be recognized as desirable, that some arrangement should be made to secure to the Ministers of the Crown that authority in Parliament which the system of Parliamentary Government requires them to exercise. And lastly, there could be no difference of opinion as to the necessity of so arranging the system of representation, as to avoid giving any encouragement to corruption. Resolutions declaring these to be the objects to which a Reform of Parliament ought to be directed, might therefore be expected to command the assent of both Houses. If passed, they would afford good Parliamentary grounds for an Address to the Crown praying for the appointment of a Committee of the Privy Council to consider by what arrangements these— the deliberately avowed purposes of the Legislature might best be attained. Such resolutions as I have described, if adopted with this view, would not be open to the objections which may in general be justly taken to the passing of abstract resolutions by either House of Parliament. They would indeed be abstract in their character, but they would have a practical and most important object, since they would serve for the guidance of those to whom the high duty of preparing a scheme of Reform for the consideration of Parliament would be entrusted. I have only to add, in concluding this Chap ter, that it will cause me no surprise if the views which it explains should generally be regarded as visionary and impracticable. I am quite prepared to find that of the changes I have suggested, some will be pronounced wild and dangerous by Conservatives, others as attacks on the liberties of the People, by politicians of opposite opinions. But though I have little expectation that there will be many by whom my views will be accepted, I am sanguine enough to hope that these pages will not prove altogether useless. They will fully accomplish the object with which they have been written, if they should serve to provoke the further discussion which is so much needed of the principles on which a Reform in Parliament ought to be attempted, and if they should be found not altogether barren of suggestions deserving the notice of those who desire to consider this most important subject in a spirit of serious inquiry, and without reference to party interests. 283 CHAPTER VIII. ON THE EXERCISE OF PATRONAGE UNDER THE working of Parliamentary Government in this Country has been much affected by the greater or less amount of patronage possessed by the Crown at different times, and by alterations of practice as to the exercise of that patronage which have taken place in the last century and a half; and it must also be much influenced hereafter by any changes which may be made on these points. It does not therefore seem foreign to the subject of this Essay, to consider the nature and effects of the system which has prevailed in this country, in making appointments to the civil and military offices which are not held by the Members of the Administration. Under all forms of government, from despotism to unbridled democracy, complaints have been common, that the servants of the State have not been wisely and honestly selected, but that merit has been habitually passed by, and the public interest sacrificed, by the appointment of incompetent men to perform important duties. No doubt these complaints are often the mere clamour of disappointed place-hunters, but they are also frequently well founded. Every different kind of government has its own difficulties in this matter, and none is free from the operation of some of the various influences that may tend to misdirect the stream of patronage. Under our own form of government (and the same may be said of free governments in general), those entrusted with patronage are under a temptation to use it corruptly, because they may thus purchase support which may help to prolong their own power. This abuse was formerly carried to a great excess in this country, and the Ministers of the day usually trusted to an unscrupulous use of the patronage vested in their hands as one of the principal means of maintaining themselves in office. So lately as in the reign of George the Third, not only were places and pensions bartered without shame for political support, but the dismissal of officers in the Army or Navy for votes given in the House of Commons was occasionally resorted to, and there were even instances of the removal of public ser vants from situations now regarded as permanent, for the avowed purpose of punishing their friends and relations for having pursued in Parliament a line of conduct obnoxious to the Minister. A striking improvement has taken place in the practice of Governments, and in the tone of public feeling upon this subject. No Minister would now dare to incur the responsibility of abusing the patronage of the Crown and its power of dismissing its servants, by such acts as were committed with impunity less than a century ago. In the last seventy or eighty years, public opinion has gradually brought the exercise of these powers of the Crown under the control of certain rules, which, though for the most part enforced by no written law, are yet practically binding upon the Government, and have put an end to many abuses. Formerly, the appointment and promotion of naval and military officers was made, almost openly, a matter of mere favour. No rules existed prescribing certain periods of service in the lower ranks in the Army and Navy, before the higher ones could be attained, and nothing was more common than to see men rise through political influence to the command of regiments and ships of the line, with scarcely any service or knowledge of their profession to recommend them. There are |