dependent upon them. They are dangers which must ever be guarded against in autocracies as well as in democracies, and no means have yet been devised to avoid them, even if they endanger liberty or civilization. They are real and ever-present dangers and threaten in times of peace as well as in times of war. I merely call attention to them for the purpose of directing attention to other dangers which threaten in this international cataclysm, and which may put our country to the supreme test.

We are involved in a war, the most terrible in its present aspects as well as in its future possibilities of recorded time, and it has been difficult to arouse the American people to the importance and necessity of properly preparing to meet it if we would preserve our liberties, protect our civilization, and perpetuate the institutions which have come to us as a heritage from the fathers.

THE FIRST GREAT DANGER.

The first great danger which threatened in the present crisis was the protest from many respectable sources against providing for an adequate Military Establishment. It has been contended that it was undemocratic and opposed to the traditional policy of our country to raise an army, even in so dangerous a crisis as that now impending, in any other way than by the volunteer system. That every war in which we have been engaged was carried to a successful conclusion by volunteers, and the valor of the volunteers has been heralded from the housetops and the hustings, in Congress and out of Congress, as an unanswerable argument for the retention of a system that has always proven and will ever prove a failure in every prolonged war.

Notwithstanding these protests, the act of May 18, 1917, for increasing the Military Establishment included a provision for the selective draft, and it is now the law of the land. No one, so far as I am advised, now seriously questions the power of Congress to enact such a law under the constitutional provision for raising and maintaining an army, and in view of this it seems strange to me, as it must to everyone, that a power which is recognized as within the limits of the Constitution should nevertheless be questioned as violative of the traditional policy of the country. If the protest had begun with the discussion of the act in question and had ended with its enactment all might be well, but the danger of which I speak lies in the fact that the subject is still being agitated in some sections of the country, and I regret to say in some parts of the South opposition to the draft is threatened, and pacifists in and out of Congress are threatening to make the question a political one in the ensuing campaigns. Only a few days ago a bill was introduced in the Senate by a distinguished southern Senator providing that no person drafted into the service shall be ordered abroad without his consent. In other words, at a time when the country ought to be united in everything that upholds the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy at the most critical juncture in our history, we find that efforts are being made and are threatened to be continued, the effect of which is and must be to weaken the Government and endanger American liberty and civilization.

THE VOLUNTEER AND THE SYSTEM.

In the discussion of this subject, we must differentiate always between the valor of the individual volunteer, his courage and his patriotism, and a system which depends upon the volunteer for ultimate success. History records the courage of the individual volunteer, but an impartial reading of history will, I think, convince anyone that the system has proven a failure, even in the wars which have been waged in America; and if that be true, what would have happened here in the raising of an army in this international crisis if the volunteer system had been relied upon, and what would happen now if in the whirligig of politics the system of the selective draft should be abandoned? In this connection it must not be forgotten that there are those in and out of Congress who are insisting that the present law is to be made an issue in the next campaign. May that beneficent Providence which has watched over the fortunes of our beloved country avert the disaster which would be sure to follow the abandonment of our present system.

President Wilson, in his message to Congress on the 2d day of April, 1917, said in reference to this war and universal liability to military service, that

It will involve the utmost practicable cooperation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to that, the extension to those Governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the Nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the Navy in all respects, but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least 500,000 men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained, by the present generation, by well conceived taxation.

There is no closer student of history to-day than President Woodrow Wilson, and, hating war and all that smacks of militarism as he does, the lessons of history taught him that in the momentous crisis now confronting America there is only one safe, one reliable, one certain way to raise an efficient army, and that is by some system which makes military service universal as well as compulsory. Having reached that conclusion, he hesitated not a moment to recommend its adoption during the war.

There is a reason why the casual student of our military history has not grasped the inherent weaknesses of the militia or volunteer system of the wars which have been waged in the United States. For the most part the histories which have always been used as text books in the schools have dwelt at length upon the splendid valor and the patriotism of the volunteers, making no distinction between the individual and the system which collectively he goes to make up. The Fourth of July orator and the demagogue alike discuss the individual and not the system. It sounds better and appeals to the pride of the average American audience to be told of the valor of their ancestors. But you will remember the storm of protest that was raised in

the last campaign when a distinguished Cabinet officer dared tell a part of the truth about the militiaman of the Revolution. Yet true it is that but for the timely aid of France and the military instruction of Von Steuben and others, it is as certain as can be that the Revolution of 1776 would have resulted disastrously for the Colonies. So it might be said of the other wars of the past century-all of them would have ended in half the time actually required to complete them, and thousands of lives and millions of treasure would have been saved, if a sane and efficient military system had been established by Congress in advance of them or during their continuance. The same argument against the draft has always been used as was used when the present selective draft law was in course of discussion in Congress, namely, that any but a volunteer system is violative of the traditions of our country, un-American, and unnecessary.

THE SELECTIVE DRAFT.

Now, let us see if the selective draft, or any form of conscription or compulsory military service, is obnoxious to either of these objections. The man who, above all others, was in a position to speak intelligently as well as feelingly upon the subject of the militia during the Revolution was Gen. Washington. He did not hesitate to speak out on more than one occasion as to the inefficiency of the volunteer system.

On February 9, 1776, he wrote:

To expect the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits as from veteran soldiers is to expect what never did and perhaps never will happen.

On August 20, 1780:

*

Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America; * * we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered with impunity, from the same cause.

September 15, 1780:

Regular troops are alone equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense as offense, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. And, again, on September 24, 1776, in a letter to the President of the Continental Congress, he said, amongst other things:

To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and, such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others. Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control can not brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and government of the army, without which licentiousness and every kind of disorder triumphantly reigns. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year; and unhappily for us and the cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been laboring to establish in the army under my immediate command is in a manner done away by having such a mixture of troops as have been called together within these few months.

Again, in the same letter, he says:

The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended from one are remote, and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For if I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter. I do not mean by this, however, to arraign the conduct of Congress; in so doing I should equally condemn my own measures if I did not my judgment; but experience, which is the best criterion to work by, so fully, clearly, decisively, reprobates the practice of trusting to militia that no man who regards order, regularity, and economy, or who has any regard for his own honor, character, or peace of mind will risk them upon this issue.

And again, in a letter to the President of the Congress, under date of December 5, 1776, he said:

When I reflect on the losses we have sustained for want of good troops, the certainty of this is placed beyond a doubt in my mind. In such a case the militia, who have been harassed and tired by repeated calls upon them, and farming and manufactures in a manner suspended, would, upon any pressing emergency, have run with alacrity to arms, whereas the cry now is, "They may be as well ruined in one way as another," and with difficulty they are obtained. I mention these things to show that, in my opinion, if any dependence is placed in the militia another year Congress will be deceived. When danger is a little removed from them they will not turn out at all. When it comes home to them the well affected, instead of flying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing their families and effects, while the disaffected are concerting measures to make their submission and spread terror and dismay all around to induce others to follow their example. Daily experience and abundant proofs warrant this information.

And in a letter to the same person under date of December 20, 1776, he said:

It is needless to add that short enlistments and a mistaken dependence upon militia have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt. We find, sir, that the enemy are daily gathering strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snowball by rolling, will increase unless some means can be devised to check effectually the progress of the enemy's arms. Militia may possibly do for it for a little while, but in a little while also the militia of those States which have been frequently called upon will not turn out at all; or if they do, it will be with so much reluctance and sloth as to amount to the same thing. Instance New Jersey. Witness Pennsylvania. Could anything but the river Delaware have saved Philadelphia?

ADVOCATED DRAFT LAWS.

On the 17th of October, 1777, he wrote to President Thomas Wharton, of Pennsylvania, as follows:

There is another matter which I beg leave to recommend to the serious consideration of the legislature of your State; that is, the adopting of some mode of completing and keeping up the quota of your continental regiments. Upon an average, your battalions have never been above one-third full, and now many of them are far below even that. From the extravagant prices given to substitutes in the militia in the different States, it has become impossible to recruit more upon the bounty allowed by Congress. The New England States and Virginia have begun to adopt the mode of drafting, and, I am informed, they have succeeded very well. I am convinced that this will be found the only method of raising continental troops, and if the measure were to become general throughout the States it would not be deemed a hardship. I mention this matter to you at this time in the hope that you will as soon as possible fall upon this or some other mode to recruit your regiments in the course of this fall and winter, and as it is more than probable that our opposition will not end with this campaign, we ought to endeavor to have a respectable army in the field in the spring, before the enemy can receive further reenforcements from Europe.

On the 18th of November, 1779, he wrote from West Point to the President of Congress as follows:

In the more early stages of the contest, when men might have enlisted for the war, no man, as my whole conduct and the uniform tenor of my letters will evince, was ever more opposed to short enlistments than I was, and while there remained a prospect of obtaining recruits upon a permanent footing in the first instance, as far as duty and a regard to my station would permit, I urged my sentiments in favor of it. But the prospect of keeping up an army by voluntary enlistments being changed, or at least standing on too precarious and uncertain a footing to depend on for the exigency of our affairs, I took the liberty in February, 1778, in a particular manner to lay before the Committee of Arrangements, then with the army at Valley Forge, a plan for an annual draft as the surest and most certain, if not the only means left us, of maintaining the army on a proper and respectable ground. And, more and more confirmed in propriety of this opinion by the intervention of a variety of circumstances unnecessary to detail, I again took the freedom of urging the plan to the committee of conference in January last; and, having reviewed it in every point of light and found it right, or at least the best that has occurred to me, I hope I shall be excused by Congress for offering it to them, and in time for carrying it into execution for the next year, if they should conceive it necessary for the States to complete their quotas of troops.

The plan I would propose is that each State be informed by Congress annually of the real deficiency of its troops, and called upon to make up, or such less specific number as Congress may think proper, by a draft; that the men drafted join the army by the 1st of January and serve until the 1st of January in the succeeding year; that from the time the drafts join the army the officers of the States from which they come be authorized and directed to use their endeavors to enlist them for the war, under the bounties to the officers themselves and the recruits granted by the act of the 23d of January last, namely, $10 to the officers for each recruit, and $200 to the recruits themselves; that all State, county, and town bounties to drafts, if practicable, be entirely abolished, on account of the uneasiness and disorders they create among the soldiers, the desertions they produce, and for other reasons which will readily occur; that on or before the 1st of October annually an abstract or return similar to the present one be transmitted to Congress, to enable them to make their requisitions to each State with certainty and precision.

On the 25th of May, 1780, he wrote to Phillip Schuyler, John Mathews, and Nathaniel Peabody, a committee of Congress:

Unless the principal part of the force be composed of men regularly organized, and on the continuance of whose services we can rely, nothing decisive can be attempted. The militia are too precarious a dependence to justify such an attempt, where they form a material part of the plan. Militia can not have the necessary habits nor the consistency either for an assault or a siege. In employing them essentially we should run a risk of being abandoned in the most critical moments. The expense and the consumption of provisions and stores, which we are bound by every motive to economize, will be very considerably increased. As we should not be able to keep the same body in the field during the whole campaign, we should a great part of the time have a double set of men to pay and feed, those in actual service and those on the march to relieve them or returning home when relieved. The operations of husbandry will suffer in proportion.

The mode by draft is, I am persuaded, the only efficacious one to obtain men. It appears to me certain that it is the only one to obtain them in time; nor can the period which you have appointed for bringing them into the field be delayed without defeating the object. I have little doubt that at any time, and much less at the present juncture, the powers of the Government exerted with confidence will be equal to the purpose of drafting. The hopes of the people, elevated by the prospects before them, will induce a cheerful compliance with this and all the other measures of vigor which have been recommended and which the exigency requires.

On March 12, 1782, he wrote James McHenry as follows:

It is idle at this late period of the war, when enthusiasm is cooled, if not done away, when the minds of that class of men who are proper subjects for soldiers are poisoned by the high bounties which have been given and the knowledge of the distresses of the Army so generally diffused through every State, to suppose that our battalions can be completed by voluntary enlistment. The attempt is vain, and we are only deceiving ourselves and injuring the cause by making the experiment. There is no other effectual method to get men suddenly but that of classing the people and compelling each class to furnish a recruit.