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evidence throughout bore the mark of moderation and foresight. After pointing out how Mr. Rhodes let the whole day slip (ie., Monday, Dec. 30, 1895) without doing anything to recall Dr. Jameson, he added that "Mr. Rhodes' mind was in such a condition at that time that he did not think he recollected clearly what took place." Mr. Hofmeyr, he considered, saved South Africa from civil war by urging the issue of the proclamation. Mr. Hofmeyr had been a minister of the Crown and was a member of the Executive, and his interference could not be regarded as that of an outsider. The effect of the raid had been, according to Mr. Schreiner-(1) to destroy men's trust in each other; (2) to injure the Cape commercially by making them lose control of the railway through the Free State; (3) to revive race antagonism, which was nearly at an end; (4) to create in men's minds an impression-an unfounded one, no doubt-that the Imperial Government tolerated or supported the policy which led to the raid; (5) to lower the prestige, dignity, and honour of England in South Africa. The Dutch people of Cape Colony were thoroughly loyal. "There was no grosser falsehood perpetrated than the constant attempts that were made to make them out disloyal. ... Perhaps they were patriotic as well."

Mr. Schreiner insisted that the demonstrations held in Mr. Rhodes' favour by no means represented a unanimous feeling. Every quiet, reasonable Englishman" who was not a strong partisan of Mr. Rhodes stood quite aloof. Such Dutch demonstrations as took place he seemed to think might be accounted for by a kind of dread of Mr. Rhodes' power. "This feeling seemed to have weighed with a certain section of the people, who feared that if they took up an honest, straightforward opposition to Mr. Rhodes, he could make it a very bad business. for them in some way or other." The Dutch at the Cape would not be on the side of the Transvaal if it failed to observe its treaty obligations. A racial war was his deepest dread; the idea of the European garrison of 800,000 whites cutting each other's throats in the midst of a black population of nearly 6,000,000 was a thing too awful to contemplate. The franchise grievance of the Uitlanders was, he considered, a real and substantial grievance to a section of the population. "It affects a large section, but I very much doubt that it affects the majority. The people who feel it are the people of South African birth." It was a theoretic grievance for immigrants. The dynamite monopoly was a substantial grievance, as it affected the mining industry. He did not think there was any substantial grievance in connection with education. "The exclusion of Uitlanders from the jury-box was a grievance, but he did not like adjectives, and would not say that it was a serious one." As to the law about public meetings, it would be a grievance if enforced, but it was "a dead letter.' The alien law was no doubt offensive, but steps must be taken to exclude

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undesirable people. During the last ten years the alterations in the franchise had been such as to make it more and more difficult for Uitlanders to obtain the vote. The Hollanders employed by the Transvaal Government did their work very efficiently. The Transvaal gold law was far more liberal than that in other parts of Africa. The most important feature of the last day of Mr. Schreiner's examination (March 23) consisted in the series of questions put by Mr. Chamberlain, the object of which appeared to be to elicit the fact that President Krüger had repeatedly attempted to infringe or evade the provisions of the London convention, and was only prevented from doing so by pressure exerted both from the Cape and from the Imperial Government. The crucial question and answer of the examination were as follows. Mr. Chamberlain asked "If we adopt your advice and maintain the convention, and determine that the Transvaal shall not wriggle out of its treaty obligations, we want, of course, to know whether our Dutch fellow-subjects will support us as well as the English. You seem now to tell us that we could not count upon that. I want to know whether, if we follow the policy you have recommended, we should be likely to have the support of what you call the loyal Dutch in the Cape Colony." Mr. Schreiner replied: "I cannot conceive a case in which the loyal Dutch of the Cape Colony would not go with her Majesty's Government, provided there had been, as I understand from you there would be, a fair trial of all diplomatic methods, and, if possible, a reference to arbitration if there was a difference of opinion as to whether there had been a breach or not. They feel strongly that good faith must be observed, but that nice questions on which lawyers may and do differ should not form the basis of an attack. In the latter event their loyalty would be put to a very severe strain."

At the conclusion of Mr. Schreiner's evidence Dr. Jameson was called (March 26), and in reply to an invitation from the committee made the following statement:

"At the end of 183, shortly after the conclusion of the Matabele war, I had many conversations with Mr. Rhodes on the subject of the federation of South Africa, and the obstacles presented to this by the attitude of the South African Republic. About the middle of 1894 Mr. Rhodes and Mr. John Hays Hammond were with me in Matabeleland, and the position of the Transvaal and the grievances of the Uitlanders in Johannesburg were freely discussed by us. When in England in the latter part of 1894 I urged the transfer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the Chartered Company. I was again in Johannesburg in March, 1895. On my return to Rhodesia from London I found the feeling of resentment against the Executive very high, and a rooted determination on the part of the general body of people to insist upon, and if necessary enforce, reforms. Rifle associations had been formed, and there

were other indications that the inhabitants were preparing for emergencies. In Rhodesia I gave special attention to the formation of the Rhodesia Horse, a volunteer force, by the Chartered Company, and to the general efficiency of the Matabeleland Mounted Police. In July, 1895, Khama and two other native chiefs were about to sail for England to stop if possible the administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate being given to the Chartered Company. I therefore went to Cape Town to confer with Mr. Rhodes. I returned to Buluwayo rom Cape Town, taking Johannesburg on my way.

"I again made my own observations as to the discontent of the general population, and finding this discontent more pronounced I, for the first time, discussed the position with influential and leading Johannesburg residents engaged in all kinds of businesses and professions. In October, 1895, a large contingent of the Matabele Mounted Police was moved down from Rhodesia through the Bechuanaland Protectorate to Pitsani, and I went to Cape Town, where I had further conversations with Mr. Rhodes, and explained to him the opinion I had formed as the result of my visits to Johannesburg respecting the position there and the intention of the people to rise if they could not otherwise obtain the redress of their grievances.

"In October and November I was again in Johannesburg, and found matters much advanced. I had many protracted discussions with the leaders, and was informed of their wishes and plans. Their first proposal was to act alone, but my troops to be in readiness on the border-a common-sense view in which I fully concurred.

"The time selected for the rising in Johannesburg was the end of December. It was agreed that simultaneously with the rising I was to start. I returned from Johannesburg to Cape Town and told Mr. Rhodes I was convinced from the representations made to me that there would be a rising, and that I had received a letter of invitation. I further told him that I had promised to help with my force, and generally the arrangements come to by me with the people in Johannesburg. He agreed, and we arranged that when the rising took place he should go to Johannesburg or Pretoria with the High Commissioner and Mr. Hofmeyr to mediate between the Transvaal Government and the Uitlanders. With these matters settled, I left Cape Town and joined my camp at Pitsani. I required no orders or authority from Mr. Rhodes, and desired neither to receive nor to send any messages from or to Cape Town. My arrangements were made direct with the people in Johannesburg, and not through the medium of Cape Town. The practical transfer of the Bechuanaland Border Police to the Chartered Company and its consequent annexation to my force was effected by the middle of December, 1895, from which time. I was ready to move. I knew that any massing of Boer troops on the Transvaal border would make it impossible for me to get

through from Pitsani and fulfil my engagement with the people at Johannesburg. This is the explanation of the urgency of my messages pressing for no delay at Johannesburg. On December 20 I was asked by Cape Town to send a copy of the Johannesburg letter of invitation. I therefore had the letter dated December 20, and sent it to Cape Town. It was fear of having my freedom of action controlled that led me at the end of December to advise Cape Town that I should make my own flotation' and start unless I heard expressly to the contrary. On Saturday, December 28, the following telegram from Johannesburg was circulated through Reuter's Agency in South Africa, and was exhibited at Mafeking and Pitsani :—


"Position becoming acute and persistent rumours afloat secret arming mines and warlike preparations. Women children leaving Rand. Americans passed resolution siding Transvaal, and Mercantile Association considers case trouble everything lose and appointed committee investigate position. Market lifeless, no business, everything politics. Volksreid and God save Queen loudly cheered Theatre Pretoria. President

and General Joubert returned. Political situation talk town, and opinion expressed by leading men modus vivendi will be arrived at and wiser counsels prevail in Johannesburg. Two citizens from Rand privately interviewed President with not wholly unsatisfactory results.'

"It appeared to me evident from this that the Transvaal authorities knew the position, and that matters in Johannesburg had come to a head. I started in the evening of the same day. Captain Holden on the Saturday night and Major Heany on the following day at noon had arrived at Pitsani from Johannesburg. They both brought messages to me from the committee at Johannesburg, postponing-not abandoning—the rising, but for the reasons given above I felt obliged to disregard these messages. In conclusion, I desire to state that no telegram, message or other communication was at any time received by me or any one at Pitsani or Mafeking from Mr. Rhodes or any one at Cape Town directing or authorising my force to move to Johannesburg. I acted entirely on my own judgment. Major Heany brought me no message from Mr. Rhodes or any one at Cape Town."

At the next sitting (March 30) Mr. F. J. Newton, Resident Commissioner and Chief Magistrate of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, was examined. He said that at Mafeking, to which place he went on the first Monday in December, 1895, for the purpose of transferring police stores to the Chartered Company, Dr. Jameson informed him that he was authorised to hold a force at Pitsani to be ready for certain eventualities in Johannesburg. These eventualities were a movement against the Government of the Transvaal. No pledge of

secrecy was exacted, but Mr. Newton was told that it would be premature to acquaint the High Commissioner, and that Sir Graham Bower already knew of this intention. Closely pressed as to his relations with Mr. Rhodes and Sir Graham Bower, and as to his reasons for not communicating with the High Commissioner, he gave somewhat uncertain answers. It was not "exactly" by direction of Sir Graham and Mr. Rhodes that he kept Lord Rosmead in the dark. Finally, he said "he decided, on his own responsibility, not to tell."

Colonel Frank Rhodes was then called, and began his evidence by reading a statement explaining his connection with the movement. He confessed he had never supposed, when his brother told him to draw upon him through the New Concessions Account, that the sum would be so great. "What did this abortive insurrection cost?" asked Sir H. CampbellBannerman. "I should think 250,000l.," was the reply. With respect to the causes of the failure of the rising, Colonel Rhodes said the "letter of invitation" was solicited by Dr. Jameson; but no use was to be made of it until the doctor heard further from the reform leaders. The "postponement of flotation, owing to unforeseen circumstances," was ascribed to the dispute about the flag which set the reformers at sixes and sevens. He thought the movement in Johannesburg was spontaneous, and not "bought or manufactured." There was some difference of opinion between Dr. Jameson and himself as to the use to which the letter of invitation was to be put. Had there been a rising, the women and children would have been in danger. "It has been suggested that you left Dr. Jameson in the lurch," observed Mr. Cripps. "I had never the least anxiety about him getting in," was the only response.

On the resumption of Colonel Rhodes' examination (April 2), in reply to Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Blake, he said he did not think Dr. Jameson ought to have used the letter of invitation as he did, without a further communication from Johannesburg. Till the reform leaders heard that he had actually started they quite believed that the march had been effectually postponed. Dr. Jameson rather forced their hands.

The next witness was Sir John Willoughby, who had been released from Holloway Prison a few days previously after serving eight of the ten months of his sentence. He said that his official position in 1895 was that of military adviser to the administrator under the Chartered Company. He attributed the failure of the raid in part to the receipt of letters brought to Dr. Jameson by two cyclists on the morning of January 1, which led to their delaying before Krugersdorp instead of passing round it. The letters gave them the impression that a force from Johannesburg was to meet them at Krugersdorp. Asked by Mr. Labouchere whether he had told the army officers serving under him at Pitsani that the imperial authorities knew of the projected advance into the Transvaal, he at first declined to

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