REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 6 OF 1953 (Department of Defense) FRIDAY, JUNE 19, 1953 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 9:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 362, caucus room, Old House Office Building, Hon. Clare E. Hoffman (chairman of the committee) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. STATEMENT OF NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I have submitted, as per your request, a statement for today. In view of the opportunity which I had to listen to the testimony yesterday I wonder if I might deviate some from this statement instead of reading it in its full form. The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Follow whatever course you wish. Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Thank you very much. I would like to follow, if I could, somewhat the following outline to give a little background: First, on the Committee on Defense Department Organization, and then a little background on the committee's thinking, then move from there to the organization, functions, and procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish this statement put in the record, or do you intend to read part of it? You may do whatever suits you. Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I will read part of it and perhaps afterward if the Secretary wants to include those parts I didn't read it would be all right with me. I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before you in connection. with the Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 relating to the Department of Defense. As background for the discussion of the reorganization plan, perhaps it would be helpful if I said first a word about the reorganization study undertaken by the Committee on Department of Defense Organization, of which I had the honor of being chairman. This report of the Committee was made available to Congress by the Secretary of Defense at the time the President sent his message and reorganization plan to the Congress. 139 34999-53-10 In mid-February of this year, the Committee was organized by the Secretary of Defense following discussions with President Eisenhower. Included in its membership were the three members of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization-Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, and myself, as well as former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, Gen. David Sarnoff of RCA, Dr. Vannevar Bush, and Gen. Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committee's instructions were to concentrate its attention on the basic organization and procedures of the Department of Defense, especially with respect to the postion of the Secretary of Defense and his relationships with his principal civilian and military officials. The objective was to strengthen the framework in order that the Department of Defense might operate more effectively in attaining the broad objectives of the President and the Secretary to provide the nation with maximum security at minimum cost, and without danger to its free institutions. At the first meeting the Committee decided it needed the advice of senior military consultants from the three services and, therefore, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, it invited Gen. George C. Marshall, who had been formerly Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and former Secretary of Defense, Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, former Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen. Carl Spaatz, former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, to serve as senior military consultants. We were fortunate in obtaining the acceptance of all three. From that time on, the 7 members of the committee and the 3 military consultants, plus our counsel, Mr. H. Struve Hensel, and a small staff under Mr. Don K. Price, met regularly 3 days a week until the report was completed. I might mention that Mr. Hensel was former General Counsel of the Department of Navy under Mr. Forrestal, and Mr. Price was Mr. Herbert Hoover's personal assistant on the Hoover Commission. Just to interpose there, this group of men probably represents a broader experience in the new Department of Defense than one could have assembled in any other group in the country. We adopted the following procedure in connection with the study: At the first meeting the list of key witnesses to be invited to appear before the committee was agreed upon. It included some two dozen men. This list was made up of the civilian and the military personnel who had most intimate contact with the operation of the Defense Department since passage of the National Security Act of 1947. They included the former Secretaries of the three services, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Assistant Secretaries of Defense and others with experience particularly relating to the work of the Defense Department. Each witness was given a list of key questions concerning the critical areas of operation in the Defense Department for study prior to his appearance before the committee. In addition, all members of the Committee studied the most significant documents pertaining to the legislative and administrative history of the Department of Defense. If you will review the list of individuals who presented their views to the committee, which appears in appendix B of the Committee's Going on to (c), it states relative to the Chairman [reading]: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs hereinafter referred to as Chairman shall be appointed by the President and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate So, the Senate as well as the President of the United States shares a responsibility in the selection of this man and that he shall serve at the pleasure of the President In other words, he is removable by the President at any time. and that his term shall be limited to 2 years and that he shall be eligible for only 1 reappointment, again with the advice and consent of the Senate, except in time of war and hereinafter declared by the Congress. So, I think it is quite clear that Congress very carefully limited the control of this Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and very wisely. Then it goes on describing his pay, and so forth, and we come down to the end: that while holding such office he shall take precedence over all other officers in the armed service, providing in italics that the Chairman shall not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or over any of the military services. Mr. DAWSON. Will you give me the page? Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Page 16. It is section 211 (d). In addition to participating as a member of the Joint Chiefs That is important that he participates as a member of the Joint Chiefs in the performance of the duties assigned in subsection (b) of this section, the Chairman shall, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, perform the following duties. Now, I want to call your attention to the fact that there it says: subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of De-↓ fense so that in every act he is subject to their direction and authorityand he shall serve as presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs, provide agenda for the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide the agenda, mind you, so that he already is responsible in the act, as amended, to provide the agenda and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prosecute their business as promptly as practical. So, that's his already designated responsibility-to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable, as well as provide the agenda. (3) Inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate, as determined by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the President of those issues on which agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not been reached. In other words, the Congress already had considered that problem and had specified that he should inform the President of these areas where decision had not been reached. In mid-February of this year, the Committee was organized by the Secretary of Defense following discussions with President Eisenhower. Included in its membership were the three members of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization-Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, and myself, as well as former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, Gen. David Sarnoff of RCA, Dr. Vannevar Bush, and Gen. Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committee's instructions were to concentrate its attention on the basic organization and procedures of the Department of Defense, especially with respect to the postion of the Secretary of Defense and his relationships with his principal civilian and military officials. The objective was to strengthen the framework in order that the Department of Defense might operate more effectively in attaining the broad objectives of the President and the Secretary to provide the nation with maximum security at minimum cost, and without danger to its free institutions. At the first meeting the Committee decided it needed the advice. of senior military consultants from the three services and, therefore, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, it invited Gen. George C. Marshall, who had been formerly Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and former Secretary of Defense, Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, former Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen. Carl Spaatz, former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, to serve as senior military consultants. We were fortunate in obtaining the acceptance of all three. From that time on, the 7 members of the committee and the 3 military consultants, plus our counsel, Mr. H. Struve Hensel, and a small staff under Mr. Don K. Price, met regularly 3 days a week until the report was completed. I might mention that Mr. Hensel was former General Counsel of the Department of Navy under Mr. Forrestal, and Mr. Price was Mr. Herbert Hoover's personal assistant on the Hoover Commission. Just to interpose there, this group of men probably represents a broader experience in the new Department of Defense than one could have assembled in any other group in the country. We adopted the following procedure in connection with the study: At the first meeting the list of key witnesses to be invited to appear before the committee was agreed upon. It included some two dozen men. This list was made up of the civilian and the military personnel who had most intimate contact with the operation of the Defense Department since passage of the National Security Act of 1947. They included the former Secretaries of the three services, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Assistant Secretaries of Defense and others with experience particularly relating to the work of the Defense Department. Each witness was given a list of key questions concerning the critical areas of operation in the Defense Department for study prior to his appearance before the committee. In addition, all members of the Committee studied the most significant documents pertaining to the legislative and administrative history of the Department of Defense. If you will review the list of individuals who presented their views to the committee, which appears in appendix B of the Committee's report, and if you will review the list of statements and communications reviewed by the committee-appendix C—and if you will review the list of published documents considered by the Committeeappendix D-you will get an idea of how deeply the Committee went into its assignment. You will see that we sought and obtained from well-qualified sources expert advice on the complex problem of the organization of the Department of Defense. At the hearings each witness was given an opportunity to discuss the written questions and make a general statement, following which he submitted to questions by the members of the committee and the military advisors. By the time we had completed the hearings and the review of the background material and the various prepared statements which we received, the committee and its three military consultants found that they were all moving toward certain common conclusions. We were able to crystalize these in a broad outline, in a 2-day session, and, on the basis of an agreed outline, a first rough draft of the report was prepared by the staff. For the next 3 weeks the Committee, with its military advisers, worked over both the form and content of successive drafts, with the most meticulous care, paragraph by paragraph. The ten of us reviewed the last draft, word by word, in a 3-day session, coming to a unanimous agreement on all points, whether it was substance or phraseology. To give credit where it is due, I know I can speak for the entire group in saying that Admiral Nimitz proved to be the most accomplished draftsman of the 10. As far as clarity and simplicity in expression with an economy of words were concerned, he took first place. I think it is only fair to point out that the substance of the final report represented a considerable evolution in the thinking of most of the members of the Committee. It is particularly evidenced by the fact that several of the Committee were already on record with suggestions which reflected widely varying points of view. Now, second, as to the recommendations of the Committee itself, the committee came to the following conclusions, which I quote from the report. First [reading]: It was not expected in 1947, when the National Security Act was adopted, and in 1949 when it was first amended, that the national security organization should be closed to further improvements. That grew out of the Committee's experience collectively and counsel's search of the congressional records in examining the debates and discussions. Second [reading]: While its fundamental principles that is, the fundamental principles of the National Security Actare still sound, experience indicates that it needs to be amended and that the organization and procedures of the department need to be improved. Those were our two basic guiding principles. Thus, a series of recommendations were made with the following purposes in mind—and again I quote: (1) To clarify the authority of the Secretary of Defense. |