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group. At times a Joint Chiefs of Staff order might have to go simultaneously to different field commands, operating under different executive agencies, in order to effect worldwide coordination. At times forces had to be taken away from one field command and placed at the disposal of another, either permanently or temporarily.

Not only was it necessary for them to exercise command, but their responsibility for taking necessary action was unavoidable. Command responsibility exercised solely by the military head of a service acting as executive agent would not have been sufficient.

I bring this in because that is proposed in the message, and as the legal changes are drawn up to provide for it, as I see it.

For instance, General Marshall was executive agent for the invasion of Europe operations and for General MacArthur, while Admiral King was executive agent for antisubmarine warfare Atlantic for Pacific Ocean areas and Solomon Island operations. It was necessary for the Navy to meet its responsibility in the Atlantic by getting supplies across to Europe and amphibious craft delivered. At the same time requirements to meet existing and future needs of MacArthur and Nimitz had to be met, all needs subject to change at any time. When Halsey recommended that MacArthur bypass the northern Philippines and advance direct to Leyte, King had to take forces from Nimitz who was under him as executive agent and pass them to MacArthur under Marshall.

The overall decision was approved by the President but the detailed implementing decisions and orders had to be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the National Security Act overall approval would have come through the Secretary of Defense. Under the proposed new changes the Secretary of Defense is apparently not to have the services of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group for implementing decisions. If the head of the Navy with sole responsibility for the Pacific Ocean area takes the stand that he is not in a position to release forces and the Army agency insists they must be made available to him, how is a correct decision to be reached?

The National Security Act includes in its declaration of policy "to provide for their--that's Army, Navy, Air-authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control under the Secretary of Defense but not to merge them." Authoritative coordination and direction of the Secretary of Defense is to enable him to achieve desired results rather than merely to assert authority.

In the Joint Chiefs of Staff he has at his disposal a machinery developed and proved in all-out war. The three heads of the military services are of course much more than three individuals. They each have for their assistance and under their military command the great capability of each organized armed service. Each becomes the spokesman for his service Secretary. In my opinion, it is only by their continuing as a responsible coordinating group that the Secretary of Defense can meet his authoritative responsibilities as Deputy Commander in Chief of the Armed Services under the President.

If, on the other hand, functions are removed from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as proposed in the report of the Rockefeller Committee and as stated to be the administrative intention in the President's message and further if a transfer of functions to the Chairman is provided for in section 1 (c) and (d), it is my view that civilian control by the Secre tary of Defense will tend to diminish rather than to improve.

There are those who seem to feel, as indicated in the report of the Rockefeller Committee and in the President's message, that high-level plans are made, a field commander is assigned, forces are allocated to his theater, and thereafter the necessity for military coordination and direction at the top ceases to be necessary. This, of course, is not at all the case.

Not only must the activities of the different field commands be coordinated, but the plans for each one are constantly unfolding, constantly subject to modification, and nearly always affecting the flow of support from all of the services.

Naturally, each field commander seeks early decision for his conduct of future operations and early allocation of completely adequate forces to carry them out. But both allocation and decision for one theater may depend on the timely outcome in another theater under another executive agency.

During the last war field commanders were prone to the belief that if a chief of the General Staff of all the armed services could have been in supreme military command, earlier decisions could have been rendered. But what the theater commander needed, and what the interests of the country required, was a timely correct decision. This was the kind of decision that the field commanders always got during war and always in time.

Paragraph 4 of section 3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the Rockefeller report reads as follows:

It is essential to keep in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were established as a planning and advisory group, not to exercise command. The National Security Act emphasized their planning and advisory role. The committee considers it unfortunate that this concept of the National Security Act has always been obscured in actual practice, even before the meetings in 1948 at Key West and Newport, at which the Secretary of Defense delegated certain command functions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On what the above information is based is not known to me. The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was established-without charter— in the early months of 1942, to coordinate the military direction of the war under the President and to coordinate American action with that of the British under the British Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of the combined British-American Chiefs of Staff. In both the above capacities the Joint Chiefs had constantly to make authoritative decisions. Throughout the war they made decisions which were duly transmitted to the various field commands in overall control of the field activities. I have never heard before of the concept that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were established not to exercise command.

Just how much the position of a military head of a service was controlled during the war by his own service Secretary apparently varied. Undoubtedly at times, perhaps because of the pressure of events, perhaps because of decisions made in major conferences outside of the United States, the Secretaries were not kept adequately informed before decisions were reached. It seems obvious that the service Secretary should be kept advised of decisions and actions involving the service of which he is the head, so that he can be in a position to interpose if desired with regard to things being done or not being done. The National Security Act, 1947, as amended, states in section 211 (b) (1), two of the duties to be performed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others, of course: First, preparation of strategic plans; and, second, provision for the strategic direction of the military forces.

Both of these functions, preparation of plans, and provision of strategic direction of military forces, are command functions. Planning unaccompanied by command authority and responsibility is planning in a vacuum. Strategic direction of military forces carried out under plans fixed by an agency outside of the executing command separates authority and responsibility and invites defeat.

The French have a saying "To command is to foresee." The foreseeing in Washington should be a long way ahead, years aheadand as far as the Navy is concerned, it had to be at least 4 years ahead of 1941. The foreseeing in Washington should be a long way ahead. It must be done by those in professional command assisted by planning staffs, service and joint. The responsibility for planning ahead and taking forehanded preparatory action must be matched by delegation of authority. As we go forward to meet our worldwide responsibilities our planning and preparations will invoke coordinated and combined operations in increasing degree, and we cannot be forehanded if the preparation by one service lags behind another.

The fundamental thing is timing and the most important part in timing is getting started first. But plans are constantly unfolding, being modified or being replaced with new plans to be followed by new preparations. Responsibility for plans and changes must continue to be coordinated as a command responsibility under either old or new civilian control.

I mean by that somebody may have been in civilian control only 2 weeks.

The alternative is a single Chief of General Staff. The changes now under consideration in Reorganization Plan No. 6 appear to be headed for an arrangement somewhere in between the two systems-at least at this time.

Objectives of the reorganization set forth in the approved Rockefeller report, in administrative action as indicated in the President's message, and in legislative changes as specifically set forth in the plan are directed toward

(1) An increase in the degree of civilian control, both administrative and purely military;

(2) Better coordination;

(3) Reduction of the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order to achieve greater civilian control, to reduce the burden on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to provide for better planning; and

(4) Better economy.

For (1) above-that is the increase in the degree of civilian control-it would appear that the legislative changes necessary would be to return the service secretaries to membership in the President's Cabinet. Any other steps necessary can be effected administratively by the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Which has to do with better coordination, the proposed reduction of the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the new program, ́if fully carried out, will have a seriously adverse effect on coordination. (3) Which has to do with the reduction of the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for three reasons, the objectives proposed in the message of reducing or eliminating the command and coordinating functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are directly implemented in part-this is, the door is opened-in section 1 (c) and (d) of the reorganization plan.

Section 1 (c) gives the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a veto on the selection and retention of members of the Joint Staff. In this respect at least the proposed veto power goes much further in one direction than the denial of vote to the Chairman in the National Security Act goes in the other direction.

I should state that the denial of vote to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff doesn't have very much effect because the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not operate under the vote system.

This new power could be so exercised as to enable the Chairman to effect the composition of a Joint Staff which conformed with his own views, and could therefore have the effect of a nearer approach of his position to that of an overall Chief of the General Staff, which was basically rejected by the Congress.

Section 1 (d), which has to do with the Chairman managing the Joint Staff, whatever its intention, will enable the Chairman, if he should so desire, to control the machinery of the Joint Staff. This authority thus removed from the joint and associated control of the other three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could seriously interfere with their ability to give proper advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. If they are denied authority to match their responsibilities they may eventually become atrophied-walled in.

With regard to relieving the increased burdens on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it appears to me that the effect of the Reorganization Acts of 1947 and 1949, paralleing the general trend in government, has been to increase the burdens on the topside. Increasingly, the power or decision has been withdrawn from lower levels and passed to higher levels. In the proposed third reorganization, the concentration of minor as well as major decisions in the hands of service heads in Washington, civilian or military, will further increase the overburdening of the topside, instead or relieving it. The effect of this overconcentration will be greater inefficiency, decreased development of leadership in the lower levels, and ultimately in the upper

levels.

The two fundamental factors in proper organization are, as I see it— 1. Effective coordination to produce a desired result;

2. The development of personnel to make effective use of the component parts of the organization.

Overemphasis on coordination will have an adverse effect on the development of personnel that is, leadership but the adverse effects may not become visible for many years, and even then not to a casual observer. The most precious attribute in nearly all fields of endeavor, but particularly so in the military, is the development of command leadership. Without command leadership even the best coordination will be ineffective, and the highest economy will be wasteful.

Better planning cannot be effected by divorcing plans from those who must execute them, either in Washington or in the field; as stated before, planning is a command function. It is not the only command function, but it can and should be improved. Improvement can be brought about by increased decentralization and by greater use of such agencies as the Strategic Survey Committee as recommended in the Rockefeller report.

It is to be recognized of course that the overburdening of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a many other governmental agencies and United

Nations agencies in Washington and New York, have been brought about by worldwide activities calling for decisions upon a multitude of batters big and little, without the great pressures for immediate action that are caused by an allout state of war, as existed in World War II. It is difficult to see how these excessive burdens can be relieved unless field or regional authorities can be given greater power of decision. This would prevent many minor decisions coming to Washington that is to the topside in Washington, at least each of them there to be processed through many busy people before a decision is reached.

Specifically, I would recommend that sections 1 (c) and 1 (d) of the Reorganization Plan No. 6 be deleted, and that, the President agreeing, a new section be added, restoring membership in the President's Cabinet to the three service secretaries.

If, however, the Committee on Government Operations, and the Congress, should decide to allow the Reorganization Plan No. 6 to come into being, I would respectfully recommend to the committee that clarifying testimony be obtained from those in the Defense Department as to the meaning and intent of changes provided in the reorganization plan and those to be made administratively as set forth in the message and in the Rockefeller report.

May I add:

The message of the President of the United States transmitting his Reorganization Plan No. 6 to the Congress sets forth deficiencies in organization to be corrected, the corrective actions that he intends to carry out, and the congressional acquiescence where necessary, as set forth in the plan.

A major corrective action as set forth in the message is to downgrade the power or functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; in particular, the Joint Chiefs are no longer to direct or coordinate the operations of the various field commanders.

Presumably sections 1 (c) and (d) of the plan are designed to provide legislative sanction for this downgrading by transferring some functions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chairman.

It is axiomatic that the authority of no officer of the Government, military or civilian, should be increased without crystal-clear proof of its actual essentiality. During the testimony before your committee, I have heard no adequate explanation as to the need for the additional authority for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that is proposed in paragraphs (c) and (d). I have heard no testimony that clearly shows that existing authority is inadequate to accomplish the improvements in the functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the pending reorganization plan is designed to accomplish. Therefore, I presume the reason for this inclusion is as set forth above.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dawson.

Mr. DAWSON. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCormack.

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do any of you other gentlemen have any questions? Mr. FOUNTAIN. No questions.

Mr. DAWSON. That was a very fine statement-very clear and very concise.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any of you gentlemen any questions?
Mr. BROOKS. No, sir, Mr. Chairman, not from me, sir.

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