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Mr. FINLETTER. One fifty-five at one time; and I think you will remember, sir, at one point it was one six three.

Now, it is my belief that 163 wings was right for mid-1954 and, secondly, we could have reached about 163 wings by mid-1954 had the decision been made in the fall of 1951 to go ahead.

It is not true that the American aircraft industry was incapable of reaching that level by middle of 1954. There might have been 1 or 2 wings or maybe a few more wings which would not have been fully modern, but not very many.

Then a decision was made in the fall of 1951 to go for 143 wings, but to stretch it a year.

Now, that 143 or 163, whatever it was, was calculated with respect to the requirements of mid-1954.

There was nothing magic in the date of 1954. There was nothing that we are saying that mid-1954 was a particular peak of danger. It was that there would be a peak of danger in 1954 which should be met by force of at least 143 wings, and that was the military require

ment.

Now, that first stretchout was a decision which was made for economic reasons, and that introduced an element of military risk.

Now, even if we went for the 143 wings and made them beyond the 1955 date, 1956 or 1957, as I have seen some talk of-and you have just now mentioned 1958-that means you have a force which would be good for 1954 coming into being in 1958, at a time when obviously Russian capabilities will be much more serious.

Mr. McCORMACK. And that was in connection with the other branches of the service-four hundred and eight or nine vessels for the Navy, as I remember, and a certain complement for the Army. Mr. FINLETTER. Exactly.

Mr. McCORMACK. Is that correct?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes.

Mr. MCCORMACK. And this throws the entire plan, the ovrall plan, of our national defense out of gear

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. McCORMACK (continuing). For the deadline.

Mr. FINLETTER. It seems to me it does; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by that? I didn't get that. Mr. McCORMACK. The 143-airwing group also was related toThe CHAIRMAN. Oh.

Mr. McCORMACK (continuing). A certain size Navy, which I remember was 408 or 409 vessels in active service, and a certain complement for the Army.

Now, we have heard a lot of talk about $40 billion floating around in the air. Will you explain that, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. FINLETTER. Yes, sir. It's simply this: That when you make an appropriation, let's say, of $16 billion for the Air Force for a fiscal year, the historical experience shows that it takes a little bit more than 4 years to spend that because of the lead-time elements. Roughly speaking, it divides like this: About 25 percent is spent in the first year, in the year in which the appropriation is made; about 40 percent. in the second year; about another 25 percent in the third, and the rest in the fourth, with a little bit carrying over into the fifth. So, it means by very definition 75 percent of your appropriation is not spent in the year in which it is made.

That is the normal state of affairs on the historical record. So, of course, there is a carryover of unexpended appropriated funds.

Mr. McCORMACK. But committed?

Mr. FINLETTER. But committed.

Mr. McCORMACK. Most of it committed?

Mr. FINLETTER. Committed.

The CHAIRMAN. Aren't we getting away from the plan and getting into an argument?

Mr. McCORMACK. I think we are getting into a very able discussion

The CHAIRMAN. I know we are.

Mr. McCORMACK (continuing). About a very important piece of testimony

The CHAIRMAN. About the size of the Air Force.

Mr. McCORMACK (continuing). About a very important piece of testimony given on our ability to carry atomic power through the air in case we are suddenly attacked.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I agree with you about that, but it seems to me we are getting away from the issue that we have here. We are getting onto this statement as to whether we should have a certain size Air Force and certain other defense organizations.

I gathered from the testimony of the witness that, in his opinion, if the recommendation of the Eisenhower budget as to the Air Force was adopted and you had this stretchout, we wouldn't be adequately defended.

Mr. FINLETTER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I got out of it; but I assumed, of course, my colleague was supporting the Eisenhower administration all the way through.

Mr. McCORMACK. Well, don't assume too much.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I was afraid of that-afraid I was-and had

Mr. McCORMACK. Well, I may have my views but I always keep my mind open, enough in reserve, to be receptive to evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize that.

May Mr. Fountain go on?

Mr. McCORMACK. Just one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty minutes.

Mr. McCORMACK. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all right.

Mr. McCORMACK. All right, Mr. Fountain. Go ahead.

Apparently the chairman doesn't like this line of questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I love it. It indicates to me your intense enthusiasm in support of the Eisenhower administration.

Mr. McCORMACK. Well, my intense enthusiasm in support of a powerful national defense.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. McCORMACK. You can put that interpretation on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fountain, go ahead.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Finletter, I have read with great interest the message which our President addressed to Congress in submitting this reorganization proposal. It is truly a masterpiece, but I do not find the thoughts expressed therein, in my own thinking, entirely consistent with the

plan which is proposed. For instance, the President outlines a number of objectives and, among them is this one:

The first objective, toward which immediate actions already are being directed is clarification of lines of authority within the Department of Defense so as to strengthen civilian responsibility.

In your opinion, will this plan strengthen civilian responsibilities? Mr. FINLETTER. I thought that there was one thing, sir, and that was arrangements with respect to command.

The President's message, as I remember it, states in the case of the various joint commands throughout the world that one of the departments shall be named as the executive department for exercising the command over that joint command, and that the secretary of the service, of the department in question should be the person through whom this command was exercised.

That would seem to me to be a strengthening of civilian control. May I say why I think that is an excellent arrangement which President Eisenhower has proposed?

You may argue in the time of all-out war, total war, that the command should be exercised probably directly by a military man, although I think that is doubtful, in the case of these joint commands, but in a time like the present, when the wars, grievous though they may be as, for example in Korea-have a huge content of political policy in them, it seems to me it is of very high importance to adopt a provision such as that contained in President Eisenhower's accompanying statement, whereby a civilian shall be the man who gives the orders to the joint commander in the field, because thereby you bring in a civilian dealing with a mixed political and military matter— indeed, a matter which may have some economic content, too.

So, to that extent, I think the civilian control is

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Do you feel that the Secretary of Defense will always have command of a situation where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has control over the appointment, the hiring, and the firing, so to speak, of the Joint Staff, which is the working body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. FINLETTER. There are two respects in which a secretary of defense might not have complete control:

1. There is a provision, which you have not referred to, which is the provision whereby the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President to the extent that the prestige of this Chairman is built up and he becomes more and more a symbol of concentrated military power to that extent there will be a tendency to look to him more than to the civilian Secretary.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I would like to ask you if, in your opinion, the substitution of six additional assistant secretaries in lieu of a couple of boards and a couple of agencies is any guaranty of economy?

Mr. FINLETTER. I think that the Assistant Secretary to take over the work of the Munitions Board is a wise provision.

The Munitions Board was not working well, and, therefore, a drastic move was needed to substitute something for it; and I think that is all right.

I do not like the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense to take over research and development. At first I had favored that

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provision, but, on second thought, it seems to me that research and development is so terribly important in this fast-moving technological revolution that it is better to have the competitive nature which came from the Research and Development Board, in which the three services were competing to get the very best possible weapons.

It is a little bit more expensive, I think. It may be a little bit more wasteful; but if you are going to waste money anywhere in the service, the place to waste it is in research and development, in my opinion. It is terribly important to be ahead in quality.

If you want an example of that, you can take the record of the F-86 against the MIG. It was only good fortune and ability, too, but also emphasis on research and development that got North American to get out a swept-back wing fighter at the time it did; and if we had been fighting MIGS with a straight-wing fighter in Korea, there would have been no 8 to 1 record, or it may have been 8 to 1 the other way.

You couldn't have sent up those straight winged jobs against those MIGS, and that was the product of research and development, and maybe a little bit of waste in the process.

If there is any place to waste, waste in research and development. Mr. FOUNTAIN. I would like to ask you if you don't feel that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff are overworked and have too many details to attend to, there are other means of relieving them of that burden than by giving to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this tremendous authority?

Mr. FINLETTER. Well, sir, I was impressed by Mr. Eberstadt's statement on that. I don't think this does relieve the Chiefs of Staff of anything. I think if anything it makes their job a little bit more difficult.

Also, I think it's open to some question as to how valid this argument about their being overworked is. It is true they are very pressed, but it does seem to me one of the reasons for that is they take too many matters on their agenda. They should, I believe, restrict themselves in the limits of their agenda.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Thank you very much, Mr. Finletter.

Mr. FINLETTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Cooke, please.

Will you identify yourself and give us a little of your history?

STATEMENT OF ADM. CHARLES M. COOKE, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED)

Admiral CoOKE. I am Adm. Charles M. Cooke, United States Navy, retired, living in California.

The CHAIRMAN. And what is your experience in the service?
Admiral COOKE. I have it in the statement, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

Admiral CoOKE. About 1 week ago I received a letter from the chairman of your committee expressing the desire of the committee to have the benefit of my views on Reorganization Plan No. 6. This letter was sent to me at my home in Sonoma, Calif. In answer,

I wrote a letter to the chairman which I shall read with some additions that I added later.

In my letter I expressed my readiness to proceed across continent to appear in person and to answer such questions as the members of the committee might desire to ask. Day before yesterday, I received a telephone call, requesting me to appear in person before the committee and I arranged to proceed by air at my own expense, but later managed to obtain transportation via Navy plane which was coming to Washington and I arrived here last night. I therefore did not have an opportunity to prepare a more formal statement.

I shall now read the letter I addressed to the chairman, together with interpolating additions.

I assume that the invitation for my appearance is based on my connection with the Navy's preparation for World War II and with the strategical direction of the war itself. My experience including duty as chief planner to the commander in chief, United States Fleet, 1936 to 1938, as a principal adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations 1938 to 1941, and as chief strategical adviser to Admiral King, 1942 to 1945, including Chief of Staff in the latter part of the war. During the war I attended all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Staff meetings with the exception of a few in the beginning, and all of the heads of Government conferences.

I should add that in conjunction with General Wedemeyer I was directly associated with preparing during the war our joint planning organization which was the basis of the organization now in use.

In the consideration of the organization of the armed services, two major factors responsible for our swift and sweeping worldwide victory should be borne in mind. First and foremost was the fact that our American institutions had produced millions of leaders who could be called upon in the various levels to mobilize and lead our war effort, industrial and military. Without this reservoir of leadership there would not have come into existence the overwhelming power that was to be given strategical direction. This leadership could not have developed but for our genius in delegating authoritative decisions and responsibility to the various levels of endeavor. This same process bears directly, in the long run, on the ability of our Armed Forces to meet and stand up under wartime demands.

Secondly, the allocation and military application of our great national effort was placed, under the President, into the hands of the command coordinating group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This leadership proved itself effective in guiding the national effort into the proper channels of military output.

Further, and all important, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the President, directed the strategic application of the national output. No substantial error can be authoritatively pointed out as to allocation of effort or as to strategic direction or timing. While there were some tactical failures in the field, strategical direction from the top was such that none of these failures in the field resulted in a strategical

reverse.

I'd like to interpolate here just a minute to say that organization has to do in the end with the waging of all-out war. It has to function in time of peace, time of limited war, but if it doesn't work in all-out war it's no good.

All major decisions at the top were made, of course, by the President. Lesser decisions at the top were made daily-individually by the military heads of the services, or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a

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