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Committed effective dose equivalent from inhalation is calculated in ICRP Publication 30, but the DAC value for external exposure to a contaminated atmospheric cloud is more restrictive than the DAC value for inhalation.

2 Committed effective dose equivalent from inhalation is not calculated in ICRP Publication 30, but DAC value for external exposure to contaminated cloud should be more restrictive than DAC value for inhalation due to relatively short half-life of radionuclide.

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DAC value is determined by limit on annual shallow dose equivalent to skin, rather than yearly limit on effective dose equiva

DAC value applies to radionuclide in vapor form only; DAC value for inhalation is more restrictive for radionuclide in inorganic

$ DAC value applies to radionuclide in inorganic or vapor form.

*DAC value for exposure to contaminated atmospheric cloud is the same as DAC value for inhalation.

[58 FR 65485, Dec. 14, 1993, as amended at 63 FR 59687, Nov. 4, 1998]

APPENDIX D TO PART 835-SURFACE
CONTAMINATION VALUES

The data presented in appendix D are to be used in identifying the need for posting of

contamination and high contamination areas in accordance with §835.603(e) and (f) and identifying the need for surface contamination monitoring and control in accordance with §§ 835.1101 and 835.1102.

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Beta-gamma emitters (nuclides with decay modes other than alpha emission or spontaneous fission) except Sr-90 and others noted above 5

71,000

20

75,000 500

200

1,000

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Tritium and tritiated compounds 6

1 The values in this appendix, with the exception noted in footnote 5, apply to radioactive contamination deposited on, but not incorporated into the interior or matrix of, the contaminated item. Where surface contamination by both alpha-and beta-gammaemitting nuclides exists, the limits established for alpha-and beta-gamma-emitting nuclides apply independently.

2 As used in this table, dpm (disintegrations per minute) means the rate of emission by radioactive material as determined by correcting the counts per minute observed by an appropriate detector for background, efficiency, and geometric factors associ ated with the instrumentation.

3 The levels may be averaged over one square meter provided the maximum surface activity in any area of 100 cm2 is less than three times the value specified. For purposes of averaging, any square meter of surface shall be considered to be above the surface contamination value if: (1) From measurements of a representative number of sections it is determined that the average contamination level exceeds the applicable value; or (2) it is determined that the sum of the activity of all isolated spots or particles in any 100 cm 2 area exceeds three times the applicable value.

4 The amount of removable radioactive material per 100 cm2 of surface area should be determined by swiping the area with dry filter or soft absorbent paper, applying moderate pressure, and then assessing the amount of radioactive material on the swipe with an appropriate instrument of known efficiency. (Note-The use of dry material may not be appropriate for tritium.) When removable contamination on objects of surface area less than 100 cm2 is determined, the activity per unit area shall be based on the actual area and the entire surface shall be wiped. It is not necessary to use swiping techniques to measure remov able contamination levels if direct scan surveys indicate that the total residual surface contamination levels are within the limits for removable contamination.

5 This category of radionuclides includes mixed fission products, including the Sr-90 which is present in them. It does not apply to Sr-90 which has been separated from the other fission products or mixtures where the Sr-90 has been enriched.

6 Tritium contamination may diffuse into the volume or matrix of materials. Evaluation of surface contamination shall consider the extent to which such contamination may migrate to the surface in order to ensure the surface contamination value provided in this appendix is not exceeded. Once this contamination migrates to the surface, it may be removable, not fixed; therefore, a "Total" value does not apply.

7 (alpha)

[58 FR 65485, Dec. 14, 1993, as amended at 63 FR 59688, Nov. 4, 1998]

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Any radionuclide other than alpha emitting radionuclides not listed above and mixtures of beta emitters of unknown composition have a value of 100 microcuries.

NOTE: Where there is involved a combination of radionuclides in known amounts, derive the value for the combination as follows: determine, for each radionuclide in the combination, the ratio between the quantity present in the combination and the value otherwise established for the specific radionuclide when not in combination. If the sum of such ratios for all radionuclides in the combination exceeds unity (1), then the accountability criterion has been exceeded. [63 FR 59688, Nov. 4, 1998]

Sec.

840.1

840.2

PART 840-EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCES

Scope and purpose.

Procedures.

840.3 Determination of extraordinary nuclear occurrence.

840.4 Criterion I-Substantial discharge of radioactive material or substantial radiation levels offsite.

840.5 Criterion II-Substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite.

AUTHORITY: Sec. 161 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (42 U.S.C. 2201); sec. 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576, as amended by Pub. L. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (42 U.S.C. 2210); Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565-613 (42 U.S.C. 7101-7352).

SOURCE: 49 FR 21473, May 21, 1984, unless otherwise noted.

§ 840.1 Scope and purpose.

(a) Scope. This subpart applies to those DOE contractor activities to which the nuclear hazards indemnity provisions in 41 CFR 9-50.704-6 apply, and to other persons indemnified with respect to such activities.

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(b) Purpose. One purpose of this subpart is to set forth the criteria which the DOE proposes to follow in order to determine whether there has been an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence.' The other purpose is to establish the conditions of the waivers of defenses proposed for incorporation in indemnity agreements.

(1) The system is to come into effect only where the discharge or dispersal constitutes a substantial amount of source, special nuclear or byproduct material, or has caused substantial radiation levels offsite. The various limits in present DOE regulations are not appropriate for direct application in the determination of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence," for they were arrived at with other purposes in mind, and those limits have been set at a level which is conservatively arrived at by incorporating a significant safety factor. Thus, a discharge or dispersal which exceeds the limits in DOE regulations, or in DOE orders, although possible cause for concern, is not one which would be expected to cause substantial injury or damage unless it exceeds by some significant multiple the appropriate regulatory limit. Accordingly, in arriving at the values in the criteria to be deemed "substantial" it is more appropriate to adopt values separate from DOE health and safety orders, and, of course the selection of these values will not in any way affect such orders. A substantial discharge, for purposes of the criteria, represents a perturbation of the environment which is clearly above that which could be anticipated from the conduct of normal activities. The criteria are intended solely for the purposes of administration of DOE statutory responsibilities under Pub. L. 89-645, and are not intended to indicate a level of discharge or dispersal at which damage is likely to occur, or even a level at

which some type of protective action is indicated. It should be clearly understood that the criteria in no way establish or indicate that there is a specific threshold of exposure at which biological damage from radiation will take place. It cannot be emphasized too frequently that the levels set to be used as criteria for the first part of the determination, that is, the criteria for amounts offsite or radiation levels offsite which are substantial, are not meant to indicate that, because such amounts or levels are determined to be substantial for purposes of administration, they are "substantial" in terms of their propensity for causing injury or damage.

(2) It is the purpose of the second part of the determination that DOE decide whether there have in fact been or will probably be substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite. The criteria for substantial damages were formulated, and the numerical values selected, on a wholly different basis from that on which the criteria used for the first part of the determination with respect to substantial discharge were derived. The only interrelation between the values selected for the discharge criteria and the damage criteria is that the discharge values are set so low that it is extremely unlikely the damage criteria could be satisfied unless the discharge values have been exceeded.

(3) The first part of the test is designed so that DOE can assure itself that something exceptional has occurred; that something untoward and unexpected has in fact taken place and that this event is of sufficient significance to raise the possibility that some damage to persons or property offsite has resulted or may result. If there appears to be no damage, the waivers will not apply because DOE will be unable, under the second part of the test, to make a determination that "substantial damages" have resulted or will probably result. If damages have resulted or will probably result, they could vary from de minimis to serious, and the waivers will not apply until the damages, both actual and probable, are determined to be "substantial" within the second part of the test.

(4) The presence or absence of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence determination does not concomitantly determine whether or not a particular claimant will recover on his claim. In effect, it is intended primarily to determine whether certain potential obstacles to recovery are to be removed from the route the claimant would ordinarily follow to seek compensation for his injury or damage. If there has not been an extraordinary nuclear occurrence determination, the claimant must proceed (in the absence of settlement) with a tort action subject to whatever issues must be met, and whatever defenses are available to the defendant, under the law applicable in the relevant jurisdiction. If there has been an extraordinary nuclear occurrence determination, the claimant must still proceed (in the absence of settlement) with a tort action, but the claimant's burden is substantially eased by the elimination of certain issues which may be involved and certain defenses which may be available to the defendant. In either case the defendant may defend with respect to such of the following matters as are in issue in any given claim: the nature of the claimant's alleged damages, the causal relationship between the event and the alleged damages, and the amount of the alleged damages.

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(a) DOE may initiate, on its own motion, the making of a determination as to whether or not there has been an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. In the event DOE does not so initiate the making of a determination, any affected person, or with any person whom an indemnity agreement is executed may petition DOE for a determination of whether or not there has been an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. If DOE does not have, or does not expect to have, within 7 days after it has received notification of an alleged event, enough information available to make a determination that there has been an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, DOE will publish a notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER setting forth the date and place of the alleged event and requesting any persons

having knowledge thereof to submit their information to DOE.

(b) When a procedure is initiated under paragraph (a) of this section, the principal staff which will begin immediately to assemble the relevant information and prepare a report on which the DOE can make its determination will consist of the Directors or their designees of the following Divisions or Offices: Office of Nuclear Safety, Office of Operational Safety, Office of Health and Environmental Research, the General Counsel or his designee, and a representative of the program division whose facility or device may be involved.

§ 840.3 Determination of extraordinary nuclear occurrence.

If the DOE determines that both of the criteria set forth in §840.4 and § 840.5 have been met, it will make the determination that there has been an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. If the DOE publishes a notice in the FEDERAL REGISTER in accordance with § 840.2(a) and does not make a determination within 90 days thereafter that there has been an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, the alleged event will be deemed not to be an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. The time for the making of a determination may be extended by DOE by notice published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

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