that the fall of the southern works would not have involved the surrender of those on the other bank.

Let us now review the advantages of the plan of attack which was actually carried out. The works assailed were of a comparatively less formidable construction. By means of our temporary road, we were enabled to make a detour, whereby we avoided to a great extent the fire from the opposite bank. Under any circumstances we could only have been exposed to this fire while crossing the portion of ground between the upper and lower north forts. General de Montauban miscalculated this interval in fixing it at 3280 yards. A reference to the map shows it to have been not more than 1500 yards. With these two forts in our possession, we should command the similar ones on the other side; we should be able to enfilade completely the two long faces of the large southern fort; and, finally, we should take in reverse the sea-defences of the principal northern work, from which direction alone the Chinese expected to be attacked.1

1 I am told by Sir Hope Grant that during the first China war in 1842 there was a current statement—which seems to have been revived for the present occasion-to the effect that, in a subsequently

Every single one of these anticipations were fulfilled to the letter. The capture of the weakest of the four largest works was followed by the almost instant submission of the remainder; and if success be a test of sound reasoning, it can hardly be denied that the step which Sir Hope resolved upon in opposition to the counsels of the French, was based on the soundest military wisdom.-H. KNOLLYS.

captured Chinese despatch, it was mentioned that "the ignorant barbarians, not knowing that guns could not be fired against an object behind them, came upon us in rear, and thus rendered all our cannons useless."

CHAPTER V.

MARCH FROM TIEN-TSIN TO HO-SI-WU-CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS AT LATTER PLACE-CHINESE OPEN NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE-ADVANCE TOWARDS CHAN-CHIA-WAN -SYMPTOMS OF TREACHERY-HAIRBREADTH ESCAPE OF COLONEL WALKER'S PARTY-ALLIES RESOLVE TO ATTACK CHINESE ARMY ENGAGEMENT OF CHAN-CHIA-WAN PROBYN'S CHARGE-DEMAND FOR THE RELEASE OF THE ENVOYS-SIR ROBERT NAPIER ORDERED UP FROM HOSI-WU-ENGAGEMENT AT PA-LE-CHIAO-SIR HOPE GRANT NEARLY CAPTURED BY TARTAR CAVALRY-CHARGE OF ENGLISH CAVALRY-GALLANT FRENCH ATTACK ON CANAL BRIDGE CHINESE OVERTURES FOR PEACE-ALLIES REFUSE TO TREAT UNTIL THE ENVOYS ARE GIVEN UPPROBYN'S RECONNAISSANCE-GENERAL IGNATIEFF LENDS A MAP OF PEKIN-DIVERSITY OF OPINION BETWEEN ALLIED COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF AS TO TRUE POINT OF ATTACK OF PEKIN ARRIVAL OF SIR ROBERT NAPIER'S DIVISION AT TANG-CHOW -SIEGE-TRAIN COMES UPPROBYN'S SECOND RECONNAISSANCE-THE ALLIED ULTIMATUM-INTERMEDIATE DEPOTS ESTABLISHED — - LETTERS FROM PARKES FURTHER ADVANCE FRENCH "MISS" OUR TRACK-FRUITLESS SEARCH FOR THEMTHEY ARE DISCOVERED AT THE SUMMER PALACE-SIR HOPE VISITS SUMMER PALACE-LOOTING-CHINESE CONSENT TO RELEASE THE ENVOYS, WHO RETURN TO CAMP -THEIR SAD STORY -HOSPITAL RETURNS - DESCRIPTION OF PEKIN.

ON 31st August, three Commissioners arrived 1 from Pekin with a view to stop our advance. They gave out that they were intrusted with full powers; but this turned out to be false. They were only mandarins of small importance; and therefore, when on the 7th September they brought forward pretended terms of a convention, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros instantly broke off negotiations, stating their resolution not to conclude a treaty before reaching Tang-chow, fifteen miles from Pekin.

[Tien-tsin, on the Pekin road, is thirty-five miles distant from Taku. The French advanced by the left bank of the Peiho, the English by the right; and by the 5th of September the bulk of our troops had been concentrated about the above-mentioned town. Throughout the camp there was a confident anticipation that all the fighting had come to an end-an expectation which was shared by Sir Hope Grant, as is manifest from the following despatches:

"HEADQUARTERS, TIEN-TSIN, 3d September 1860.

"MY LORD,-I have the honour to request

1 At Tien-tsin.

that your Excellency will inform me what amount of escort you wish to accompany the special Embassy to Pekin; and also, in about how many days they will be required to be ready to start.-I have, &c.

"J. HOPE GRANT.

"The Right Hon. the EARL of ELGIN

and KINCARDINE."

The strength of the English escort was fixed at 1000 men, and a battery of artillery; but the French, for reasons best known to themselves, objected to our so employing more than 150

men.

"HEADQUARTERS, TIEN-TSIN, 7th September 1860.

"MY LORD,-I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the recent operations in the north of China having terminated successfully, peace is about to be concluded with the Chinese Government. I shall be much obliged, therefore, by your ordering all further supplies of every kind. for the army in China, that have not yet left India, to be stopped. Orders have been sent to Singapore to send back everything that has not