835 demanded of him to be outside the requirements of the contract," he could appeal to the head of the department, "whose decision or that of his duly authorized representative shall be final and binding upon the parties to the contract." Held: The Court of Claims may not review an administrative decision made under this provision. 1. Contractual provisions for the settlement of disputes have long been used by the Government and sustained by this Court, are not forbidden by Congress, and should not be frustrated by judicial "interpretation' of contracts. 2. Regardless of whether the dispute in this case involved a question of fact or a question of law, it was within the ambit of the clear language of the provision for the final administrative settlement of such disputes. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. EDWIN C. M. DICKEY, PETITIONER, v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 47558] [114 C. Cls. 439; 338 U. S. 938] Patents; infringement; anticipation by prior art. Petition dismissed. Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court January 9, 1950. THE UNITED STATES, PETITIONER, v. HELEN W. BENEDICT AND FRANK B. SMITH, AS TRUSTEES, AND LELAND E. STOWELL AND UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES UNDER THE WILL OF JOHN E. ANDRUS, DECEASED [No. 48463] [112 C. Cls. 550; 338 U. S. 692] On writ of certiorari (336 U. S. 966) to review a judgment of the Court of Claims holding that under a trust indenture 115 C. Cls. which required the trustees to pay a charitable corporation 45% of the total 1944 income of the trust, after expenses, the trustees were entitled, under Sections 22 and 162 (a) of U. S. Code, Title 26, to deduct on the fiduciary return 45% of the full amount of long-term capital gains which had been set aside for such charitable use, and not merely 45% of one-half of the long-term capital gains by reason of the "capital gains" provisions of Section 117 (a) and (b). The judgment of the Court of Claims was reversed February 13, 1950, by the Supreme Court in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Burton. The syllabus of the Supreme Court opinion is as follows: In 1944, trustees permanently set aside a charitable contribution from gains realized upon the disposition of capital assets held in the trust for more than six months. Pursuant to § 117 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code, they treated only 50% of these capital gains as income in computing the income of the trust. Held: Under § 162 (a), only 50% of the charitable contribution (the porportionate part attributable to the taxable part of the capital gains) could be deducted in computing the federal income tax of the trust. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Jackson were of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Claims should be affirmed for the reasons which it gave. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter filed a separate opinion. JOHN J. CASALE, INC., PETITIONER, v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 48642] [114 C. Cls. 599; 338 U. S. 954] Transportation tax; trucks leased and drivers furnished by lessor for transportation of property. Petition dismissed. Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court February 13, 1950. 835 HARRIS HENRY HORNER, PETITIONER, v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 49030] [114 C. Cls. 612; 338 U. S. 956] Jursidiction; suit for compensation for use of patented invention. Plaintiff's petition dismissed on defendant's motion. Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court February 13, 1950. Rehearing denied March 13, 1950, 339 U. S. 916. DAISY B. WOOTEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 49010] [114 C. Cls. 608; 339 U. S. 903] Income tax; assignment of claim for refund void under the statute. Defendant's demurrer sustained and plaintiffs' petition dismissed. Plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court February 20, 1950. WILLIAM MacDONALD, ET AL., COPARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS AS TARLTON-MacDONALD COMPANY, PETITIONERS, v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 46505] [113 C. Cls. 300; 114 C. Cls. 730; 339 U. S. 911] Government contract; under lump sum war construction contract, the contractor obligated to secure lumber wherever possible and at price necessary. Petition dismissed. Plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court March 13, 1950. 115 C. Cls. J. H. CRAIN AND R. E. LEE WILSON, JR., TRUSTEES OF LEE WILSON AND COMPANY, A BUSINESS TRUST, PETITIONERS, v. THE UNITED STATES [Nos. 45779 and 45997] [114 C. Cls. 94; 339 U. S. 911] Agricultural Adjustment Act; jurisdiction; discretion of Secretary of Agriculture in determination of facts. Petitions dismissed. Plaintiffs' petitions for writs of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court March 13, 1950. THE UNITED STATES, PETITIONER, v. COMMODITIES TRADING CORPORATION, ET AL. (S. C. No. 156) THE COMMODITIES TRADING CORPORATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. THE UNITED STATES (S. C. No. 163) [C. Cls. No. 46611] [113 C. Cls. 244; 339 U. S. 121] On writs of certiorari (337 U. S. 857) to review a judgment of the Court of Claims holding that wartime ceiling price was not the proper measure of just compensation for a quantity of pepper, a nonperishable commodity, requisitioned. On March 27, 1950, the judgment of the Court of Claims was reversed by the Supreme Court and the cause remanded with directions to enter an appropriate judgment based on the maximum ceiling price of the pepper at the time it was taken.* Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, in which it was held: First. The Supreme Court has never attempted to prescribe a rigid rule for determining what is "just compensation" under all circumstances and in all cases, under the Fifth Amendment. Fair market value has normally been accepted as a just standard. But while *See order June 5, 1950, Vol. 116. 835 Congress did not expressly provide that prices fixed under the Price Control Act should constitute the measure of just compensation, the court concludes that the Congressional purpose and the necessities of a wartime economy require that ceiling prices be accepted as the measure of just compensation, so far as that can be done consistently with the objectives of the Fifth Amendment. Second. The Emergency Price Control Act's provision that the Act should not be construed as compelling an owner to sell his property against his will did not give rise to a "retention value" which must be added to the ceiling price in order to meet the constitutional requirement of "just compensation" in case of requisition. Third. While there is no constitutional obstacle to treating "generally fair and equitable" ceiling prices as the normal measure of just compensation for commodities held for sale, there must be room for special exceptions to such a general rule. However, in the instant case "Commodities", just like other traders in pepper and other products, bought pepper with the intention of ultimately selling on the market. No more than any other owner is "Commodities" entitled to "retention value", a value based on speculation concerning the price it might have obtained for pepper after the war and after price controls were removed. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter filed a separate opinion dissenting in part. Mr. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion. Petition for rehearing denied May 1, 1950. STANDARD-VACUUM OIL COMPANY, PETITIONER, v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 48319] [112 C. Cls. 137; 339 U. S. 157] On writ of certiorari (336 U. S. 935) to review a judgment of the Court of Claims granting defendant's motion to dismiss certain claims in plaintiff's amended petition and holding that since the plaintiff knew that its stores and supplies in the Philippine Islands had either been requisitioned for military purposes by the United States Govern |