In a decision dated July 11, 1977, an immigration judge found the applicants, the master and 36 crewmen of the M/T "Dosina", inadmissible under section 212(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(20), and ordered them excluded and deported. The immigration judge then certified his decision to this Board. In a decision dated July 14, 1978, this Board reversed the immigration judge's decision and terminated the exclusion proceedings. The basis of this reversal was the Board's finding that the aliens involved were crewmen within the meaning of section 101(a)(15)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(D), and as such were not amenable to exclusion proceedings, but rather only to the procedures set forth in section 252(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1282(a), governing crewmen specifically. The Seafarer's International Union of North America (SIUNA), which submitted a brief as amicus curiae to the Board when the case was certified to the Board by the immigration judge, now moves the Board to reconsider its decision of July 14, 1978, reversing the immigration judge's decision. The motion will be denied. In its motion, the SIUNA has combined two objectives: its desire to press the point that it is an interested party with standing in this case, and its opposition to the Board's finding that the immigration judge's decision was incorrect. Both of these objectives, however, have been melded into one theory in essence: that reconsideration is mandated because the economic interests of the Union's members are affected by the decision. This proposition, however, tends to ignore the major issue in dispute in the Board's decision. This issue was the question of the immigration judge's jurisdiction to consider the admissibility of the alien crewmen who had applied for temporary permission to land in the United States. The Board analyzed this question in two steps. The first was the question of resolving whether or not the aliens involved were crewmen. The Board concluded that they were, after considering the points raised both on oral argument before the Board and in the various briefs filed by the ship's crew, the Service, and several amicus curiae, among them the SIUNA. The seond step was deciding whether or not the immigration. judge had jurisdiction under section 235(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b), to consider the admissibility of alien crewmen. Again, after considering the points raised, the Board concluded that he did not, and ordered the exclusion proceedings terminated. This end result, the termination of the proceedings, it should be pointed out, was the object of both the aliens involved and the Service, who had contended from the beginning that the exclusion proceedings 1 We note that the file contains two motions with the same points contained in them. We have treated them as one. had been improperly begun. The SIUNA became involved in the proceedings only as an amicus curiae pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 292.1(d) because the Board considered the issues raised to be important.2 In proceedings before the Board, an amicus curiae is not a party to the proceedings but is a participant only for the benefit of the Board in cases of general public interest. An amicus curiae serves this purpose by making suggestions to the Board, by providing supplemental assistance to existing parties and by insuring a complete presentation of difficult issues so that the Board may reach a proper decision. The Union here was never a party to the proceedings and we do not consider the fact that an amicus brief was filed sufficient grounds for the Union to enter a motion to reconsider our decision. To do so, would be to allow the Union to reopen the proceedings, an action to which neither the aliens involved nor the Service have given their assent. We know of no legal principle which would dictate such a result, particularly where the major contention of the Union is not a point advanced in argument by the aliens involved, or by the Service. See, Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 370 (1960). In addition, even if the union had the right to move for reconsideration, the motion would have to be considered defective. While, as previously noted, the motion appears to combine two objectives, the only basis for reconsideration offered is that the Union has substantial economic interests in the matter, as the alien crewmen compete with United States seamen for the same jobs and the interests of these seamen have not been adequately represented in the proceedings. In this regard, the Union contends that the regulatory function of exclusion proceedings concerning aliens who seek employment in the United States cannot be denied, and the primary purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act is to protect United States labor from the influx of foreign labor. While we will not pass judgment on these assertions, we must point out that the economic effect of such alien crewmen was not the issue before the Board. The question was a narrow one of the jurisdiction of the immigration judge under the statute to consider an alien crewman's admissibility when he has applied for temporary permission to land. Under section 235(b) of the Act, an immigration judge clearly has no such jurisdiction. The union does not address this issue in its motion to reconsider. Even if we were to find that the Union had the right to file such a motion, it has not asked the Board to reconsider the only two points which were before the Board, namely whether or not the aliens were crewmen, and if they were, whether or not the immigration judge had the specified jurisdiction over them. The economic detriment to 2 "The Board may grant permission to appear, on a case-by-case basis, as amicus curiae, to an attorney or to an organization represented by an attorney, if the public interest will be served thereby." United States seamen represented by the Union, caused by alien crewmen, is therefore irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue. The Union's argument that its members' interests can only be protected if the proceedings are reopened tends to assume that a purpose of the Board's review was to protect these interests. This ignores the fact that the sole purpose of our review was to insure that the Immigration and Nationality Act was properly interpreted as it related to the jurisdiction of an immigration judge in regard to alien crewmen. For these reasons the motion to reconsider will be denied. ORDER: The motion is denied. Board Member Ralph Farb abstained from consideration of this case. MATTER OF PEREZ In Visa Petition Proceedings A-21445108 Decided by Board May 30, 1979 (1) In order for an adoption to be recognized for immigration purposes, it must conform to the applicable law of the jurisdiction where it occurred as well as to the statutory requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E). (2) Under Article 367 of the Civil Code and Article 886 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Chihuahua, Mexico, adoptions by persons with descendants are not prohibited. In addition, the Chihuahua Civil Code does not contain any provision forbidding the adoption of a blood niece. (3) The petitioner met her burden of proving that the beneficiary was her adopted child where the adoption conformed with the law of the place where it occurred (Chihuahua, Mexico) and where the evidence indicated that the beneficiary, a blood niece of the petitioner, (1) was unmarried, (2) was adopted at the age of 12, (3) was in the legal custody of her adoptive parents since the 1975 adoption, and (4) had resided with her adoptive parents since the adoption. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Ruben Bonilla, Jr., Esquire P. O. Drawer 5427 BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Appleman, Maguire, and Farb, Board Members The lawful permanent resident petitioner applied for preference status for the beneficiary as her unmarried daughter under section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2). The District Director denied the original petition on July 25, 1977. The petitioner appealed and we remanded. On remand, the District Director, in a decision dated March 16, 1979, approved the petition and certified the case to us for review on March 21, 1979. We affirm. The petitioner, 55 years old, was born in Zacatecas, Mexico, and was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on March 18, 1954. The beneficiary, 15 years of age, was born on May 30, 1963, in Chihuahua, Mexico. She has been living with the petitioner and the petitioner's husband in Corpus Christi, Texas, since the age of two and was formally adopted by them on July 18, 1975, in Chihuahua, Mexico, at the age of 12. The beneficiary is the blood niece of her adoptive parents. The District Director predicated his original decision on Article 390 of the Civil Code of Mexico which prohibited the adoption of a minor child by persons with descendants. He concluded that since the petitioner and her husband already had a son, the adoption of the beneficiary was invalid and the petitioner could not, therefore, confer immigration benefits on the beneficiary. We remanded the record, requesting that the District Director consider the validity of the adoption under the law of Chihuahua, Mexico, and produce material showing that the petitioner had a son as contended in his decision. Although the record contained a birth registration card and marriage certificate of the alleged son, neither of these documents, nor other evidence in the record, in any way tied that individual with the petitioner. On remand, the petition was approved based on a report entitled "Adoption-Chihuahua, Mexico" prepared by the Hispanic Law Division of the Library of Congress on February 8, 1978.1 The report states that taken together, Article 367 of the Civil Code and Article 886 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Chihuahua, Mexico do not prohibit adoptions by persons with descendants. In addition, the Civil Code does not contain any provision forbidding the adoption of a blood niece. In order for an adoption to be recognized for immigration purposes, it must conform to the applicable law of the jurisdiction where it occurred as well as to the statutory requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E). Matter of Lee, Interim Decision 2649 (BIA 1978); see Matter of Garcia, Interim Decision 2630 (BIA 1978); Matter of Dhillon, Interim Decision 2620 (BIA 1977). Section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that: The term "child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is a child adopted while under the age of fourteen years if the child has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years. It appears from the record that the beneficiary is unmarried. Her birth record certifies that she was born on May 30, 1963. The court decree of adoption issued on July 18, 1975, indicates that she was adopted at the age of 12. In addition, it shows that the beneficiary has resided with the petitioner since the age of two. School certificates contained in the record show that she attended Corpus Christi schools from 1969 to 1977, which indicates that she has been in the legal custody of the petitioner since the 1975 adoption. Therefore, the age, two-year residency, and legal custody requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) have been satisfied. In light of the report prepared by the Library of Congress, under 1 That report is included as an addendum. |