow you to do the same thing as cash.

USE OF AMERICAN PLANES BY THE BRITISH

Another question: Is there any truth to the rumor that some of us hear that England is not using the planes we are sending to her?

Secretary ŠTIMSON. I do not think that is true as the question is asked; no. There may be delays because of the necessity of education in the use of them and the necessary adaptation to the situation of warfare, but any implication that the planes will not be used is false.

Mr. POWERS. No; I do not imply they will not be used, but I understood the great majority of the planes we are sending to England are not being used. And, if such is the case, I wanted to find out from you if you knew why they are not being used.

Secretary STIMSON. I do not think that is the case, sir.
Mr. POWERS. Is it not?

Secretary STIMSON. No.

MATERIAL FURNISHED BRITAIN AFTER EVACUATION

OF DUNKERQUE

Mr. POWERS. Someone mentioned the fact, Mr. Secretary, that we had transferred or sold war materials to England after the Dunkerque evacuation, and that we helped England considerably by doing that. Could you tell us how the sale or transfer of those materials was made and under what authority?

Secretary STIMSON. I was not Secretary at that time, and I do not know.

General MARSHALL. It was made under the existing law on the basis of obsolescense or surplus, and it was done, in the main, through the United States Steel.

Mr. POWERS. Do not misunderstand me; I am happy it was done, but I wanted to find out how.

General MARSHALL. We turned over in each case the material to one or another firm, some to the Curtiss people, but the main bulk was to the United States Steel; in turn for which the Chief of Ordnance received contracts for other material at a rate determined