PREFACE. In the first edition of my Essay on PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, I endeavoured to ascertain on what principles any new measure of Parliamentary Reform ought to be framed, and to what objects it ought to be directed; but I advisedly abstained from suggesting any means of carrying into effect the views I had stated. I venture now to offer to the Public a new edition of the Essay, for the purpose of supplying this intentional omission in the former one. I am induced to do so by my belief that the altered circumstances of the present time afford advantages which were previously wanting for discussing proposals for the improvement of our Representative system. The subject is no longer likely to give occasion for an immediate strife of political parties, since the House of Commons has equally rejected the Bills submitted to it by the Administrations of Lord Derby and Lord Palmerston; the first by a direct vote, the second by the less candid, but not less effectual, process of delaying its progress by interminable speeches, till it was withdrawn by its authors in despair. In the debates on these Bills, the leading Members of the House of Commons have stated their views, not only on the measures before them, but generally on the changes it would be proper to make in our system of Representation. The subject has also been discussed in many pamphlets, reviews, and larger works, some of them written with great ability and in a philosophic spirit, the want of which, though perhaps unavoidable, is to be remarked and regretted in the speeches of Parliamentary speakers. Much light has thus been thrown on this difficult and important question, and many of those who had given their assent to the expediency of attempting a Reform of the House of Commons, have opened their eyes both to the tendency of such measures as have hitherto been proposed, to lead by steps more or less rapid to the ascendancy of mere numbers in the government of the country, and also to the danger of thus throwing a preponderance of political power into the hands of the least educated classes of the commu nity. The wholesome dread of such an alteration in the character of our Constitution, has likewise been much increased by late events in America, and there is at present a manifest indisposition among a majority of the educated classes of all parties, to entertain projects of change having a Democratic tendency. Yet it would be a mistake to infer that this state of public opinion renders it unnecessary to consider the subject at all, or that it is either possible, or desirable, that the question of Parliamentary Reform should be indefinitely, or even very long, put aside. The defects in the constitution of the House of Commons are so real and so serious, that those who carefully consider them can hardly wish that all attempts to correct them should be finally abandoned; and if it were ever so much to be wished, it would be impossible that the present state of things should be permanently maintained unaltered. Though I believe a large majority of the educated classes to be opposed to a Democratic Reform, we know that there is a numerous and active party bent upon carrying such a measure. In striving to attain their object this party possesses a great advantage, in the fact that the other considerable political parties in the Nation are irrevocably committed to the principle of Parliamen |