APPENDIX

EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT OF ADM. ARTHUR WILLIAM RADFORD, NOMINEE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AT A HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, MAY 28, 1953

Chairman SALTONSTALL. Admiral, it happens that you are appearing before this committee at the same time as a plan submitted by the President to reorganize the Department of Defense is also before the committee. This plan, supplemented by the President's message and the report of the Rockefeller Commission, makes what are purported to be important changes in the responsibilities and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In other words, you are taking over from General Bradley the JCS at the time when the rules are to be changed.

I have five questions I would like to ask you. My first 2 or 3 questions have to do with the manner in which the JCS function, where they get their business, and how they transact it.

I would like to ask you how do matters come before the JCS, in your opinion, for consideration, and in what form does the JCS action manifest itself?

Admiral RADFORD. Mr. Chairman, I have been away from Washington for 4 years, and my contacts with the detailed work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been frequent.

I may make a statement which could be improved upon by somebody who is working with them from day to day, but I believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in general, follow the pattern of operation that I knew when I was here before.

The JCS are primarily a planning and advisory group. They may and do originate papers-any one of the members may introduce a paper for consideration. They may and do receive papers requiring or requesting their advice or action, from the Secretary of Defense, and probably from any one of the service Secretaries.

These papers are, first, received in the secretariat, given a number and, in other words, they are placed in the proper place in the files.

They may go in as a part of a series of papers. They are then considered by a committee or section of the Joint Staff which operates under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the study of the paper, with recommendations by the Joint Staff, is finally delivered to the Chiefs for their action at one of their formal meetings. At each of their meetings they have an agenda that has been prepared by General Bradley, and they proceed with the consideration of papers in the order in which they appear on that agenda.

They may accept the recommendations of the Joint Staff or they may change them. But in any event, when they reach an agreement on a paper-and I would say that well over 90 percent of all the papers that they process are agreementsthat paper is finished up in what they call the final green form, and is sent to the individual who asked the question, or if it is a Chiefs' matter that they have originated, it is given the distribution within the Defense Department and the military organization that is required. It may be a paper that requires further action down the line.

I know that in Pearl Harbor, as the commander in chief of the Pacific Command, I constantly received directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff or papers from them, which we study, and we then use in working up the plans that we have to make. Chairman SALTONSTALL. In your opinion, what is the significance or the effect of that part of the law which specifies that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall have no vote?

Admiral RADFORD. I have always supposed that it was designed to prevent an imbalance in the procedure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In other words, you have

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three members, Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Chairman is bound to come from 1 of the 3 services, being a military man, and if he had a vote, there would be 2 members of 1 service allowed to vote on that particular question.

Chairman SALTONSTALL. Assuming that the JCS make to the Secretary of Defense a recommendation-let us say it is a unanimous recommendation-with which the Secretary of Defense finds himself in complete disagreement, in your opinion whose views should prevail in such a situation?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, on a matter of great importance-and I could only imagine that that would happen in such a case-I feel almost certain that the Secretary of Defense would first come down and discuss the matter with the complete membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and tell them why he disagreed with their recommendation, and probably ask for a reconsideration or a discussion with him present.

If they adhere to their former position, I feel amost certain, if the matter was serious, that the Secretary of Defense would then advise the President of that situation and that the decision, the final decision, would have to be made by the President.

Chairman SALTONSTALL. And the recommendations of the JCS are, of course, confined to strictly military strategy, military tactics, and do not go into the political background of any problem?"

Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir.

Chairman SALTONSTALL. What is your concept of the duties, responsibilities, and authority of the Chairman of the JCS, as they now exist, and what do you think will be his duties, responsibilities, and authority after the reorganization plan now pending betore Congress has been put into effect?

Admiral RADFORD. Well, as I see it, the Chairman-the position of Chairman, which was authorized-which was legislated for in 1949, became a manager of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a sense. He also was a link between the Secretary of Defense and probably a very necessary one, in connection with the Secretary of Defense's relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

He has prepared their agenda; he has spoken for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in many instances. Not having detailed command responsibilities, he was free to devote time to things which would be very difficult for one of the members to handle; in other words, they all have, in addition to their Joint Staff responsibilities, the responsibilities of military departments; they have command responsibilities. The Chairman does not. He is free to represent them in many respects. I do not believe that is changed a great deal under this reorganization plan. I would like to point out that I am not too familiar with that plan. I was not in on any of the discussions. I have read that part which pertains to the Chairman, but I am not familiar as to why they made the changes or recommended the changes.

I discussed the new organization plan briefly with General Bradley the other day and, as I see it, the recommendations or changes in the law, which permit the Chairman to do more than he now does, are designed to expedite the business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman SALTONSTALL. Not to give him more authority, necessarily, but to give him more administrative duties.

Admiral RADFORD. More administrative authority.

Chairman SALTONSTALL. Do you feel that the reorganization plan, together with the President's message and the report of the Rockefeller Commission, indicate a tendency to bypass or whittle down the Secretaries of the three military departments, Army, Navy, and Air Force? I ask that question particularly because of the relationship that would be bound to exist between the JCS and the Secretaries of the three forces as compared with the Secretary of Defense and his Assistant Secretary.

Admiral RADFORD. As I said, Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar, too familiar, with the reorganization proposals nor am I familiar with the discussions that preceded or accompanied the drafting of that document.

In connection with the service Secretaries, in the last few days I have been with all three Secretaries, and as I gathered from their conversation, they support this plan which I am sure they would not if they felt that they were going to be bypassed.

Chairman SALTONSTALL. Admiral Radford, my final question and, perhaps, it is a double question, is: Anyone who reads the daily papers and the current periodicals is aware of the fact that in 1949 you testified before the House Committee on Armed Services, at which time you expressed certain views with respect to strategic bombing by long-range bombers and the so-called atomic blitz.

Prior to those 1949 House hearings, testimony which you had given regarding the 1947 Unification Act was regarded by some as being in opposition to the bill then under consideration.

These are two questions really: Do you still hold those same views on these subjects? If so, do you feel that any difference in your personal views with those of accepted policy and doctrine would adversely affect your ability to do a good job as Chairman of the JCS?

Admiral RADFORD. Mr. Chairman, it is almost 4 years since the hearings that you refer to were held in 1949. There have been developments, improvements in material, and certain other changes which would naturally cause me to modify some of my positions.

I do not think that in times when we have as much change as we have now that one can have 4 years pass and feel exactly as he did about questions of material and questions of strategy. In other words, we are going ahead too fast for anyone to have ideas which are fixed.

While, in general, I have no feeling that at that time I said anything I did not honestly believe, I would say that under conditions as they exist today, I probably would modify some of my statements.

In the matter of the unification hearings, I was ordered back to Washington immediately after the end of the war. I was in Tokyo when the war ended, and in November I arrived in Washington under direct orders from the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal, who told me that he was not satisfied that the Navy Department had a single office which would concentrate in that office all the matters, the legislative matters, in connection with the so-called unification hearings. He ordered me to set up such an office, said I could have anyone that I wanted to work for me.

He also ordered Admiral Sherman in as my first assistant, and we were directed to get going.

I told Mr. Forrestal at the time that I was surprised. I said, "I think you have made a very poor selection. I know nothing about this business, and I would prefer not to get into it."

He said that he wanted me to do it, so I tackled the job as best I could. There have been references from time to time in the newspapers that I was against unification. In the first place, it has never been clear to me exactly what people meant when they said that you were for or against unification. If they mean that their object is uniformity in all aspects of the Defense Department, then I am against it. I think you have to have three very strong independent services, and can expect differences of opinion.

I do not think that you want men in the Defense Department who are going to agree for agreement's sake. Military men who have years of experience and training behind them, have very strong feelings about certain aspects of their work, and I think that is proper.

I think that in time, with the joint schools that we have, that the armed services will have a body of officers who understand the problems of the other services much better than some of us do now, who did not have that opportunity when we were young.

We

My ideas in 1947 were certainly that the status quo was not satisfactory. had to have an improved defense organization. I felt that in certain ways the bill that was before the Congress in 1947 was not the best bill that could be drawn. I stated my objections to the bill as frankly as I could. Congress passed the bill, and I have tried to make it work ever since. Chairman SALTONSTALL. Thank you, sir.

LIST OF WITNESSES APPEARING FOR AND AGAINST REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 6 OF 1953

Witnesses for Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953:

Roger M. Kyes, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Joseph M. Dodge, Director, Bureau of the Budget.

Nelson Rockefeller, Chairman, Committee on Department of
Defense Organization.

itnesses in favor of H. J. Res. 264, eliminating subsections (c) and ') of section 1 from Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953: Hon. Herbert Hoover, former President of the United States. Ferdinand Eberstadt, former chairman, Hoover Commission task force on the National Security Organization.

Gen. Robert Wood Johnson, chairman of the board, Johnson & Johnson.

Thomas K. Finletter, former Secretary of Air.

Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., United States Navy, retired.

Maj. Gen. Merritt A. Edson, United States Marine Corps, retired.

Hon. Charles E. Bennett, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida.

Adm. Richard S. Edwards, United States Navy, retired.

Omar B. Ketchum, director, National Legislative Service, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States.

Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's Chief of Staff during World War II.

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