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NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company

The New York Times

August 17, 2005 Wednesday

Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section C; Column 1; Business/Financial Desk, Pg. 4

LENGTH: 852 words

HEADLINE: Chinese Cryptologists Get Invitations to a U.S. Conference, but No Visas

BYLINE: BY JOHN MARKOFF; Chris Buckley contributed reporting from Beijing for this article.

DATELINE: SAN FRANCISCO, Aug. 16

BODY:

Last year a Chinese mathematician, Xiaoyun Wang, shook up the insular world of code breakers by exposing a new vulnerability in a crucial American standard for data encryption. On Monday, she was scheduled to explain her discovery in a keynote address to an international group of researchers meeting in California.

But a stand-in had to take her place, because she was not able to enter the country. Indeed, only one of nine Chinese researchers who sought to enter the country for the conference received a visa in time to attend.

Although none of the scientists were officially denied visas by the United States Consulate, officials at the State Department and National Academy of Sciences said this week that the situation was not uncommon.

Lengthy delays in issuing visas are now routine, they said, particularly for those involved in sensitive scientific and technical fields.

The visa snag angered organizers of the annual meeting of the International Cryptology Conference, who argued that restrictions originally created to prevent the transfer of advanced technologies from the United States are now having the opposite effect.

"It's not a question of them stealing our jobs," said Stuart Haber, a Hewlett-Packard computer security expert who is program chairman for the meeting, Crypto 2005, being held this week in Santa Barbara. "We need to learn from them, but we are shooting ourselves in the foot."

Mr. Haber and other researchers stressed that progress is made in the field of cryptography by continually investigating existing algorithms and systems for weaknesses, in efforts like Ms. Wang's. Among scholars and software engineers, finding such obscure logical flaws is considered a badge of honor and not a hostile act.

Ms. Wang, a mathematician at Tsinghua University in Beijing, and her student Hongbo Yu were scheduled to present a paper in Santa Barbara on Monday on their successful attack on a United States government cryptographic function called Sha-1.

Sha-1 is a formula for creating what mathematicians call a hash, a single number used to represent a larger message or a data file. Such algorithms are routinely used in encryption and

authentication systems.

In addition to presenting the technical paper, Ms. Wang had been planning on detailing further advances in her work during an informal session this week, according to several researchers attending the event.

After Ms. Wang failed to obtain a visa, a third member of the research team, Yiqun Lisa Yin, presented the paper instead on Monday morning. A Chinese citizen, she is currently an independent security consultant in Connecticut and has been a student of Ronald L. Rivest, a prominent M.I.T. cryptographer.

An official at the National Institute for Standards and Technology, which is responsible for maintaining the country's cryptographic standards, said that he was disappointed by Ms. Wang's absence and that he had tried to intervene several times in recent weeks to persuade the State Department to allow her to appear at the conference.

"I have no idea why she didn't get her visa," said the official, William Burr, the manager of the Security Technology Group at the institute. "But I attempted to convince them that this wasn't some strange woman. I wanted to let them know that there was someone whose business was affected by her work and who was anxious to see her."

He said he was still hopeful that Ms. Wang would be permitted to attend a technology conference that the institute has scheduled for October.

A State Department spokeswoman said on Monday that the potential time it takes for visa applications to be approved is clearly outlined on Web sites maintained by United States embassies around the world.

"I certainly do appreciate that this is a frustration," said the spokeswoman, Angela Aggeler, of the Bureau of Consular Affairs. "We talk to people who experience this all the time."

She noted that Chinese visas that require review under a scientific and technical category, known as Mantis (as in praying mantis), routinely take more than two months. Ms. Wang and her student both applied in early July. Ms. Wang was interviewed by consular officials on Aug. 9, but typically two weeks are needed after such an interview for a visa to be processed.

Last week, after the conference organizers realized that it was unlikely that Ms. Wang would obtain a visa in time to attend the event, they contacted the White House science adviser, John H. Marburger III, asking him to intervene with the State Department. (Asked if he had done so, Mr. Marburger's office said only that such questions are routinely referred to the Office of Consular

Affairs.)

The organizers noted that another Chinese computer security expert, Dingyi Pei, a researcher at the State Key Laboratory of Information Security in Beijing and head of the International Cryptology Conference's annual Asia research conference, had not received a visa last year. Because of the delay last year, he applied this year in early June and had his interview July 19, but did not get a visa until Tuesday.

URL: http://www.nytimes.com

THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES, SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE MICHELLE VAN CLEAVE, NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The National
Counterintelligence
Strategy of the
United States

Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive

March 2005

National Counterintelligence Strategy
of the United States

PREFACE

The Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 USC 401) directs that the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive produce, on an annual basis, a strategy for the counterintelligence programs and activities of the United States Government. This is the first national counterintelligence strategy promulgated pursuant to that Act. President George W. Bush approved The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States on March 1, 2005.

Counterintelligence, as defined in the National Security Act of 1947, is "information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities."

As used in this Strategy, counterintelligence includes defensive and offensive activities conducted at home and abroad to protect against the traditional and emerging foreign intelligence threats of the 21" Century.

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