doubling the force of the citizens, the pillagers were driven out with great loss. Three times the count, with his cavalry, charged upon the people, in different quarters of the city, and three times he was repulsed, with great slaughter. At last he threatened to put to death the eighty prisoners whom he had arrested. Fouquet, associating with himself, the abbot of Saint Sernin, again entered the city as a mediator. The two prelates demanded of the Toulousians, to surrender their arms and fortresses, engaging, by oath, that on these conditions, the count should release their prisoners, and neither touch their persons nor their goods, but protesting, that they had no mercy to expect, if they persisted in their rebellion. The bishop, Fouquet, and the count Simon appear, by this time, to have been so well known that their word inspired no confidence; but the fearful danger of the hostages, the critical situation of the city, and more than all, the constant repugnance of the people to believe that the lords and the priests would falsify their oaths, determined the Toulousians to submission. Mutual oaths were exchanged; the arms were given up; the fortresses were surrendered to the soldiers of Montfort; and when the citizens had thus deprived themselves of all means of resistance, Montfort put the most considerable persons amongst them in irons, and sent them, with the prisoners whom he had before seized, into the principal castles of the province, where they all perished, either by want or by a violent death. Then he commanded the rest of the citizens to pay him, before the 1st of the following Novem

ber, the exorbitant sum of thirty thousand marks of silver, in order to ransom their city from the flames, and their persons from a universal carnage. There remained to the Toulousians no resource, and they were obliged to submit to these hard conditions.*

1217. Simon de Montfort, who regarded all that his neighbours retained, as so much taken from himself, renewed the war in the following year, as well with Raymond Roger, count of Foix, with whom he disputed the restitutions he was enjoined to make, by the decisions of the council of Lateran, as with Raymond VII, then reduced to the possession of Provence. He besieged the son of the former, Roger Bernard, in Montgrenier, and, after six weeks, obliged him to capitulate. He then engaged with the latter on the Rhone, and hanged all the inhabitants of the castle of Bernis, of which he had rendered himself master. Nevertheless, the citizens of Beaucaire and of St. Gilles resisted all his attacks, although these two places were part of the concessions made to him by the council of Lateran, and confirmed by Philip Augustus. He was more fortunate in Valentinois, whither he afterwards carried the war. He had obtained there several advantages, when he learned that the inhabitants of Toulouse, indignant at the cruelty

* Historia de los faicts de Tolosa, p. 78-84. Petri Val. Cern. Hist. Albigens. cap. lxxxiii, p. 661.-Guil. de Podio Laurentii, cap. xxix, p. 683. Hist. Gen. de Languedoc, liv. xxiìi, ch. ix,

p. 292-294.

+Hist. Albigens. Petri Val. Cern. cap. lxxxiv, p. 661. Hist. de Languedoc, liv. xxiii, ch. xiii, p. 296.

and perfidity with which they had been treated the preceding year, had secretly recalled, from Aragon, their count, Raymond VI, who on the 13th of September, had entered into his capital.*

The return of count Raymond VI gave occasion for a touching manifestation of the national sentiments which were cherished by the inhabitants of the South of France. This descendant of an ancient house, long signalized in the service of the cross in the Holy Land, possessed no qualities which could properly speaking be regarded as grand or heroic. He had shown neither distinguished talents nor force of character; he had early been induced to consent to what he disapproved, and to inscribe his name amongst those of the crusaders who came to ravish his country, and who secretly nourished the project of conquering his heritage. His submission to all the ecclesiastical censures, to all the outrages, to all the injustice, which the legates, the provincial councils, the pope, and the council of Lateran, had accumulated on his head, sufficiently indicated either his weakness, or his superstitious fears; and his retreat from the Narbonnese castle, and then from Toulouse, was perhaps the effect of his timidity. But the people of all the province of Albigeois, did not forget that he had · incurred the hatred of his oppressors, only by his indulgence towards them; that he had abhorred

* Hist. Albigens. cap. lxxxiv, lxxxv, p. 662. Guill. de Podio Laurentii, cap. xxx, p. 683. Historia de los faicts de Tolosa, p. 84 et seq. Histoire de Languedoc, liv. xxiii, ch. xviii, p. 299.

bloodshed and punishments, and that in spite of his promises, in spite even of the persuasion with which they had succeeded in inspiring him, that his religious duty, as well as his interest, demanded these persecutions, he had always checked the zeal of the executioners. His administration had been gentle; public liberty in the cities, commerce, manufactures, science, and poetry had made rapid advances by his assistance and encouragement. If his civil character wanted force he had at least given proofs that he possessed the courage of the wrarior, and the talents of the general. His young son Raymond VII, already rendered illustrious by high exploits before his twentieth year, appeared, with a more experienced constancy, and a loftier character, to promise a happier reign.

But the two Raymonds became still more dear to the people, by their contrast with Simon de Montfort and the crusaders. It was not the zeal of the Albigensian heretics which was awakened for the house of Toulouse; their church was drowned in blood, their race had disappeared, their opinions had ceased to influence society; but in their name the other parts of the population had been the objects of martyrdom. Hundreds of villages had seen all their inhabitants massacred, with a blind fury, and without the crusaders giving themselves the trouble to examne whether they contained a single heretic. We cannot tell what credit to give to the numbers assigned for the armies of the cross, nor whether we may believe that in the course of a single year five hundred thousand men were poured into

Languedoc. But this we certainly know, that armies, much superior in number, much inferior in discipline, to those which were employed in other wars, had arrived, for seven or eight successive years, almost without interruption, upon this desolated country; that they entered it without pay, and without magazines, that they provided for all their necessities with the sword, that they considered it as their right, to live at the expense of the country, and that all the harvests of the peasants, all the provisions and merchandise of the citizens, were, on every occasion, seized with a rapacious hand, and divided at discretion, amongst the crusaders. No calculation can. ascertain, with any precision, the dissipation of wealth, or the destruction of human life, which were the consequences of the crusade against the Albigenses. There was scarcely a peasant who did not reckon in his family some unhappy one, whose life had been cut off by the sword of Montfort's soldiers; not one but had repeatedly witnessed the ravaging of his property by them. More than three quarters of the knights and landed proprietors had been spoiled of their castles and fiefs, to gratify some of the French soldierssome of Simon de Montfort's creatures. Thus spoiled, they were named Faidits, and had the favor granted them of remaining in the country, provided they were neither heretics, nor excommunicated, nor suspected of having given an asylum to those who were so; but they were never to be permitted to enter a walled city, nor to enjoy the honor of mounting a war-horse. Every species of injustice, all kinds of affronts, perse