thein. * He treats of the Sublime in a lofty manner, as his Tranflator has judicioufly obferv'd: He warms our Fancy, and exalts our Mind; he forms our Tafte; and teaches us to diftinguish what is either fine, or faulty, in the most famous ancient Writers.

B. IS LONGINUS fuch a wonderful Author? Did he not live in the days of ZENOBIA, and the Emperor AU RELIAN?

A. Yes; you cannot but know their History.

B. Did not those Days fall vaftly fhort of the Politeness of former Ages? And can you imagine that an Author who flourish'd in the Declenfion of Learning and Eloquence had a better Taste than IsoCRATES? I cannot believe it.

A. I was furpriz'd myself, to find it fo: but you need only read him, to be convinc'd of it. Tho' he liv'd in a very corrupted Age, he form'd his Judgment upon the ancient Models; and has avoided almost all the reigning Faults of his own Time; I fay almoft all, for, I must

*Thee, bold LONGINUS! all the Nine infpire,
And bless their Critick with a Poet's Fire:
An ardent Judge, who, zealous in his Truft,
With Warmth gives Sentence, yet is always juft:
Whofe own Example ftrengthens all his Laws,
And is himself that great SUBLIME he draws.

own,

Mr. POPE's Effay on Criticifin, p.45:

own, he study'd rather what is admirable, than what is useful; and did not confider Eloquence as fubfervient to Morality; nor apply it to direct the Conduct of Life. And in this he does not seem to have had fuch folid Views as the antient Greeks, and especially fome of their Philofophers. But we ought to forgive him a Failing, for which ISOCRATES was far more remarkable, tho' he liv'd in a more refin'd Age. And this Defect ought the rather to be over-look'd in a particular Discourse, where LONGINUS does not treat of what is proper to inftruct Men, but of what is apt to move and feize their Paf fions. I chufe to recommend this Author, Sir, because he will help to explain my Meaning to you. You will fee what a glorious Character he gives of D EMOSTHENES, from whom he quotes feveral Paffages that are moft fublime: He will likewife fhew you thofe Faults of ISOCRATES that I mention'd. If you

*

be

* ὁ δὲ ἔνθεν λαβὼν * * μεγαλοφυεςάτε καὶ ἐπ' ἄκρον ἀρετῆς σωτετελεσμένας υψηγορίας τόνοι, ἔμψυχα πά 2η, περισσίαν, αγχίνοιαν, τάχος, ἔνθεν δ ̓, ὃ κύριον, * πασιν απρόσιτον δεινότη@ καὶ διαμιν· ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα, φημί, ὡς θεόπεμπά τινα δωρήματα (ἰ γὰρ εἰπεῖν θεμιτὸν ἀνα θρώπινα) αθρόα ἐς ἑαυτὸν ἔσπασε. δια τότο οἷς ἔχει κα λοῖς ἅπαντας αἰεὶ νικα, καὶ ὑπὲς ὧν οὐκ ἔχει, ωσπερεί και τα βροντα και καταφέγγει τις ἀπ' αἰῶνος ρήτορας και Τον ἄν τις κεραυνοῖς φερομένοις αντανοῖξαι τὰ ὄμματα διαιτο, ἢ ἀντοφθαλμῆσαι τοῖς ἐπαλλήλοις εκείνη πάθεσιν LONGINUS, §. 34.

2

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be unwilling to take the trouble of becoming acquainted with thefe Authors, by reading their Works; you may get a very juft Notion of them by confulting LONGINUS. Let us now leave IsoCRATES; and talk of DEMOSTHENES, and CICERO.

B. You are for leaving ISOCRATES, because he is not for your Purpose.

A. Let us go on then with IsoCRATES, fince you are not yet convinc'd: and let us judge of his Rhetorick by the Rules of Eloquence itself, and by the Sentiments of PLATO, the moft eloquent Writer among the Antients. Will you be determin'd by him?

*

B. I'll be determin'd by him, if he be in the right but I never refign my Judgment implicitly to any Author.

:

A. Remember this Rule: it is all that I ask of you. And if you do not let fome fashion

C

*Sed ego neque illis affentiebar, neque harum difpu tationum inventori, & principi longe omnium in dicendo graviffimo, & ELOQUENTISSIMO PLATONI, cujus tum Athenis cum Carneade diligentius legi Gorgiam: quo in libro, hoc maxime admirabar Platonem, quod mihi in Oratoribus irridendis, ipfe effe ORATOR SUMMUS videbatur. CIC, de Orat, lib. 1. §. 11.

Quid denique Demofthenes non illud jusjurandum per cofos in Marathone ac Salamine propugnatores reipublicæ, fatis manifefto docet præceptorem ejus PL ATONEM fuiffe? Quem ipfum num Afianum appellabimus plerunque inftinctis Divino Spiritu vatibus comparandum? QUINT, lib, xij. cap. io. See LONGINUS §, xiij,

fashionable Prejudices biafs your Judgment, Reason will foon convince you of the Truth. I wou'd therefore have you believe neither ISOCRATES, nor PLATO: but judge of them both, by clearPrinciples. Now I fuppofe you will grant that the chief End of Eloquence is to perfuade Men to embrace Truth and Virtue.

B. I'm not of your Mind: this is what I have already deny❜d.

A. I'll endeavour to prove it then. Eloquence, if I mistake not, may be confider'd in three refpects: As the Art of enforcing Truth on People's Minds, and of making them better: As an Art indifferent in itself, which wicked Men may use as well as Good;, and which may be apply'd to recommend Injuftice and Error, as well as Probity, and Truth: and, As an Art which selfish Men may ufe to ingratiate themselves with others; to raise their Reputation, and make their Fortune. Which of thefe Ends do you admit of?

B. I allow of them all. What do you infer from this Conceffion?

A. The Inference will afterwards appear. Have patience a little; and be fatisfy'd, if I fay nothing but what is evidently true, till by gradual Advances I lead you to the right Conclufion. Of the three Ends of Eloquence, I now mention'd, you will undoubtedly prefer the firft.

B. Yes:

B. Yes: it is the best.

A. What think you of the Second? B. I fee what you drive at: You are going into a Fallacy. The fecond fort is faulty, because of the ill Use the Orátor makes of his Eloquence, to enforce Error and Vice, But ftill the Rhetorick of a wicked Man may be good in itself, tho' the Ufe he makes of it be pernicious. Now we are talking of the Nature and Rules of Eloquence; not of the Ufes it fhou'd be apply'd to. Let us keep to the true State of the Queftion.

A. If you will do me the favour to hear me a little, you will find that I have the Point in difpute always in view. You feein then to condemn the fecond fort of Eloquence: or, to fpeak without Ambiguity, you condemn the f Abuse of Rhetorick.

B. Right. You now speak correctly. So far then we are agreed.

When I confider the Means of happy living (says an eloquent Writer) and the Caufes of their Corruption, I can hardly forbear recanting what I faid before; and concluding, that Eloquence ought to be banish't out of all Civil Societies, as a thing fatal to Peace and good Manners. To this Opinion I fhou'd wholly incline, if I did not find, that it is a Weapon which may be as eafily procur'd by bad Men, as by good and that if these only should caft it away, and thofe retain it; the naked Innocence of Virtue would be be upon all Occafions expos'd to the armed Malice of the Wicked.

:

Bishop SPRAT's Hift. of the Royal Society, p. 111,

t