Admiral RADFORD. The basic strategy is to lick the other fellow in a hurry. Mr. DORN. That is exactly right, and always has been and that was the way Alexander the Great went about it. Thank you. Mr. BOGGS. The admiral made reference quite a while ago to the fact that what we need in peacetime is economy. If I understood the admiral correctly in his testimony, it is your contention that this proposal would not effect economy and would cost more. Admiral RADFORD. That is correct. Mr. BOGGS. Probably we would get no more efficiency out of it. Now, if you have given any thought to it, what would you suggest to effect any economies in our armed services without impairing our efficiency. Admiral RADFORD. Well, my feeling in this matter is that this particular legislation will cost more for the same relative efficiency that we have now. I do not think that it will increase our military efficiency, and you will pay more for what you are getting. You cannot set up two new government departments and expect to run on the same appropriation, with the same relative efficiency; that is my feeling about this bill. I think you will find that the Army and the Navy, as two depart,ments will run more economically as they get closer together. Mr. BOGGS. Gradually, without legislative assistance as proposed in this bill, the services will get closer together, without being made to get close together by legislation. Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir. Mr. JUDD. May I ask one question? In view of your reply to Mr. Dorn's inquiry regarding the Central Intelligence Agency, and your statement as to your personal familiarity with it, do you think, assuming this bill were to be passed, that the Central Intelligence Agency ought to be under the National Security Council or directly under the Secretary of National Defense on a par with the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board, and the National Security Resources Board; all of those are set up in the National Defense Establishment, but the Central Intelligence Agency is put under the National Security Council, so that it has a half dozen heads. It seems to me that this is so important that it ought to be on a par with any of these other agencies. Do you have any comment to make on that? Admiral RADFORD. My personal familiarity was with the Joint Research and Development Board. I have no particular familiarity, and I have had no personal connection with the Intelligence agency. Mr. JUDD. I misunderstood you. I thought you were referring to that. Admiral RADFORD. I feel that the Central Intelligence Agency should be under the National Security Council. Mr. JUDD. You do not think that its reports might go around and around and never get action on something that is important. Admiral RADFORD. I hardly think so. I would not argue very much one way or the other. I think the important thing is to have the agency, and I thing that its handling of reports can be controlled by the director, or would be. Mr. JUDD. That is all. Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, I was not here at the beginning and I do not know whether the admiral stated or not-are you on active service now, Admiral? Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir. Mr. BOGGS. What is your present position? Admiral RADFORD. I am commander of the Second Task Fleet in the Atlantic. Mr. BOGGS. Part of the Atlantic Fleet. Admiral RADFORD. That is right; yes, sir. Mr. BOGGS. Thank you very much. Mr. LATHAM. I believe that Admiral Radford during the war was Vice Chief of Naval Operations for Air, is that correct? Admiral RADFORD. Not during the war. After the war I was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air until last February. Mr. LATHAM. Admiral, I would like to ask you one question along the line of Mr. McCormack's question regarding the Secretary of National Defense. You are certainly in favor of a unified command in the field, are you not, Admiral? Admiral RADFORD. That is right, absolutely. Mr. LATHAM. Where instant decisions are essential? Mr. LATHAM. Is it a fair statement of your view to say that back at Washington where the over-all strategic decisions are made and where instant decision is not an essential feature that you would feel safer with a decision based on the collective judgment of a group like the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than a single individual? Admiral RADFORD. That is correct. Mr. LATHAM. Who might take you off in the wrong direction. Admiral RADFORD. Well, of course, we always have the President available for any instant decisions that have to be made. Mr. LATHAM. Yes, but you feel safer for the security of this country if you had to follow out in your capacity as an admiral of the Navy decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than one single individual. Admiral RADFORD. Yes, sir; I would. Mr. JUDD. Admiral, do you know of instances where the President has overridden the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Admiral RADFORD. No, I do not. I do not think Mr. JUDD. Would that not be most unlikely? Admiral RADFORD. Most unlikely. Mr. JUDD. That the Secretary of National Defense would override the recommendations of his Joint Chiefs of Staff? Admiral RADFORD. If they were unanimous recommendations, I doubt if he would. Admiral King, I believe, has testified that there were probably, in the whole course of the war only three or four decisions that the Joint Chiefs of Staff took to the President; in regard to matters on which they were unable to reach a unanimous decision. Mr. LATHAM. Would it also be true, Admiral, that the President would be very unlikely to overrule the Secretary of National Defense who spoke for all the branches of the services? Admiral RADFORD. I think so. Mr. JUDD. If they were united; but if they were not Mr. LATHAM. It does not mean that they would be united, because it might be his decision, his personal decision, and I am quite sure the President would uphold his hand in that situation. Mr. JUDD. Even though there were tremendous pressure and good arguments brought to him by whichever service was being discriminated against in its own view, do you think he would always stand by his Secretary of National Defense? Mr. LATHAM. I do not say he always would, but I think there would be a great tendency to do it. Mr. JUDD. Yes; but we know that during the first war Woodrow Wilson passed over 64 generals as I recall, to get Pershing, and Mr. Roosevelt brought up generals who were not next in line. As I recall, Marshall himself was not a West Pointer, and there was some opposition to him on that account. There are risks in having power in one man, the question is whether that risk outweighs the risk of possible failure to get anywhere because of divergence of opinion and indecision. Admiral RADFORD. I do not think we have suffered from any lack of decisions when they were needed. Mr. JUDD. We have not since Pearl Harbor. The question is did we suffer from it before Pearl Harbor Admiral RADFORD. I do not think Pearl Harbor was caused by lack of decision. Mr. JUDD. Well, lack of unification in handling all of our national defense with resultant lack of action? Admiral RADFORD. No; I think it was simpler than that; I think people were not on the job. Mr. JUDD. I would not argue on that. Mr. KARSTEN. What people do you mean were not on the job? Admiral RADFORD. I do not like to open up old sores. I do not think they made a realistic appraisal of the situation. Mr. KARSTEN. They could not under the set-up operating at that time, I do not think. Mr. DORN. That is what I think, and that is what General Kenny thinks, that they had enough stuff to defend Pearl Harbor if they had known and had been properly appraised of the situation all the way down the line. Mr. JUDD. Is that what you mean by not being on the job? Admiral RADFORD. I took part in Admiral Yarnell's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1932, which the Japs copied, and I expected the Japs to attack Pearl Harbor in the way that they did. Mr. DORN. That is a true statement. I remember Admiral Yarnell said it was an identical attack which he pulled off in practice. Mr. LATHAM. If there are no further questions, Admiral, we are very grateful to you for your testimony, and we thank you very much. Admiral RADFORD. Thank you. (A letter and proposed bill by Vice Adm. Radford follows:) Hon. CLAIRE HOFFMAN, COMMANDER SECOND TASK FLEET, Chairman, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 1501, New House Office Building, Washington, D. C. DEAR CHAIRMAN HOFFMAN: When I appeared before your committee on June 26, 1947 you directed me to submit (a) my comments on H. R. 3979, (b) a draft of legislation which would represent my own solution to the problem of improving our organization for National Security I have studied H. R. 3979 and believe that it is a decided improvement over H. R. 2319. In its broad provisions I find only one major defect-the establishment of a separate Department of Air. As I testified, I consider the establish ment of an additional executive department not only unnecessary but extremely unwise for many reasons. With an amendment eliminating this department and certain other rather minor changes, H. R. 3979 would, to my mind, represent a sound and typically American approach to the problem. I say "American approach" because I feel that the Congress and the public in general are not fully aware of the fact that this country, up to now, has followed a distinctly original organizational pattern, militarily. Efforts to induce us to follow the German pattern or the English pattern have so far proven unavailing but powerful influences in this direction are still at work. Personally I find no virtue in a military organization such as the German and I find little more in the English pattern which seems to be favored by so many at this time. I feel strongly that United States Armed Forces have demonstrated beyond all question of doubt, in two world wars, that our basic organization is sound. Because the British made a mistake in 1918 and are unable to rectify it-is no good reason to my mind why we as a nation should blindly follow their lead nearly 30 years later. As an enclosure to this letter I submit for your consideration a draft of legislation which covers my recommendations in detail. It provides for the very necessary coordination of the military effort and above all for economy in peacetime. It is this feature of economy in peacetime which seems to me to have been so completely sidetracked in the general consideration given to the subject of an improved organization for national security, up to now. In closing let me thank you again for the opportunity given me to testify before your committee. I appreciate your personal efforts and those of other membersto find the correct answer to what is certainly one of the most serious problems before the Congress today. Respectfully, A. W. RADford. Enclosure: Draft of legislation covering my recommendations. [H. R. ——, 80th Cong., Ist sess.] A BILL To promote the National Security by providing for the integration of the Nation's foreign, military, and economic policies; for the effective coordination of the departments and agencies of the Government and their functions relating to the security of the Nation; and by providing for a flexible, efficient, and economical structure in conformity with our democratic process for the coordination of all civil and military elements concerned with the national security of the country Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SHORT TITLE SECTION 1. That this Act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947." DECLARATION OF POLICY SEC. 2. (a) In enacting this legislation it is the intent of Congress to provide permanent, effective, and economical machinery for the coordination of all elements of national security. In so doing, Congress is mindful, as were the founders of this Government, of the inherent danger to democracy in any coalition of the military forces under a common nonelected head. It is therefore the intent of Congress that the military departments and services affected by this legislation should not be merged or consolidated, or placed under a single nonelected civilian head, a single military commander, or an over-all high command or national general staff. (b) Congress recognizes that modern warfare is total in character, that its effects extend to virtually every segment of the population and to nearly every aspect of civilian life, and that the civilian contribution to the prosecution of warfare is at least equal in importance to that of the Military Establishment. Congress believes, as a consequence, that it is now more important than ever to maintain civilian control of all measures taken to promote the national security, and to hold within proper bounds the influence of the Military Establishment upon the Government. It is the intent of Congress, in enacting this legislation to reaffirm this traditional American principle. (c) It is also the intent of Congress, in enacting this legislation to reorganize the military structure of the Nation to conform to the requirements of modern warfare. In so doing, Congress subscribes to the philosophy that the basic elements of over-all military power are land power, sea power, and air power; that one element of the military structure, the United States Army, with the United States Army Air Corps, should be constituted as a balanced force of land, air, and sea components for the exercise of land power; that the other element of the military structure, the naval service comprising the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps with Marine Corps aviation, and United States Naval Aviation should be constituted as a balanced force of sea, air, and land components for the exercise of sea power. It is the belief of Congress that such a military structure is consonant with the actual nature of modern warfare, and is the most effective and economical structure which could be erected. (d) It is the intention of Congress that the internal administration of the departments and agencies affected by this legislation should not be hampered or interfered with; and that the official or bodies charged with the coordination of such departments and agencies should concern themselves solely with broad policies affecting such departments and agencies in common, and not with matters of sole concern to any one department or agency. TITLE I-COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SEC. 101. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council'). The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: Provided, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place. The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. The Council shall be composed of the President; the Vice President; the Secretary of State; the Assistant to the President for National Security, appointed under section 102 (b); the Secretary of the Army, referred to in section 202 (a); the Secretary of the Navy; the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, appointed under section 104 (a); and such other members as the President may designate from time to time. (b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies of the departments and agencies of the Government and their functions relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council (1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and |