Page images

simplification, efficiency, and economy any of such agencies should be coordinated with other agencies, or abolished, or the personnel thereof reduced, and make recommendations with respect thereto. Copies of the report or reports of such studies and recommendations, together with the essential facts in connection therewith, shall be transmitted to the President and to the Congress.

In other words, you just started your work; you haven't gone into it; you just started your work.

Mr. GULICK. I thought Mr. Brownlow had covered that accurately in his initial statement to the committee. We have in course of completion now the various factual memoranda and reports which have been prepared on the basis of which we have devoted ourselves to this major job of dealing with the more efficient general management and coordination of the divisions of the executive department.

The question of overlapping and duplication, to which reference is made in that statement we dealt with to a contribution, through an allotment of our funds, as Mr. Brownlow explained to you at the opening session, through the Brookings study, which is reporting from time to time through Senator Byrd's committee.

Representative CoCHRAN. Are you going to stand on the Brookings Institution report?

Mr. GULICK. Not necessarily. These reports which are being made are reports of experts and express their individual views.

Representative COCHRAN. This law specifically provides that you shall do this and not the Brookings Institution.

Mr. GULICK. Well, it provides that we shall make recommendations with regard to the general organization management, and that we have done, sir, in the report which has been submitted to the Congress, as required by law. When we shall have submitted to you the remainder of the documents that we have prepared we will have complied fully with the purposes of the law.

Representative COCHRAN. Together with the Brookings Institution report?

Mr. GULICK. We are going into that, so far as we find it necessary, in connection with this broader question of general organization.

Representative COCHRAN. You are going out into the field; you are going to look into the situation yourself to determine for yourself whether or not the consolidated bureaus, such as you mentioned a few minutes ago, the national parks, the forestry, and so forth?

Mr. GULICK. We are not going into those details. We do not regard that that is within the terms of the statement, nor within the necessary features of the job, and we feel that that would seriously overlap the work which was undertaken by the Senate committee and House committee. We are endeavoring to work out with those two committees some general arrangement so there will be no overlapping

Representative COCHRAN. Will we receive from you some report that will indicate the agencies which you think should be abolished and which should be grouped ?

Mr. GULICK. We have already indicated the agencies, the general grouping that should be worked out for the agencies.

Representative COCHRAN. What agency have you indicated should be abolished ?

Mr. GULICK. Oh, there are several. The National Emergency Council.

Representative COCHRAN. I mean where they are spending some money.

Mr. GULICK. We were not requested to deal with, nor does that statement raise before us, the question of the broad policies of the work that is to be carried on by the Government. We are responsible for the preparation of plans, to carry on such policies, such work as may be determined upon by the Congress and the President. So that we are engaged as efficiency engineers would be engaged to deal with the structure, not with the jobs that are to be done.

Representative COCHRAN. For instance, I have repeatedly heard that the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the waterworks of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, is being handled by the Hydrographic Service of the Navy, and the land work of the Coast and Geodetic Survey is being handled by the Geological Survey. If that be true, and your investigations would show it to be true, why not recommend to this committee that we abolish the Coast and Geodetic Survey? I do not pass judgment now; I merely suggest.

Mr. GULICK. That is a question of overlapping and duplication which falls within the field of the committee which the Senate set up and the House set up to deal with those problems.

Representative COCHRAN. It also falls within your field, does it not?

Mr. GULICK. We do not feel that it does.

Representative GIFFORD. Try to keep in mind that broad framework which you have there, which I see has 12 hooks, with other hooks hung underneath so you will have 13 principal hooks. What I mean is, how can you present a structure to us, a framework, when you do not know what you want to put in it? How would you know how to build a house when you do not know how many rooms you desire and what you would put into the rooms? You are asking us to pass on a framework when you do not know what is going into the house. Do you recommend a plan for legislation before the scheme is ready? Why was this report seemingly hurried along and you

ask us to build this framework when we do not know what we are going to do with it?

Mr. GULICK. Well, now, you have asked two questions there, first as to the question of the timing of the report, as you phrase it, "Why was it hurried along", and, second, why is it reasonable to draw a general scheme without the detailed plans that you would put on each one of the hooks.

On the first question that you raise, with regard to the hooks, I will say this, that it is perfectly clear to anyone who examines the structure of this Government that we have scores of agencies that are at loose ends, over which no man can possibly exercise general supervision. We are trying to bring some order out of that chaos. We would sit down then to see what would be a satisfactory general scheme of reorganization for these over a hundred separate agencies. On January 1, as I remember it, there were 134 separate agencies or activities reporting to the President in some fashion. About 76 of them were of first-rate importance. We said to ourselves, “What are the new types of activities which have been developed in the United States since about 1913, when the last of the existing departments was set up?"

In going over that we found that there were two major lines of activity which have come into the Government. One was in the general field of human betterment, social affairs, and the other was in the field of major public works. Up until this time, except incidental things that were taken up at various times, like the Panama Canal, we had no broad demand for a continuous stream of public works.

Representative GIFFORD. I would not want to continue that line of argument. I just want to ask you if you think it would be better to have one more hook and make it a very large one?

Mr. GULICK. There is danger in administration in doing that.

Representative GIFFORD. You have a broad scheme hung up for us to look at, and after all this detailed study we bring up a definite instance, and you cannot answer us, and you will not, until you go into the field, as you say. We do not know whether that room be a dining room, we do not know whether it will be an eating establishment, we do not know whether it ought to go into the parlor, you cannot tell us which hook to hang it on.

Mr. GULICK. Because the question of the precise hook depends upon the precise division of the work. In some cases you have to study the work to work it out satisfactorily.

Representative GIFFORD. Are those hooks so diversified that you cannot tell whether they belong in the dining room, the parlor, or the cellar?

Mr. GULICK. That is what we have endeavored to do, in stating there what the 12 hooks will deal with, we have named the dining room, the kitchen, and the bedrooms.

Representative GIFFORD. The point that Mr. Cochran is making I am sure is very appropriate. According to what he read, if you can take a sample and say which hook that belongs on, if that is the meaning of all this work of 2 or 3 years, we might as well not build this framework, if we do not know what goes in it. I cannot pass on a sample of what would be in that room. It looks to me like I do not want to build the structure if you are not prepared to say what you can use it for.

Mr. GULICK. Congressman, have you examined the statement of what the 12 hooks will be? We have tried to state there the gen-, eral nature of the dining room, the kitchen and the bedrooms to which you referred.

Representative GIFFORD. Mr. Cochran is suggesting that the structure ought to be more completed before we are expected to act. You haven't completed the details of the structure enough. An architect is very careful about his details if he wants to attract a customer.

Senator HARRISON. Mr. Gulick, let me make this observation in connection with this. I happened to be a member of the committee in 1921 and 1922 appointed by the House and Senate. We got a beautiful map with these rooms from President Harding as to this reorganization plan. It was one of his major propositions in his campaign. We worked for 2 years. He stated specifically about these various things that you want to do, and the Cabinet officers fought each other every time they came before the committee. Consequently we did nothing for 2 years. In my opinion, you have got | to give this power to the Executive if anything is to be accomplished.

Senator BYRNES. Mr. Gulick, what difference is there between this proposal of yours and the proposal of the committee under the Hoover administration?

Mr. GULICK. The essential difference is this, that we propose that the Executive shall be given the tools with which to do the job after you have given him the power. That is what was never done before.

Senator BYRNES. We gave to President Hoover the power to merge and consolidate.

Mr. GULICK. That is right.

Senator BYRNES. And to abolish. But we did put in a provision that his actions should be sent to the Congress, and either House had the right, by resolution, to veto it. Is that correct?

Senator Byrnes. In your report, in your recommendation you do not make any such provision.

Mr. Gulick. May I address myself to that. The provision, as stated in the grant to President Hoover, proved utterly unworkabie. Nothing was done under it, practically.

Senator BYRNES. I will say this, in justice to President Hoover, that I presented that on the floor of the Senate, urging that President Hoover be given that power, but it was not a very good time to accomplish results in that this power was given to him in the summer of 1932 and we were in the midst of a campaign. He did send one order to the House, as I recall it, and the House vetoed it by resolution, which discouraged him from sending any others.

Mr. GULICK. So then, when the Economy Act was passed, that was changed and it was required that the Executive order should lie before the Congress for some period of time, 60 days if it were in session, and in that case the veto could be exercised not by an individual House of the Congress, but could be exercised by the two Houses acting concurrently, and the approval of the President. Now, that type of veto is no different from the type of veto which we forsee within the plan which we have outlined here; namely, that the Executive, after issuing the order carrying out the reorganization, must then bring up that reorganization in his next Budget. It appears right there in the material within the Budget. So that the appropriations committees of the House and Senate would have the chance there to review the reasonableness of the things that had been done and to insist on refusing to accept it, if they so desire, and that requires not the two-thirds vote as would be the case if they were done by joint action subject to Presidential veto.

Senator BARKLEY. Would the refusal of the committees of the two Houses, or jointly in their report to the Houses upon the appropriations set up in the Budget after the reorganization, would that of itself nullify the reorganization by simply refusing to appropriate money for it? I understand that the committees of either House, or both Houses, under your plan, would have no power to nullify the order of reorganization, except insofar as their refusal to appropriate money to carry it out might be a nullification.

Mr. GULICK. There would be a discussion of the problem and you would work out a compromise, and an act could be passed by Congress.

Senator BYRNES. For illustration, a bill was passed in the Senate yesterday, an independent offices appropriation bill; as it came from

the House it had an appropriation for the Central Statistical Board. We struck it out. After a conference, the Senate adopted it. Is that your idea as to how it would work out? If we wanted to abolish it, we could abolish it if the House would agree with us on that action?

Mr. GULICK. Or you can take it up in an act. Having the order lie before the Congress for 60 days, it seems to us, was no different from the provision that we suggest here.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us follow that up a little further. As a matter of practical operation of the Government, assume that the President is given the authority to make the reorganization, which, I think, is probably the only way a reorganization ever can be made, if it is made; assume that he acts under that authority and then sends his Budget in in conformity to the reorganization. If the Congress, or if the Appropriations Committee in either House, dislikes the reorganization and expresses its opinion on the subject by refusing to make an appropriation in conformity to it, how will the Government be operated until that controversy is settled ?

Assume that there is an irreconcilable conflict on the subject, as is readily conceivable, and the Congress persists in its refusal to adopt it in accordance with the Budget which comprehends the reorganization. We would then have no Budget in force, no appropriation, and your entire Government machinery would be without the ability to function for lack of funds.

Senator O'MAHONEY. And the Budget Bureau failed to recommend an appropriation for the agency which has been discontinued!

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, it would not make a recommendation for the old agency, because the old agency no longer exists.

Senator O'MAHONEY, Exactly.
The CHAIRMAN. The new organization is in force.

Senator O’MAHONEY. So you have the Budget Bureau refusing on one side and the committee on the other.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a particularly hopeless conflict. My thought was that your plan contemplated, within certain limitations, giving the Executive the power to make the allocations; passing up to him, if you please, the buck—that is the way we sometimes express it when we find something is difficult and we want somebody else to do it-passing up to him the problem of determining what shall go in the various compartments of this new framework.

My understanding of your plan was that that was final, unless the Congress should see fit to legislate further upon the subject, and that a budget presented in pursuance to the reorganization would necessarily carry with it the obligation upon the Congress to make appropriations. We frequently make appropriations in accordance with existing law where questions are raised as to whether the statute authorizing the appropriation ought really to have been passed. I can remember a hundred times, in my service in both the House and Senate, when it would be said by the Committee on Appropriations, the representatives of that organization, "We have incorporated this item in the appropriation bill for the reason that the law authorized it, and we feel that it is our duty not to legislate, not to insist upon legislation, but to follow the existing law with respect to authorizations.” Now, if you depart from that plan, you will have the Government in a situation where it cannot operate.

« PreviousContinue »