Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was organized in 1903 and kept in operation until 1942, about June, I believe, of 1942, at which time they were superseded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But they dealt in the same general type of questions and had the same general type of relationship to the Commander in Chief. So that the process, I am advised, of getting papers from the Joint Board is the same as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President, as Commander in Chief, issues instructions as to the release of the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a subsequent report or statement showing what the set-up would be if we have an independent Air Force; as, for example, as to the approximate number of men, the cost, their duties, and all of that?

General NORSTAD. There are a number of related studies in the Air Force as to the organization under unification. I do not have first-hand knowledge of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us where we can find them, or whom we may ask to get them?

General NORSTAD. I should think, Mr. Chairman, that is you would address a letter to the Secretary of War, he could obtain them.

Mr. HARDY. I did want to pursue another subject with the General for a minute.

General, I wanted to ask you a question or two in connection with the need for a separate Air Force, or whether a separate Air Force is desirable in connection with the need of the Ground Forces for tactical air support. I do not know whether you discussed that when you were before the committee before or not?

General NORSTAD. You may not recall it, Mr. Hardy, but I quoted at that time from one individual and one agency that I thought made more authoritative statements on it than I could from my position, from my experience. I quoted first of all, on the subject of the Army's attitude toward us, the man that I thought was the world's best authority on the subject as far as the Army was concerned, and that was General Eisenhower, who before your committee repeated almost word for word what I had heard him say before, and which I quoted to you: That he wanted the Air Force in one package, because as a ground commander, when he needed the air to support the Ground Forces he needed all of the air and not just that peculiar part which is earmarked and allocated solely for the purpose of supporting the Ground Forces.

That was borne out by my two and a half years of experience with the so-called strategic and tactical Air Forces and their operations. You cannot draw the line. You can draw the line in function, but you cannot draw the line in organization between the so-called tactical and so-called strategic Air Forces. When you need them one place, you use all of them, or all that you can apply. When you need them in the other place, you use them all.

We used in every major land operation the strategic Air Force, the so-called strategic Air Force. And we needed to use that strategic Air Force.

Mr. HARDY. That was used as a forerunner of your tactical operations?

General NORSTAD. In war, when you need something you need all of it; you never have enough no matter how much you have got.

You use all of your tactical and so-called strategic Air Forces on one test; when the problem is too advanced the Ground Forces, that is the major problem for everybody fiighting the war. You use them all together. When your job is strategic or divided between your normal support for the Ground Forces and your strategical effort, you will divert from your so-called tactical Air Force aircraft that can be used strategically. And we did it, time after time.

The other authority that I quoted what I believed to be and what is generally believed to be the only really objective, really authoritative study, that has been made on the matter of the Air Forces. That is that made by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey; which was not the Army's committee, and not the Air Forces' committee, and not the Navy's committee but the committee appointed by the President of the United States and responsible to him. It operated under joint charter from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

I commended to you at that time the conclusions of that committee, which stated categorically that while all defense organizations should be in general geared toward recognition of the part that air plays in modern war, there should be a third agency on a parity with the Army and the Navy. I would like to repeat that.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been in the record once, has it not? General NORSTAD. It has been in the record once, yes, sir. Mr. HARDY. Would not your arguments with respect to air support for the Ground Forces apply also the naval forces?

General NORSTAD. It is my general opinion, Mr. Hardy, that there are conditions in the Navy, in the naval operation, which are unique and peculiar to the Navy. I stated this before, too. For that reason, it is altogether proper in my mind that the Navy should have its aviation for its naval purposes.

Mr. HARDY. You do not think, then, that you have the same reasons for including the naval air arm in your Department of Air if one is set up, that you do in concentrating all Army Air Forces into a separate unit.

General NORSTAD. That is very strongly and very definitely my opinion.

Mr. HARDY. I noticed yesterday in the paper a statement by General Devers about the possible transport of ground troops by plane. Would that not militate against a separate Air Force? If that is done, should they not have within the Air Force operation complete control of their transport?

General NORSTAD. Neither I nor the War Department think so, Mr. Hardy. It is a plan of the War Department, as you know, which has been announced by General Devers and others, that all of the ground units that are not air-borne, as we know them, must be air transportable. I think everyone agrees that the modern necessity for flexibility and quick movement demands that they be air transportable. Therefore, all of the routine Infantry divisions are being geared organizationally from the standpoint of equipment toward being air transportable. We want to make the whole Army, if possible, just as far as possible, air transportable. That does not necessitate the Air Transport being a part of the Army, nor does it make it desirable.

There again, you have the question of air supply and air movement of personnel and other uses for the large transport-type aircraft. If you allocate an organization and so many aircraft to do the job, you have that problem. Because following that line of reasoning, you would have to allocate the equipment to do that job for the organization. For that peculiar purpose you would have those airplanes sitting on the ground for 30 days a month or 20 days a month. have to duplicate that for another purpose over here and for another purpose over there. It is not a question of money. It is just a question of not having the available equipment. You would never

have it.

You

Mr. HARDY. But would it not be more readily, more quickly available if a Ground Force commander simply had to go to the War Department to get it instead of having to go to another department to get it? We oper

General NORSTAD. We had no problem during the war. ated under much the same system.

The CHAIRMAN. We will resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 4:45 p. m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a. m. the following morning, July 1, 1947.)

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

TUESDAY, JULY 1, 1947

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS,

Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 1501 of the New House Office Building, Hon. Clare E. Hoffman, chairman, presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.
Our first witness will be Vice Adm. G. F. Bogan.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. G. F. BOGAN, UNITED STATES NAVY

Admiral Bogan, we should like to hear you give us a short statement of your background, what you have been doing, where you have served, and the length of your service.

Admiral BOGAN. I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912. served on destroyers in the European theater during the First World War and in the Asiatic later.

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity?

Admiral BOGAN. As engineering and gunnery officer, executive officer, and commanding officer of destroyers.

In 1924 I entered Pensacola as a student naval aviator. Since that time I have had 5 years on carriers, 2 years as a flight-test officer at Anacostia, executive officer at Pensacola, commanding officer at the naval air station at Miami prior to the war; also air officer, navigator, and executive officer in aircraft carriers.

During the war I was commanding officer of the Saratoga, 6 months as commander of Carrier Division 25, a division of jeep carriers supporting Saipan; and later a task group in Task Forces 38 and 58 until the end of the war. Since February, a year ago, I have been in command of the air force of the Atlantic Fleet with headquarters at Norfolk.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed with your statement.

Admiral BOGAN. I would rather read the statement and be subject to questioning because necessity has made the statement brief.

The proposed legislation known as H. R. 2319 was designed as a measure to unite the armed services and to enhance the national security. In my opinion it will not accomplish either of those objectives.

Under the provisions of this act there is established a third service, the United States Air Force, and a super-Secretary of National Security, charged with coordinating the three branches as they will then exist. Naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps remain as

integral parts of the Navy and, I am informed, that sections are or will be written into the bill to protect their respective integrities. It is doubtful if that status can be maintained in practical and protracted operation.

It is my earnest belief that this measure is a "bill of divorcement" rather than unification in that it separates the Army Air Force from the Army and superimposes an additional political structure at the top whose difficult task under its terms will be to make three, not two, organizations function as a single whole.

Today, gentleman, our major offensive and defensive weapon is the airplane. It will not always remain so but until it is replaced our national security, to be factual, depends to a great degree on the proper employment of that weapon. While we retain control of the air in a theater of military operations, land or sea, domination of the terrestrial and sea areas follows. Without that control, it is impossible. For that reason I believe that instead of autonomy for Air, greater integration of Air with ground Army and surface and subsurface Navy is vitally necessary.

It would appear that the studies and hearings of this legislation to date have been confined almost wholly to military and political witnesses.

I just learned this morning that the hearings are to terminate as of today. I do not believe that the Navy has had a chance to state its case before the members of this committee, and I believe there is a great deal more information available to you gentlemen if you care and have the time to seek it out.

The industrial mobilization of modern warfare has not received the attention its importance requires. I believe that the whole question is of timeless significance, that the effort to resolve this matter hastily now, at a time when chaos is widespread throughout the world, will not bring about the desired end but will, on the contrary, have an adverse effect.

There has been criticism, warranted in many cases, of duplication of effort in the Army and Navy. The President can, by Executive order, eliminate unnecessary overlapping practices.

Continued intereducation between existing services will bring about strengthened mutual understanding, which I do not think exists because of recriminations and animosities developed during the conception and gestation of this legislation. The conduct of joint training exercises and the assignment of personnel of one branch to that of the other for periods of duty will be of great benefit. The staff and war colleges now functioning for officers of all services should pay generous dividends.

While these are continuing I recommend a study by a board of men of recognized ability and unquestioned integrity into all phases of this problem. They should not be rushed or hampered by the time element. Technical military advisers can be made available as required. Their final findings and report can then be the basis for sound legislation to improve national security. It is my conviction that such a board would recommend two departments with closer liaison than now exists or a gradual transposition to one department by evolution as opposed to the three departments created by H. R.

2319.

I have no further comment.