him up in some old worn-out dress of the world-spirit; and the present, which wants fashion, will not look at him. There is, perhaps, reason in that. How many stand-points, however, Hegel has made obsolete, is shown by the present rebellion of all. It is the aim of the reply to force the examination of human thought ever toward the Absolute, and to maintain Hegel's Absolute,—although in a new shape, which will perhaps be as little recognized by foes or friends as Gabler is inclined to recognize the dressing up of Hegel's in the gold frame of fancy and the trappings of poetry (p. IV.) But as this new shape, like every other shape which calls itself an emanation from Hegel, rests on the dialectic method, everything, as was shown in the previous article, reduces itself to the question whether the dialectic method of pure thinking is correct. If it is false, there arises from it no knowledge, and no new mode of seizing the Absolute. It is therefore of no use to swing round in one's own circle; the question always comes up again: What has been done to redeem the dialectic method? for it is the basis of the whole. In the previous article, the main points at issue were clearly set forth; they were, 1°. The suppositionless beginning; 2°. The immanent interconnection; 5°. The application of the progressus in infinitum; 7°. The delusiveness of the Hegelian syllogism. Among these, again, the assertion of the absence of presupposition, the negation, and the identity, stand prominent as the real pillars of the whole edifice. In the reply, there is as good as nothing on all these points—at least, there is scarcely one word looking at all like a refutation, or really bringing home a misapprehension. It brings no danger except to the cause which the reply defends, when it refuses to occupy itself with all these things, or, as we say, does not stand up and hold its own. Thus, then, the Logical Question in Hegel's System stands at precisely the same point where it stood at the close of the previous essay; there is not a single iota cleared up. At best, we have been shown, by one example, how it can not be cleared up. We are told in the Theaitetos of Plato, in connection with that movement, to which Hegel compared the negativity, concerning the disciples of the profound Herakleitos:-"About these speculations of Herakleitos which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot talk with them about them. For, in accordance with their text-books, they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they are absolutely without the power of doing this; or, rather, they have no particle of rest in them, and they are in a state of negation of rest which no words can express. If you ask any one of them a question, he will produce, as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you inquire the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled word, and will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another." THE MERCHANT OF VENICE. [Conclusion of the Article in the April number.] In a late number of the Journal there was a partial analysis of Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice." We now propose to complete that criticism by extending it to other parts of the same drama. But first it will be well to recapitulate the results arrived at in the former essay. Only the leading collision of the play was there developed, that between Shylock and Antonio. The first characteristic to be observed in respect to these two characters is that the one was a Jew and the other a Christian; hence the historical collision involved in the drama was between the Hebrew and the modern world. But, in the second place, this collision was elevated from a merely natural to a spiritual basis by the ends which these two men proposed; that of Shylock being the acquisition of gain, in general Thrift; while that of Antonio, though he was a merchant, subordinated money to higher purposes. In the third place, Shylock's end-Property-is absolutely confirmed and protected by Law, which possesses objective validity, and cannot be assailed with impunity. With this mighty principle Antonio falls into conflict by his bond, for bonds and all contracts must be held sacred if property be protected. Hence Law enforces Shylock's end and seizes upon Antonio. But Formal Law manifests its limitation through its own self-contradiction and thus annuls itself, this is the point made by Portia in her celebrated defence whereby Antonio is saved. But this result cannot be final, for it is purely negative and terminates in the annulment of Law; hence we pass to a higher principle which takes up and harmonizes within itself the negation before mentioned, namely, the principle of Mercy, which in its turn saves the Jew. When Law becomes self-contradictory, annihilates its own end, destroys that which it was made to protect, there must be some way of abating its action, and this is accomplished by a system of mercy. But let it not be forgotten that within its own sphere Law is paramount, and cannot be interfered with from any quarter. The reason why the Jew does not perish, though he has willed and tried to commit murder, is that he was the real object of mercy, since he was arraigned for subjective intention which lay outside of his consciousness. Hence he was in truth not responsible. Nor could the court and Portia reasonably condemn the Jew after they had maintained the cause of mercy with such persistency and power. It would be a flagrant inconsistency to demand that for Antonio which they the next moment refuse to Shylock. Hence the piece is not a tragedy. Moreover, it will be seen at the very outset that this play, if it be true to thought and history, cannot have a tragic termination. Christianity has triumphed in the world, and its representative, who is here Antonio, cannot perish in such a conflict. Nor can the Jew suffer death at the hands of Christians, for their doctrine is forgiveness and mercy. Hence the difficulty must be mediated. But who is to perform the act of mediation? This question brings us to the third leading character of the drama-Portia. But before we go on let us speak of a possible misunderstanding. By the foregoing remarks, or in the previous essay, it is not meant to assert or to be implied that the Jews of the present day are Shylocks. On the contrary, they have risen out of the narrow limits of nationality and religion as completely as any other people. No one can deny them their full share of the culture, liberality and genius of modern times. Nor is the historical position of this nationality to be underestimated. It has certainly contributed the largest ingredient to our modern civilization, and it alone of all worldhistorical peoples of antiquity is in existence to-day. Shylock, however, represents the ancient Hebrew, with all his peculiarities, cast into the modern world. He is the product of two influences: first, the original Jewish character; secondly, that character in a strange land, persecuted and outlawed by society. Hence the bitterness which overflows his whole existence, and poisons not merely his social relations, but his own domestic hearth. In America these external restraints are removed, there is hardly a prejudice except what is imported, and no one would think of distinguishing in any public relation the Jews from the common body of citizens. But to resume. Portia is the third great character of the play, and in importance stands quite on a par with Antonio and Shylock. Her function is mediatorial; in fact, she may be called the grand mediatrix of the entire drama. In her we see the instrumentality by which the main results are brought about. Through her courtship with Bassanio, Antonio comes into the power of the Jew by means of the loan. At her house all the personages of the play assemble and the wooing is done. Moreover, she accomplishes the rescue of Antonio, which is the main mediation of the poem. The great principle of which she is the bearer may be termed the Right of Subjectivity. She asserts the validity of the Internal and the Spiritual against the crushing might of externality. But she does not deny the Right of the Objective in its true limitation. Only when this Objective becomes destructive of its end and self-contradictory, as in the case when the Law was about to murder Antonio, does she place a limit to it and invoke a higher principle. Her struggle is with legality and proscription asserting themselves in spheres where they do not belong. But in relations when this contradiction no longer appears, she is the most ethical of women. In the Family her subordination is complete, almost devout. In fact, we shall see that all her acts have one end and one impelling motive: devotion to her husband, an absolute unity with his feelings and interests; in other words, subordination to the Family. She vindicates the Right of Subjectivity to herself in order that she may obtain the one whom she really loves, without which princple, it need hardly be said, the true existence of the Family is impossible. So peculiar is this character, so difficult is it to ascertain its unity, and so important is its place in the drama, that we shall be justified in looking somewhat minutely at all the circumstances in which it has been placed by the poet. First comes the long array of suitors, among whom were to be seen the nobility from every part of Europe-nay, even from Africa. The motive for this elaborate display, as we have before intimated, was to show the necessity of Bassanio's borrowing large sums of money to compete with these nobles, and also to exhibit Portia in all her dignity and splendor. But Portia has quite disregarded the outward glitter of wealth and rank, and has seemingly sought out a follower in the retinue of a lord instead of the lord himself "a Venetian, a scholar, and a soldier, that came hither in the company of the Marquis of Montferrat." So at the outset we see that she cares naught for the External, but lays stress upon the Internal. The poet has thus given us an inkling of her inclination that we may not be in the dark about her choice. Moreover, we already know of the inclination of Bassanio from the very first scene of the play, and he too is aware of Portia's preference for himself. This point, then, let us carefully bear in mind, that the poet has already let us into the secret, unknown to the outside world, that Portia and Bassanio love one another, and that each one knows of the other's love. The two people, therefore, belong together; they alone can form a rational union, since they possess the absolute prerequisite of the Family, namely, reciprocal love. Under ordinary circumstances nothing would remain but that the happy pair should go to the nearest church, and, in common parlance, have the knot tied. But to this blissful |