Mr. BUCK. We are only giving him control functions, aside from these other things that we mentioned.

Representative TABER. Now, a man who is Secretary of the Treasury is ex officio the head of the accounting system, he is ex officio. the head of the disbursing system, he is ex officio the head of the Procurement Division, he is ex officio the head of the apportionment and allotments, and he is the man who, under that system, is ex officio the head of the Claim Settlement Division.

Mr. BUCK. Surely, because those are all control functions.

Representative TABER. Now, do you not think you are putting contradictory functions into the hands of one man?

Mr. Buck. I think the only contradictory functions are those which we have discussed from time to time, namely, the control and the postaudit. We have taken out the postaudit and simply given him control functions along with some other functions which are clearly fiscal in character.

Representative TABER. You are giving him a preaudit of all accounts and all payments.

Mr. Buck. That is right.

Representative TABER. That is the only executive audit you are providing in the scheme you are setting up. The postaudit is of no value whatever, except as you have the matter drift into the Appropriations Committee later on.

Mr. BUCK. Would you say that the present audit is of no value because there is a postaudit in 90 percent of the cases?

Representative TABER. Oh, no; no.

Mr. BUCK. The other one will be just as effective as this one is at the present moment.

Representative TABER. Oh, no.

Mr. Buck. Why not?

Representative TABER. Because your present Comptroller General has the authority to fix the balances of the departments under the

statute.

Senator BYRD. He signs the warrants.

Representative TABER. And signs the warrants; yes.

Mr. BUCK. We decided the other day that was incidental. Representative TABER. Your proposed Auditor General has absolutely no power whatever except to report to Congress.

Mr. BUCK. After all, everything comes back to Congress.
Representative TABER. Oh, yes.

Mr. Buck. Let us look at the powers of Congress. The power of the purse is vested in Congress, first, to make appropriations for the executive and the administrative departments, and, second, to review what they spend. And this Auditor General would be the agent that would provide the information for that review. It is by the process of review of the expenditures that Congress finds out, not only what the departments did with the funds it gave them but what they will probably do with the next money they get from Congress.

Representative TABER. Yes; but you find that out

Mr. BUCK (interposing). By asking them before the Appropriations Committee?

Representative TABER. Why, certainly.

Mr. BUCK. Is that it?

Representative TABER. That is it.

Mr. Buck. Then you do not have any disinterested facts in the case. You simply take the administrative heads' and the bureau chiefs' word for it.

Representative TABER. You have no report on them except what you get from the Budget, and what you develop in some other way? Mr. BUCK. I would like to see a system by which you will have a report. Let me put into the record here, Mr. Chairman

Representative TABER (interposing). I, frankly, think I know how we could get a report, but I do not think your way is the way to get it.

Mr. Buck. Will you let me put into the record, Mr. Chairman, what I consider to be the principal functions of the Auditor General! The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. Buck. Number 1. Postaudit of the expenditure document, that is, the vouchers, pay rolls, contracts, and so forth, in whatever detail may be necessary to determine the legality and propriety of the expenditures.

2. Examine and audit all accounts and bookkeeping entries of expenditures in the various stages, that is, as appropriations, apportionments, allotments, obligations, balances of appropriations, bonds, disbursements, and any cost analyses.

This, of course, would apply to all departments, the operating departments as well as the Treasury Department.

3. Examine and audit the revenues and receipts of the Government from the point of assessment until the moneys are placed in the custody of the United States Treasurer.

That is very imperfectly done at the present time.

4. Ascertain if adequate checks are maintained by the revenueproducing agencies over the receipts of moneys belonging to the Government.

5. Ascertain if adequate checks and controls are maintained by the Treasury Department and by the spending departments and establishments over the expenditure of funds.

6. Examine the financial statements issued by the Treasury officers and other accounting officers to ascertain if the fiscal information is accurate and in the best form.

7. Report to the special committee of Congress on the foregoing audits and examinations, with suggestions for improvements in fiscal procedure.

8. Act as the investigational agency of Congress, or any one of its committees, in examining and reporting on financial practices and procedures in any department or establishment of the Government.

Representative VINSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask some questions? The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Representative VINSON. When did you arrive at that last thought, Mr. Buck?

Mr. BUCK. What is that?

Representative VINSON. No. 8.

Mr. Buck. No. 8? When did I personally?
Representative VINSON. Yes.

Mr. Buск. Oh, I do not know; quite a long time ago. I have written quite a bit on the subject, going back, I should say, 10 years. Senator HARRISON. Read that again.

Mr. Buck. A lot of it is in a book which I published in 1929. Representative VINSON. I want it followed up. Read that again. for Senator Harrison.

Mr. BUCK. No. 8?

Senator HARRISON. Yes.

Mr. BUCK. Act as the investigational agency of Congress, or any one of its committees, in examining and reporting on financial practices and procedures in any department or establishment of the Government.

Representative VINSON. Now, that same thing was purposed when the Budget Act was passed, was it not?

Mr. BUCK. I think to some extent; yes.

Representative VINSON. All right. That was one of the purposes for the passage of the Budget Act.

Representative TABER. It is right in the act.

Representative VINSON. It is right in the act, is it not?

Mr. Buck. The Budget Bureau acts as an investigational agency for the President, and I think it also provides in there that the Comptroller General is to make special reports to Congress or any one of its committees.

Representative TABER. The Comptroller General is specifically required by the Budget Act to make reports.

Representative VINSON. Now, then, that has not been complied with is that not correct? Insofar as the Budget Bureau or the Comptroller General's office being used as a body to make investigations for the use of Congress, that has fallen into the discard. That just never has happened.

Mr. BUCK. There have been a few cases pointed out to me where some studies have been made.

Representative VINSON. I know, but, as a regular proposition, year in and year out, conveying information to the legislative branch of the Government under the language in the Budget Act directed to the Bureau of the Budget and also the Comptroller General, it has not worked out practically, has it?

Mr. BUCK. I would say that it had not been used to any great

extent.

Representative VINSON. That is right. Now, when the Bureau of Efficiency was created, what was its function, what was its purpose? Mr. Buck. It was supposed to make efficiency studies and ascertain better methods of procedure for the administrative departments. Representative VINSON. And was not that supposed to be an arm of Congress, or rather not an arm in the technical sense but to assist Congress in legislative and appropriation measures?

Mr. Buck. I do not think that they were so much a congressional arm as they were executive. I think they were supposed to haveRepresentative VINSON. As a matter of fact, of course, technically, they were executive.

Mr. BUCK. I think that is correct.

Representative VINSON. Your Budget is executive and your Comptroller General is executive, and that is the weakness of relying upon

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the executive side to make the investigations for the purpose of the use of those investigations by the legislative branch.

Mr. Buck. There seems to be some difference of opinion among the members of the committee. You say the Comptropller General is executive. I just had it impressed upon me that he was an agent of Congress.

Representative VINSON. He is supposed to be an agent of Congress, but I think we won't have any quarrel in regard to the question of the power as to the control feature of it. You and your committee have reached the conclusion that the control features of the Comptroller General's office should be divorced. Now, what is the real reason for that conclusion? Is it based upon practical situations, or is it based upon a legal ground, or both?

Mr. Buck. For myself I would say that it was largely practical, because in 15 years it is obvious the present organization has failed to perform the functions that it was intended to perform.

Representative VINSON. Just as the Budget has failed to be of any particular help to the Congress in regard to their investigations.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection the Budget Act seems to require "that the Bureau at the request of any committee of either House having jurisdiction over revenue or appropriations shall furnish the committee such aid and information as it may request.'

Do you mean to say, Mr. Vinson, that requests have been made that have not been complied with under that section?

Representative VINSON. What section are you referring to?

The CHAIRMAN. I am referring to section 212 of the Budget Act

of 1921.

Representative VINSON. Yes; I make that statement upon my own personal responsibility. I was a member of the Appropriations Committee. I endeavored to secure information that had been gathered together by the Bureau of Efficiency. And the Committee on Appropriations of the House was refused that information.

In one of the appropriations bills, which was an independent offices appropriations bill, I caused an amendment to be inserted that would bring that information to the Appropriations Committee or to the house. When it went to conference, I recall very vividly the surprise that Senator Reed Smoot had that the House Members and the House committee could not get that information. And I recall that he said that he got it, and it was mentioned that we were not all Reed Smoots.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember when that was?

Representative VINSON. That was in 1927, probably, or 1928. And there was an amendment that required the Bureau of Efficiency to inform the Appropriations Committee of the House. It gave the authority for the Bureau of the Budget to furnish that information to a committee.

And I was thinking, Senator Robinson, that it was that language that was inserted at that time. I do not have it.

The CHAIRMAN. At what time?

Representative VINSON. About 1927.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I have quoted the language, Mr. Vinson, in the act approved June 10, 1921.

Representative VINSON. We were not able to get the information under that section, and I know it was amended in this appropriation bill. We were supposed to get it under that.

The CHAIRMAN. Under section 212, the act of 1921, approved June 10, 1921, the committee upon request was entitled to the information. Senator LA FOLLETTE. That refers, does it not, to the Bureau of the Budget?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. And Representative Vinson is talking about the Bureau of Efficiency.

Representative VINSON. Yes; the Bureau of Efficiency.

Now, the point I am making is this: You cannot rely upon the Executive to make the investigations and report to the legislative branch. That has been tried several different times. And it listens well, when a person has a pleasant voice, and it looks well on paper, but those of us who have been here know that if you are going to get information for the Congress it has got to be done through an arm of the Congress.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Excuse me. Is not that what is suggested here?

Mr. Buck. That is what we are proposing.

Representative VINSON. I did not understand it that way.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. The Auditor General will do that?
Mr. BUCK. Yes.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. These are all the things which Mr. Buck conceives the Auditor General will do.

Senator HARRISON. This is the type of information that would come to Congress by the Auditor General.

Representative VINSON. I am not just certain, but I have carried it in my mind throughout the years, while the Bureau of Efficiency was created technically as an arm of the Executive I think it was created to assist Congress, to bring information to Congress to be used in considering legislation on appropriations.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. Could we not assume that at least this Auditor General, if it was set up under this system, would be just as much an arm of the Congress and just as responsible to an agency of the Congress as the present Comptroller General?

Representative VINSON. And nothing has been done under the Comptroller General's act looking towards bringing information to Congress upon which to pass legislation or appropriations.

Senator LA FOLLETTE. În the last analysis is not that Congress' fault? Are not we guilty of laches, or whatever it is you lawyers call it? Are not we guilty of sitting on our rights, and not exercising them?

Representative VINSON. Certainly we have the power, but this proposal creates a joint committee that has no legislative power, and it seems to me it is just a sort of mote on the law. It is removed from the Appropriations Committee, it is removed from the other legislative committees, and it does seem to me it will function as a joint committee. One further word. After you have transmitted to the joint committee information such as the gentleman referred to on the witness stand this morning, whether a person spent 50 cents in Europe for baskets or 75 cents, or whether he spent more money