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controls current at all times and con- 1926.65 to develop the appropriate haztrolling their use;

ard controls (rather than the provi(5) Define the characteristics of the sions for technical safety requirements safety management programs nec- in paragraph (a) of this section), proessary to ensure the safe operation of vided the activity involves either: the facility, including (where applica (1) Work not done within a permable) quality assurance, procedures, nent structure, or maintenance, personnel training, con (2) The decommissioning of a facility duct of operations, emergency pre- with only low-level residual fixed raparedness, fire protection, waste man dioactivity. agement, and radiation protection; and

(6) With respect to a nonreactor nu- $830.206 Preliminary documented clear facility with fissionable material safety analysis. in a form and amount sufficient to pose

If construction begins after Decema potential for criticality, define a

ber 11, 2000, the contractor responsible criticality safety program that:

for a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 new DOE (i) Ensures that operations with fis

nuclear facility or a major modificasionable material remain subcritical

tion to a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE under all normal and credible abnor

nuclear facility must: mal conditions,

(a) Prepare a preliminary docu(ii) Identifies applicable nuclear

mented safety analysis for the facility, criticality safety standards, and

and (iii) Describes how the program

(b) Obtain DOE approval of: meets applicable nuclear criticality safety standards.

(1) The nuclear safety design criteria

to be used in preparing the preliminary $830.205 Technical safety require

documented safety analysis unless the ments.

contractor uses the design criteria in (a) A contractor responsible for a

DOE Order 420.1, Facility Safety; and hazard category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear

(2) The preliminary documented safefacility must:

ty analysis before the contractor can (1) Develop technical safety require

procure materials or components or ments that are derived from the docu

begin construction; provided that DOE mented safety analysis;

may authorize the contractor to per(2) Prior to use, obtain DOE approval

form limited procurement and conof technical safety requirements and

struction activities without approval any change to technical safety require

of a preliminary documented safety ments; and

analysis if DOE determines that the ac(3) Notify DOE of any violation of a

tivities are not detrimental to public technical safety requirement.

health and safety and are in the best (b) A contractor may take emergency

interests of DOE. actions that depart from an approved

$ 830.207 DOE approval of safety basis. technical safety requirement when no actions consistent with the technical (a) By April 10, 2003, a contractor resafety requirement are immediately sponsible for a hazard category 1, 2, or apparent, and when these actions are 3 existing DOE nuclear facility must needed to protect workers, the public submit for DOE approval a safety basis or the environment from imminent and that meets the requirements of this significant harm. Such actions must be Subpart. approved by a certified operator for a (b) Pending issuance of a safety evalreactor or by a person in authority as uation report in which DOE approves a designated in the technical safety re safety basis for a hazard category 1, 2, quirements for nonreactor nuclear fa- or 3 existing DOE nuclear facility, the cilities. The contractor must report contractor responsible for the facility the emergency actions to DOE as soon must continue to perform work in acas practicable.

cordance with the safety basis for the (c) A contractor for an environ facility in effect on October 10, 2000, or mental restoration activity may follow as approved by DOE at a later date, the provisions of 29 CFR 1910.120 or and maintain the existing safety basis consistent with the requirements of nuclear facility to analyze the facility, the this Subpart.

work to be performed, and the associated (c) If the safety basis for a hazard hazards and to identify the conditions, safe category 1, 2, or 3 existing DOE nuclear

boundaries, and hazard controls necessary to facility already meets the require

protect workers, the public and the environments of this Subpart and reflects the

ment from adverse consequences. These current work and hazards associated

analyses and hazard controls constitute the

safety basis upon which the contractor and with the facility, the contractor re

DOE rely to conclude that the facility can be sponsible for the facility must, by

operated safely. Performing work consistent April 9, 2001, notify DOE, document the

with the safety basis provides reasonable asadequacy of the existing safety basis

surance of adequate protection of workers, and request DOE to issue a safety eval

the public, and the environment. uation report that approves the exist

2. The safety basis requirements are ining safety basis. If DOE does not issue tended to further the objective of making a safety evaluation report by October safety an integral part of how work is per10, 2001, the contractor must submit a formed throughout the DOE complex. Develsafety basis pursuant to paragraph (a) oping a thorough understanding of a nuclear of this section.

facility, the work to be performed, the asso(d) With respect to a hazard category ciated hazards and the needed hazard con1, 2, or 3 new DOE nuclear facility or a trols is essential to integrating safety into major modification to a hazard cat management and work at all levels. Peregory 1, 2. or 3 DOE nuclear facility, a forming work in accordance with the safety contractor may not begin operation of

basis for a nuclear facility is the realization the facility or modification prior to

of that objective. the issuance of a safety evaluation re

C. SCOPE port in which DOE approves the safety basis for the facility or modification.

1. A contractor must establish and main

tain a safety basis for a hazard category 1, 2, APPENDIX A TO SUBPART B TO PART or 3 DOE nuclear facility because these fa830–GENERAL STATEMENT OF SAFE

cilities have the potential for significant raTY BASIS POLICY

diological consequences. DOE-STD-1027-92

(“Hazard Categorization and Accident AnalA. INTRODUCTION

ysis Techniques for compliance with DOE

Order 5480.23. Nuclear Safety Analysis ReThis appendix describes DOE's expectations for the safety basis requirements of 10 ports, Change Notice 1, September 1997) sets CFR Part 830, acceptable methods for imple

forth the methodology for categorizing a menting these requirements, and criteria

DOE nuclear facility (see Table 1). The hazDOE will use to evaluate compliance with ard categorization must be based on an inthese requirements. This Appendix does not ventory of all radioactive materials within a create any new requirements and should be nuclear facility. used consistently with DOE Policy 450.2A, 2. Unlike the quality assurance require“Identifying. Implementing and Complying ments of Part 830 that apply to all DOE nuwith Environment, Safety and Health Re clear facilities (including radiological faciliquirements" (May 15, 1996).

ties), the safety basis requirements only B. PURPOSE

apply to hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear

facilities and do not apply to nuclear facili1. The safety basis requirements of Part 830 ties below hazard category 3. require the contractor responsible for a DOE


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categorization as a hazard category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facil. ity.

D. INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT 1. The safety basis requirements are consistent with integrated safety management. DOE expects that, if a contractor complies with the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) clause on integration of environment, safety, and health into work planning and execution (48 CFR 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety and Health into Work Planning and Execution) and the DEAR clause on laws, regulations, and DOE directives (48 CFR 970.5204-2, Laws, Regulations and DOE Directives), the contractor will have established the foundation to meet the safety basis requirements.

2. The processes embedded in a safety management system should lead to a contractor establishing adequate safety bases and safety

agement programs that will meet the safety basis requirements of this Subpart. Consequently, the DOE expects if a contractor has adequately implemented integrated safety management, few additional requirements will stem from this Subpart and, in such cases, the existing safety basis prepared in accordance with integrated safety management provisions, including existing DOE safety requirements in contracts, should meet the requirements of this Subpart.

3. DOE does not expect there to be any conflict between contractual requirements and regulatory requirements. In fact, DOE expects that contract provisions will be used to provide more detail on implementation of safety basis requirements such as preparing a documented safety analysis, developing technical safety requirements, and implementing a USQ process.

DOE enforcement provisions and policy in 10 CFR Part 820.

3. DOE does not intend the adoption of the safety basis requirements to affect the existing quality assurance requirements or the existing obligation of contractors to comply with the quality assurance requirements. In particular, in conjunction with the adoption of the safety basis requirements, DOE revised the language in 10 CFR 830.122(e)(1) to make clear that hazard controls are part of the work processes to which a contractor and other persons must adhere when performing work. This obligation to perform work consistent with hazard controls adopted to meet regulatory or contract requirements existed prior to the adoption of the safety basis requirements and is both consistent with and independent of the safety basis requirements.

4. A documented safety analysis must address all hazards (that is, both radiological and nonradiological hazards) and the controls necessary to provide adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment from these hazards. Section 234A of the Atomic Energy Act, however, only authorizes DOE to issue civil penalties for violations of requirements related to nuclear safety. Therefore, DOE will impose civil penalties for violations of the safety basis requirements (including hazard controls) only if they are related to nuclear safety.


REQUIREMENTS 1. Enforcement of the safety basis requirements will be performance oriented. That is, DOE will focus its enforcement efforts on whether a contractor operates a nuclear facility consistent with the safety basis for the facility and, in particular, whether work is performed in accordance with the safety basis.

2. As part of the approval process, DOE will review the content and quality of the safety basis documentation. DOE intends to use the approval process to assess the adequacy of a safety basis developed by a contractor to ensure that workers, the public, and the environment are provided reasonable assurance of adequate protection from identified hazards. Once approved by DOE, the safety basis documentation will not be subject to regulatory enforcement actions unless DOE determines that the information which supports the documentation is not complete and accurate in all material respects, as required by 10 CFR 820.11. This is consistent with the

F. DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS 1. A documented safety analysis must demonstrate the extent to which a nuclear facility can be operated safely with respect to workers, the public, and the environment.

2. DOE expects a contractor to use a graded approach to develop a documented safety analysis and describe how the graded approach was applied. The level of detail, analysis, and documentation will reflect the complexity and hazard associated with a particular facility. Thus, the documented safety analysis for a simple, low hazard facility may be relatively short and qualitative in nature, while the documented safety analysis for a complex, high hazard facility may be quite elaborate and more quantitative. DOE will work with its contractors to ensure a documented safety analysis is appropriate for the facility for which it is being developed.

3. Because DOE has ultimate responsibility for the safety of its facilities, DOE will review each documented safety analysis to determine whether the rigor and detail of the documented safety analysis are appropriate for the complexity and hazards expected at the nuclear facility. In particular, DOE will evaluate the documented safety analysis by considering the extent to which the documented safety analysis (1) satisfies the provisions of the methodology used to prepare

the documented safety analysis and (2) ade 4. In most cases, the contract will provide quately addresses the criteria set forth in 10 the framework for specifying the methodCFR 830.204(b). DOE will prepare a Safety ology and schedule for developing a docuEvaluation Report to document the results

he results mented safety analysis. Table 2 sets forth acof its review of the documented safety anal ceptable methodologies for preparing a docuysis. A documented safety analysis must

mented safety analysis. contain any conditions or changes required by DOE.


The contractor responsible for "

May prepare its documented safety analyses by ". (1) A DOE reactor

Using the method in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Regulatory Guide 1.70, Standard Format and Content of
Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, or suc

cessor document. (2) A DOE nonreactor nuclear facility

Using the method in DOE-STD-3009, Change Notice No. 1,

January 2000, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports,

July 1994, or successor document. (3) A DOE nuclear facility with a limited operational life ... Using the method in either

(1) DOE-STD-3009., Change Notice No. 1, January 2000. OF

successor document, or (2) DOE-STD-3011-94, Guidance for Preparation of DOE

5480.22 (TSR) and DOE 5480.23 (SAR) Implementation

Plans, November 1994, or successor document. (4) The deactivation or the transition surveillance and mainte- Using the method in either: nance of a DOE nuclear facility.

(1) DOE-STD-3009, Change Notice No. 1, January 2000, or

successor document, or

(2) DOE-STD-3011-94 or successor document. (5) The decommissioning of a DOE nuclear facility.

(1) Using the method in DOE-STD-1120-98, Integration of En

vironment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activ

ties, May 1998, or successor document; (2) Using the provisions in 29 CFR 1910.120 (or 29 CFR

1926.65 for construction activities) for developing Safety and Health Programs, Work Plans, Health and Safety Plans, and Emergency Response Plans to address public safety, as well as worker safety, and (3) Deriving hazard controls based on the Safety and Health

Programs, the Work Plans, the Health and Safety Plans, and

the Emergency Response Plans. (6) A DOE environmental restoration activity that involves ei- (1) Using the method in DOE-STD-1120–98 or successor doc

ther work not done within a permanent structure or the de ument, and commissioning of a facility with only low-level residual fixed (2) Using the provisions in 29 CFR 1910.120 (or 29 CFR radioactivity.

1926.65 for construction activities) for developing a Safety and Health Program and a site-specific Health and Safety Plan (including elements for Emergency Response Plans, conduct of operations, training and qualifications, and main

tenance management). (7) A DOE nuclear explosive facility and the nuclear explosive Developing its documented safety analysis in two pieces: operations conducted therein.

(1) A Safety Analysis Report for the nuclear facility that con

siders the generic nuclear explosive operations and is prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-3009, Change Notice

No. 1, January 2000, or successor document, and (2) A Hazard Analysis Report for the specific nuclear explosive

operations prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-3016-99. Hazards Analysis Reports for Nuclear Explosive Operations,

February 1999, or successor document. (8) A DOE hazard category 3 nonreactor nuclear facility ......... Using the methods in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 of DOE-STD

3009, Change Notice No. 1, January 2000, or successor

document to address in a simplified fashion: (1) The basic description of the facility/activity and its oper.

ations, including safety structures, systems, and compo

nents; (2) A qualitative hazards analysis; and (3) The hazard controls (consisting primarily of inventory limits

and safety management programs) and their bases (9) Transportation activities .........

(1) Preparing a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging in ac

cordance with DOE-0-460.1A, Packaging and Transpor

tation Safety, October 2, 1996, or successor document and (2) Preparing a Transportation Safety Document in accordance with DOE-G-460.1-1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE O 460.1A, Packaging and Transportation Safety, June 5. 1997. or successor document.

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110) Transportation and onsite transter of nuclear explosives, (1) Preparing a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging in acnuclear components, Navel nuclear fuel elements, Category 1 1 cordance with DOE-O_461.1, Packaging and Transportation and Category Il special nuclear materials, special assem of Materials of National Security Interest, September 29, blies, and other materials of national security.

2000, or successor document and (2) Preparing a Transportation Safety Document in accordance

with DOE-M–461.1-1, Packaging and Transfer of Materials of National Security Interest Manual, September 29, 2000, or successor document.


5. Table 2 refers to specific types of nuclear the general public, and to include any refacilities. These references are not intended lated area, structure, facility, or activity to constitute an exhaustive list of the spe the extent necessary to ensure proper implecific types of nuclear facilities. Part 830 de mentation of the requirements established fines nuclear facility broadly to include all

by Part 830. The only exceptions are those those facilities, activities, or operations that

facilities specifically excluded such as accelinvolve, or will involve, radioactive and/or

erators. Table 3 defines the specific nuclear fissionable materials in such form and quan

facilities referenced in Table 2 that are not tity that a nuclear or a nuclear explosive

defined in 10 CFR 830.3 hazard potentially exists to the employees or


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(1) Deactivation ..

(2) Decontamination ....

(3) Decommissioning ...............

(4) Environmental restoration activities .....

(5) Generic nuclear explosive operation

(6) Nuclear explosive facility

The process of placing a facility in a stable and known condi

tion, including the removal of hazardous and radioactive ma

terials The removal or reduction of residual radioactive and haz

ardous materials by mechanical, chemical, or other tech

niques to achieve a stated objective or end condition Those actions taking place after deactivation of a nuclear facil

ity to retire it from service and includes surveillance and maintenance, decontamination, and/or dismantlement. The process by which contaminated sites and facilities are

identified and characterized and by which existing contamination is contained, or removed and disposed A characterization that considers the collective attributes (such

as special facility system requirements, physical weapon characteristics, or quantities and chemical physical forms of hazardous materials) for all projected nuclear explosive op

erations to be conducted at a facility A nuclear facility at which nuclear operations and activities in

volving a nuclear explosive may be conducted Any activity involving a nuclear explosive, including activities in

which main-charge, high-explosive parts and pits are collo

cated. A nuclear facility for which there is a short remaining oper

ational period before ending the facility's mission and initiating deactivation and decommissioning and for which there

are no intended additional missions other than cleanup A specific nuclear explosive subjected to the stipulated steps

of an individual operation, such as assembly or disassembly Activities conducted when a facility is not operating or during

deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning operations when surveillance and maintenance are the predominant activities being conducted at the facility. These activities are necessary for satisfactory containment of hazardous materials and protection of workers, the public, and the environment. These activities include providing periodic inspections, maintenance of structures, systems, and components, and actions to prevent the alteration of hazardous materials to an unsafe state

(7) Nuclear explosive operation .................

(8) Nuclear facility with a limited operational life

(9) Specific nuclear explosive operation
(10) Transition surveillance and maintenance activities.

sign and construction of a new DOE nuclear

6. If construction begins after December 11, 2000, the contractor responsible for the de

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