The CHAIRMAN. Under that, Mr. Snyder, will Walter Reed and Bethesda be under one command?

Mr. SNYDER. Not necessarily.

We are trying to explore this thing. I do not know, I am trying to make up my mind, but certainly this bill is not a merger, it is unification, and in my mind there is a certain hope that we can get unification of hospital facilities. Where you have a base on which there is Army personnel and where there is Navy personnel, they might all use the same hospital, at least they can all use the same rations. Your clothing is something different, you have different uniforms, and so forth.

However, I would appreciate, as you give your testimony here, your pointing out wherein there would be a duplication of quartermaster and medical in addition to what we have now.

Admiral OFSTIE. That is just the point, Mr. Snyder, that at the present time the air forces are almost autonomous. They have set up these separate duplicating agencies. The major items are ordnance, which, of course, is fundamental, that is, the bombing up and all that sort of thing.

You know that

Under the bill you can be assured they are going to establish their own aviation engineers, their own aviation ordnance. there is very little ordnance in the air forces today.

The point is that there are a number of duplications within the Army Air Forces and the Army today, and there are others. Mr. DORN. And we hope there will be less under this bill.

Mr. KARSTEN. Did the Navy build those fields for the Army to which you referred?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes. So far as I know, there were no duplications of airfields.

In some places the Navy built the field and the Army used those fields and vice versa. I think that was pretty well coordinated. Admiral OFSTIE. I believe in the Marianas the major building effort there was done by Navy Sea Bees for the B-29s.

The CHAIRMAN. Going back.here, you stated there would be duplication and there seems to be some difference of opinion. Will you specify just where there will be duplication and whether or not there will be duplications that we say are now in existence?

Mr. Doran said, if I understood him, that the air forces did certain things now and were independent. His views would not be the same as yours?

Admiral OFSTIE. In the case of the Medical Corps, which was mentioned specifically, the Air Forces set up, in effect, separate medical facilities.

The CHAIRMAN. Now?

Admiral OFSTIE. No, which are a duplication.

The CHAIRMAN.. You mean that will continue, that will not be a new duplication?

Admiral OFSTIE. That will continue and I do not believe it should be a duplication. I believe it should be part of the Army Medical. Mr. WADSWORTH. Is it not a fact that the aviation medical group is devoted to a special type of medical research and treatment having to do with flying?

Admiral OFSTIE. A certain percentage. We have a certain number of flight surgeons in the Navy. They are right in the Navy. A

broken arm is the same whether you are an aviator or on the ground. Mr. WADSWORTH. And that man will be treated by an appropriate medical corps. He does not have to be treated under this bill by a separate aviation medical corps.

My understanding is that the aviation medical corps has devoted itself to certain fields of medicine, research with respect to the effects on the human mechanism of high altitude flying and high speeds. Admiral OFSTIE. Plus common medical work.

Mr. WADSWORTH. That could be done just as it is done today. Have you read General Spaatz' testimony on these points as to duplication?

Admiral OFSTIE. No, sir.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I think it would be very informing if you did. You mentioned chow a while ago, stating that the air corps if it had a quartermaster general, would buy the chow for the air corps.

General Spattz made it perfectly clear that they had no intention of doing such a thing, that the Quartermaster General of the Army would continue to buy all the food.

Admiral OFSTIE. Buy it for the Navy?

Mr. WADSWORTH. No, he did not say that. I am repeating the general tenor of General Spaatz' remarks. He explained that they would continue doing just as they do now, that the air corps would certify to the Quartermaster General of the Army they needed so much bread, so much meat. That would be passed upon in the Quartermaster General's office.

The purchase is made along with ordinary Army purchases and the Air Corps would get its share, there would be no duplication at all. The same would be true with clothing.

Mr. DORN. And probably the same with engineers.

Mr. RIZLEY. I have a parliamentary inquiry.

Unfortunately I have not been able to attend all these hearings, but I attended as many of them as I could.

It was my observation when witnesses were here testifying for this bill that they were permitted to give their statement, and some of us on the committee who do not have our minds made up would have a chance to hear what the witness said rather than have the question argued by the obvious partisans of the bill, partisans of one side of the bill.

Personally, I would like to hear what this witness has to say.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness may continue. The questioning, then, will be as heretofore.

Admiral OFSTIE. I am opposed to the unified Air Force or the autonomous Air Force for several reasons:

First of all, I believe that strategic bombing, which was given such a large play in the last war is just about over.

I might say that General Arnold is of that opinion, and stated in an article of his that the proximity fuse, the jet fighter, and various other things have made it impossible to go ahead with the same type of bombing as was carried out in the last war.

There has been a suggestion brought forward that things are going to change greatly within a very short period of time, we are going to have supersonic speeds and tremendous aircraft that can get by anything.

That simply is not the fact; we have nothing in sight today, no means today of passing through the trans-sonic zone. Unquestionably, I believe in due course and in years to come after we get new materials, new fuels, other new developments, we will get into the trans-sonic and super-sonic range, but we have nothing in sight today, and the belief that we will continue strategic bombing in the old manner, such as was carried out against Germany and against Japan, is, I think, a mistake.

Then, again, we are told a great deal about guided missiles which have been suggested as a proper development by the Air Force. The guided missile has gone a very short distance as a matter of fact. We are still down to about the V-1 and the V-2, and again, until we have new fuels and new materials, we are going to see little progress. In other words, it will be 15 or 20 years before we will get anywhere with that sort of thing. That is now a major part of the work of the separate Air Forces.

I have noticed that one or more witnesses before this committee have specifically referred to the summary report of the United States strategic bombing survey of Japan as the basis for the setting up of a separate Air Force.

I was the senior naval member of the strategic bombing survey team in Japan and was in their various conferences both out there and after we returned to this country. The civilian members of that committee prepared an initial draft of their final report in March of 1946, which was the time when we expected to close up the survey. As a matter of fact, it is still going on. However, in that March draft the civilian members of the strategic bombing survey stated:

These lessons, do not, however, support the view that an independent and coordinate role exists for the Air Forces.

In April, much the same thing, almost identical.

The CHAIRMAN. If you desire, we will incorporate that in the record. Admiral OFSTIE. I will send it up in proper form. (The report referred to is as follows:)

ADDENDUM TO TESTIMONY OF REAR ADм. R. A. OFSTIE BEFORE HOUSE COмMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ON JUNE 30, 1947

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

Washington 25, D. C., July 1, 1947. Excerpts from conclusions in successive draft copies of the summary report of the United States strategic bombing survey (Japan) relating to the separate air force.

(A) DRAFT OF MARCH 5, 1946

"The Congress of the United States is today considering a bill for the reorganization of our Military Establishment. The lessons of the Pacific war strongly support that form of organization which clarifies their functional responsibilities and favors a higher degree of coordination in their development, their planning, their intelligence, and their operations. These lessons do not, however, support the view that an independent and coordinate role exists for the Air Forces. They rather support the view that both at land and at sea the prime objective is control of the air and that all forces should be geared into a coordinated team to achieve that objective."

(B) DRAFT OF APRIL 10, 1946

* These lessons emphasize that it is more important that our entire military establishments be designed to meet the new strategic and tactical problems arising from the atomic bomb and increased capabilities of air weapons than that there be an independent and coordinate role for the Air Forces."

(C) DRAFT OF MAY 1, 1946

"The Congress of the United States is today considering legislation for the reorganization and unification of our military establishments. The Survey is of the opinion that the prompt passage of such a bill is in the national interest. The lessons of the Pacific war strongly support that form of organization which provides unity of command, capable of clear and effective decision at the top, strengthens civilian control, and thus provides closer integration of military policy with foreign and domestic policy, and favors a high degree of coordination in planning, intelligence, and research and development. Such unity of command, should, however, decentralize administrative burdens and permit specialized training and the free development of the component forces, even at the risk of some duplication. Some duplicative effort and expense are necessary to provide legitimate and required competition and initiative. The lessons of the Pacific war emphasize that it is more important that our entire Military Establishment be ⚫ designed to meet the new strategic and tactical problems arising from the atomic bomb and the increasing power and range of modern weapons than that there be an independent and coordinated role for the air forces."

(D) PUBLISHED REPORT, DATED JULY 1, 1946

Within a Department of Common Defense which provides unity of command and is itself oriented toward air and new weapons, the Survey believes that, in addition to the Army and the Nayv, there sould be an equal and coordinate position for a third establishment. To this establishment should be given primary responsibility for passive, and active defense against long-range attack on our cities, industries, and other sustaining resources; for strategic attack, whether by air-plane or guided missile; and for all air units other than carrier-air and such land-based air units as can be more effective es components part of the of the Army or Navy. The mission of such a new estalbishment would differ considerably from that of an autonomous air force and would, in certain respects, require additional and broader experience than has heretofore been required by the Army Air Forces alone."

Admiral OFSTIE. In the final report, to be perfectly frank, after a great deal of pressure was applied to these gentlemen, they came out with quite a different conclusion. Surely, after their months in Japan and several months here in this country, they had reached conclusions which I think must have been sound. Surely, they were not given any push from the Navy, and yet in the course of a few months after they put out their first draft, they changed completely. No doubt some of you men have seen the Summary Report in which you will find quite an amazing recommendation, an Air Force that will handle all the defense of the country and all guided missiles, and all that sort of thing. It is a very interesting development.

In closing, I would simply like to say that it appears to me that a future war must be fought just about the way it was fought in the Pacific; that is to say, we must move forward to obtain bases fairly close to the enemy in moderate range and then apply everything we have to overcome his will to fight.

In that case, it seems to me that we must have an Army and a Navy with their aviation support completely integrated within those forces.

I do not see how you can possibly expect a successful military effort otherwise.

If that logic is right, then I do not see the purpose of the autonomous Air Force.

I have one final statement.

I do not see the requirement for great speed in this thing. Last year, it was evident that an effort was being made to push the socalled merger bill through, and as a "must," immediately.

In the Navy we are gradually cutting down into a peacetime status. We are getting more and more coordinating agencies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are working well with the Atomic Energy Commission. All these things are progressing.

I see no vital need for things to be done right now unless there is a desire to have it over with before we can really go into the cost and effects, and so on, in a thorough manner.

That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Along that same line, I have noticed in the press various statements about this being a "must" piece of legislation.

I know of no member of the steering committee, unless it be some member of this committee, and I do not recall at the moment whether a member of the steering committee is on this committee, has said a word to me about this being a "must" piece of legislation. Neither Speaker Martin nor Majority Leader Halleck has said anything to me about it being "must" legislation.

As for the statement in one of the papers that we have been dawdling along on these hearings, that might be characterized as a "Drew Pearson" statement.

Now, an order did come down within the last 4 or 5 days, did it not, from the Secretary of the Navy, relaxing regulations 94 and 95? Admiral OFSTIE. I believe there is an order to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. I should like to have a copy of that here which I think represents the first time that the so-called gag on the Navy has been released.

(The order referred to is as follows:)

From: Sec Nav.

To: ALNAV No. 139.

Released by: James Forrestal.

Date: June 23, 1947.

I have recently become aware that a feeling of restraint may exist among certain naval personnel in regard to their latitude of expression before committees of Congress on the proposed National Security Act of 1947. This feeling, which is counter to the statutes and to the orderly processes of free expression, may have peen engendered by misinterpretation of articles 94 and 95, U. S. navy regulations, which in practical effect do not limit a naval officer's freedom of expression but require that in addressing Congress, communications are to be channeled through the Secretary of the Navy.

Without in any way weakening my endorsement of the January 16, 1947, agreement between the War and Navy Departments which was promulgated by ALNAV 21, I wish to make clear that every person in the naval service is at liberty to voice his professional and personal opinion when testifying before a committee of Congress on the proposed National Security Act of 1947. To this end, and only with regard to the proposed National Security Act of 1947, those provisions of articles 94 and 95, U. S. Navy regulations, which prescribe that communications between officers of the naval service and committees and Members of Congress be channeled through or authorized by me, have been waived.

The CHAIRMAN. I will say this, though, that while these hearings. will close as ordered by the committee on Tuesday, if there is any admiral or anyone in authority who really has any knowledge or thinks he has which will be helpful to the House, I will be glad to hear his testimony. You may not have the attendance of the members of the committee, but I will arrange for the stenographer and you can put your views on record.

Mr. Manasco?

Mr. MANASCO. Admiral Ofstie, one of the witnesses representing naval aviation had some fears that if this bill became law, naval

62559-47-41