kind have been introduced; the definitive establishment of this system of government does not in any of them date back so much as twenty years. Hence, although the prospect of its succeeding is at least in some cases encouraging, (in others I fear it is the reverse,) it cannot yet be said to have stood the test of experience.

Having thus taken a general view of the nature and effects of Parliamentary Government in this country, the succeeding Chapters of this Essay will be devoted to a more particular examination of the questions which it is my object to consider.

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CHAPTER II.

ADVANTAGES OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT.

ON comparing Parliamentary Government as it now exists in this country with other Representative Governments, the following seem to be the chief advantages belonging to the former.

First. It enables the different powers of the State to work together with harmony and energy, and provides for the systematic direction of the measures of the Legislature to objects of public good, more perfectly than Representative Constitutions of a different kind. In the latter, the executive power and the power of legislation are lodged in separate and independent authorities, while under the system of Parliamentary Government they are virtually united, as I have already observed, since those to whom the executive authority is en

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trusted, have also the duty of recommending to the Legislature the measures it should adopt, and must retire if their advice is not generally followed.

To understand the full importance of this we must consider how difficult it has been found when there has been no bond of union between the Executive Government and a Representative Assembly, armed with the powers usually assigned to such a body, to prevent a conflict between them; and also that the welfare of the state requires, not only that a struggle between these authorities should be guarded against, but also that their harmonious co-operation should be secured. In France, the many different Constitutions which have been established since 1789, on the principle of keeping the Legislative and Executive authorities as distinct and independent of each other as possible, have all had the same result, of leading to a struggle between the two, and at last to the violent overthrow of the arrangement that had been made.

In our own country, from the accession of the Stuarts (when the great power of the House of Commons may be said to have begun) till after the Revolution of 1688, the Crown and the House of Commons were in almost continual conflict; nor was their good understanding with each other secured till a bond of union between them was created by the

arrangement I have adverted to. Nor is this to be wondered at, looking to the fact that in the government of a great nation which has reached an advanced stage of civilization, the Executive and Legislative authorities have continual need of each other. It is useless for the Legislature to pass good laws if they are not properly enforced by the Executive Government. On the other hand, the Executive Government cannot perform its functions with vigour and effect if denied the active support of the Legislature, to which it is continually compelled to apply for new powers, or new laws to meet new exigencies that arise, and its action must be crippled if it cannot rely upon obtaining the assistance of this kind which it requires.

The harmonious co-operation of these different powers in the State is especially necessary with respect to financial arrangements. The imposition of taxes, and the appropriation of the revenue to the public service, constitute one of the chief duties of Representative Legislatures, as well as the source of their power. In the performance of this part of their duties, it is of the utmost importance that they should act in strict concert with the Executive Government, or rather under its direction. Without this there can be no security for efficiency and economy in conducting the public

service. The Government cannot be responsible for the former, if it cannot command the grants of money it considers necessary for the different branches of the service; while experience has demonstrated, that jobs and injudicious expenditure in some cases, are no less to be expected than equally injudicious parsimony in others, from entrusting the finances of a State to the uncontrolled management of a popular assembly. Under such a system there is no individual responsibility for errors and abuses that may be committed; and the responsibility which is divided among all the members of a numerous body, is far too slight a restraint upon them to prevent these evils.

They have accordingly prevailed to a very great extent, both in the United States and in some of our own Colonies. Private and corrupt interests have had too much weight in deciding questions relating to the grant of money in their Legislatures, which have also not unfrequently been led into acts of real improvidence, by the reluctance of any individual member to incur the odium of proposing or supporting an unpopular outlay of money, or an increase of taxation, however urgently the one or the other might be called for by the true interests of the country. It is the nature of popular assemblies in a still higher degree than of men acting