and to give the armed forces what they want, and that of necessity it is always wasteful and something is always becoming obsolete, so we just go along one step at a time.

Mr. ZACHARIAS. That is true, sir, and the point I would like to make is this:

First, there is no urgency in bringing about this drastic reorganization. Secondly, the present organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army and Navy and Air Forces under the Army and Navy are fully capable of taking care, in the foreseeable future, of any contingency that might arise.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you this: You are not by your testimony criticizing, or intending to criticize, any of these developments which came along as they did during the war. You are not condemning any one because we appropriated, or the Air Forces built a bomber or any other weapon, are you?

Mr. ZACHARIAS. That is quite correct, sir. My one point is, the future organization must be the right answer, and we must take just as much time as is necessary, to arrive at that.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Admiral, I want to make my questions just as short as possible, and I will ask you, in view of the time only, to make your answers just as short as possible on the few that I have left.

You, to a certain extent, evaded the question which I asked you in regard to the obsolescence of large battleships and large carrier vessels by saying that certain modifications would be necessary.

Now, do you, at this time, know of any modification which can be made to a naval vessel which will protect it from the gama, beta, and neutron rays in the atomic bomb?

Mr. ZACHARIAS. Well sir,

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will withdraw that question, Admiral, at this time.

Well, I am sorry, but I will have to put the rest of my questions in executive session, sir.

Mr. SNYDER. Will the gentleman yield for one question: The admiral referred to the battle of Midway; was not the factor of the decision of the Japs there that they divided their forces and sent part to Midway and part to Dutch Harbor?

Mr. ZACHARIAS. The defeat of the Japs at Midway was made possible by the courage of those dive bomber pilots, and the torpedo plane pilots who devoted themselves to the role of suicide planes for the first time in this war. It was the men in those torpedo squadrons who drove in and sank those Japanese carriers, that made that victory possible.

As you probably know, out of that number, only one, Ensign Gay, survived out of those squadrons. They were the ones who made possible that victory because the Japs had such a tremendous superiority there that if we had not had that good luck at that time on the part of the aviators, it would have been too bad and we would have been fighting yet.

Mr. SNYDER. The forces were divided, they weakened themselves by sending part of them to Dutch Harbor. If they had kept their forces intact, it would have been different.

Mr. ZACHARIAS. That was only a small force that went to Dutch Harbor. They had plenty there to lick us completely.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, in view of the lateness of the hour and the nature of my questions that I have to ask the admiral, I am yielding back to the committee the balance of my questioning period, and I hope that we will have an opportunity to question the admiral in executive session.

Mr. JUDD (presiding). The chairman asked that we adjourn now and in view of the fact that the admiral is to return., without objection, the committee will stand adjourned at the call of the Chair.

Mr. SNYDER. Before the committee separates, I want to make this observation, that it seems to me that this is one of the most important bills that is confronting the Congress at this session, and that the testimony that we have heard so far has been of considerably contributing character, which is going to necessitate rather careful study on the part of the committee.

I think since the admiral is here, we ought to adjourn until tomorrow morning, call him back and hear him then, get through with him and go on with those other witnesses who it has been intimated to us are going to be called.

An adjournment to the call of the Chair, to possibly next week, I think is putting the matter off entirely too long.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I will agree with you with one amendment, that the next meeting in which Admiral Zacharias appears should be in executive session.

Mr. DORN. Before you make that motion, I have some questions I would like to ask and I am the only member of this committee who served in the Air Force and I have some questions that should be brought out.

Mr. RICH. You may bring those out in executive session.

Mr. SNYDER. I move now that the committee adjourn and meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Chairman, before you consider that motion, may I put in the record at this time the articles from the Washington Post that the admiral referred to a while ago?

Mr. JUDD. Without objection they will be included in the record. (The articles referred to are as follows:)

[From the Washington Post, Tuesday, May 27, 1947]

"MERGER DOUBLE TALK"-A COMMUNICATION

It is not often that I have to disagree with an editorial of the Post. As a matter of fact, during the war the Post developed a farsighted and lucid editorial policy to such an extent that during the closing phases of the Pacific war it made a great contribution to the psychological warfare campaign against the Japanese high command, which I was privileged to carry on at that time.

But now, the Post in its issue on Tuesday, May 20, indulges in criticism which borders on petulance. It refers to the merger bill recently introduced by Senator Robertson as "Merger double talk," and indulges in wisecracking phrases which are certain to mislead the public. I know that this is not the intention of the Post. But with limited opportunity for intensive study of the subject, the public's conclusions could well be affected. Furthermore, I cannot find a single argument in the editorial which supports Senate bill S. 758, which has been under consideration for so long.

Those who have had the courage to oppose the bill (S. 758) for unification of the armed forces-a bill reportedly a compromise to meet directives from above-have opposed it because they see in it a positive and serious threat to our future national security. If that threat exists, then all considerations of personal desire must be definitely put aside.

My only feeling about the merger, and this feeling has been strengthened by recent contact with the public in various parts of the country through lectures and

discussion, is that we must have the right answer. I know that we cannot get the right answer by jumping precipitously into some new and untried set-up when we have just won the greatest war in all history with the military organization known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I do not like the manner in which the merger proposal was suddenly thrown into the open without any previous consultation with the Navy. I must say that the Navy was caught completely by surprise by a completed study which seems to have been under consideration by the Air Force and the Army for a period of 3 years. That is not my idea of cooperative procedure and unfortunately it makes me wonder what is behind it.

I am sure that the public has not the slightest idea of the factors involved in the present bill (S. 758) and that is why I propose to bring out those factors which affect them directly as individuals and citizens of this great country.

There is urgent need for the unification of our foreign policy, military policy, and economic policy, but we must decide whether in time of war the country will be run by civilians or by the military. There is no compromise on this. History shows the great danger of civilian control being eliminated, as military dominance grows. That, however, is what will obtain under the present bill in which the proposed Secretary of National Defense will be representing the military instead of being a personal representative of the President.

As a deputy of the President, he could make decisions in the name of the President in matters of disagreement and thereby maintain the democratic principles on which this country was founded. The latter procedure could not interfere with decisions on military strategy which would still be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the National Security Council.

The proposed bill does not provide participation of the Atomic Energy Commission or important committees of Congress which are charged with making provisions to implement the decisions of the National Security Council. But it does provide for a duplicate and unnecessary war council, an organization requiring a separate staff for members who sit on all boards.

The proposed bill allows the military to dominate the National Security Resources Board which has the vital function of coordinating military and civilian production needs. This could be extremely dangerous.

The bill also provides a joint staff under the joint chiefs, which becomes in fact a national general staff capable of incorporating all the evils of the German system. They will "plan, direct, coordinate, and supervise." The members are to have unlimited tours of duty in this group. Although the group is limited to 100 officers, it is to be noted that former legislation provided for only 44 officers on the General Staff of the Army, but in reality it increased to about 5,000. This is what happened to control in Germany.

Now, coming to specific vital functions which could be curtailed under this bill, the Marine Corps and naval aviation are the two most vitally affected. The Marine Corps' amphibious operations are vital to quick seizure of distant bases necessary for the Navy to carry out its function of control of the sea. The Marine Corps, in spite of opposition, developed this splendid technique, one of the greatest factors in winning the war. This technique was fully employed and made possible the Normandy landings. Yet, under the present bill the Marine Corps could be abolished by an unfavorably disposed Secretary of Defense through the simple method of curtailing the budget.

In the same manner naval aviation could be effectively curtailed. When we recall that it was the Navy (over the opposition of Army high level bomber advocates) which developed the dive bombers and torpedo planes without which we would have lost the Battle of Midway and would have been fighting yet, we must realize that naval aviation is an integral part of sea power which must not be curtailed or hampered. The experience of England with 20 years of curtailed naval aviation should be a sufficient example. I can say categorically that had England's naval aviation been at a stage comparable to ours at the beginning of World War II, she could have prevented the Scandinavian operations of the Germans and the whole course of the war in Europe would have been changed.

In trying to arrive at the right answer to the question now confronting us, I like to consider the lessons of history. History shows that every nation which has had a merger of its armed forces has gone down to defeat. This includes the Romans, Napoleon, the German Kaiser, and finally Hitler. The reason is that with a merger they invariably begin to think in terms of only one of their branches and usually the ground forces because of the sheer weight of numbers. When they do this they lose all the strategical concepts of sea power.

This is what made it impossible for Hitler to invade England. To anyone who might be interested in this phase of the proposed merger I recommend that he read the full text of a treatise by Fletcher Pratt, a nationally known military

scientist, called The Case Against Unification and published in the December, 1945, issue of the magazine Sea Power.

In my own field of specialized experience intelligence-the bill falls far short in failing to provide specifically for a well integrated and efficient organization. It provides simply for the transfer of the functions of the present Central Intelligence Group to the new Central Intelligence Agency. As presently constituted the organization cannot possibly meet the needs of the Nation which has been suddenly thrust into the position of leadership in world affairs.

Therefore, it is quite probable that Senator Robertson was motivated by considerations contained herein and that a little further inspection will reveal that it as not merger double talk.”

ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS,

Rear Admiral, United States Navy (Retired)

[From the Washington Post, Wednesday, May 28, 1947]

INTEGRATING OUR ARMED SERVICES

It must have been apparent from Admiral Zacharias' letter on the page opposite yesterday that the pending bill to integrate Army and Navy still has to contend with a certain amount of Navy opposition. That is not surprising. In Britain a similar "merger" was not wholly acceptable until the traditionalists had left the scene. But it is wrong to suggest that the Navy "was caught completely by surprise." To be sure, the reform was not put before all ranks and ratings assembled in a sort of town meeting. But the bill was hammered out by the top men in both branches of the armed forces, and it represents the lowest common denominator of agreement. Furthermore, it was instigated by the Secretary of the Navy himself, who, acting with great courage and public spirit, decided to break the impasse over ways and means of accomplishing the integration recommended by President Truman.

* * *

Admiral Zacharias objects to "some new and untried set-up when we have just won the greatest war in all history with the Joint Chiefs of Staff." That is not the verdict of even the Joint Chiefs. It is the testimony of at least one of them that the joint chiefs system caused such delays as actually to put off our victory. We mean General Marshall. He said "unification of the armed forces is a must for lasting peace. Lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy probably delayed victory.' Cooperation under the joint chiefs system was impossible until all four chiefs had agreed. In the field the delays were regarded conclusively as a testimony to the inadequacy of the joint chiefs system. Even Admiral Nimitz, now Chief of Naval Operations, says "My experience in securing directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff leads me to believe that it will be far better to have a single commander of armed forces who has all the authority and responsibility for issuing directives."

That the system worked as well as it did was due in part to the commanding personality of General Marshall. Wherever he sat, that was the head of the table. Now he is no longer a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and see what has happened. In August 1945, they were asked by the President to prepare a joint strategical concept and war plan for the United States. That was nearly 2 years ago. The plan has not yet been delivered. The Joint Chiefs cannot get together on it. They would doubtless be apart even if General Marshall were a member, for there is no goad any longer from the pressure of events. Committee government is bound to be inchoate when decisions have to overcome the hurdle of the kind of rivalries that exist in the armed services.

Under the proposed set-up the Joint Chiefs would not be junked. On the contrary, they would be retained. But they would be under a man who would be responsible for getting things done, i. e., a single Secretary of National Defense. Admiral Zacharias trots out the objection to a single Secretary that his unifying influence would put our defense under military domination. We yield to none in our anxiety to keep civilian supremacy in our Government, but we cannot see the force of this argument. The proposed Secretary would be a civilian, he would be responsible to another civilian, viz, the President, and in all matters he would have a civilian Congress to contend with. Admiral Zacharias seems to forget the powers of Congress. He warns our readers that "under the proposed bill the Marine Corps could be abolished by an unfavorably disposed Secretary of Defense through the simple method of curtailing the budget.' Over the dead body of Congress. And a single Secretary would have to prove his case before the Bureau

of the Budget, the President, and public opinion before he came near a congressional committee.

No congressional committee would ever take the single Secretary's say-so on finance. It would hear from subordinate heads of major agencies within the affected department. And what a platform this would afford General Vandegrift in the fantastic event envisaged by Admiral Zacharias. Incidentally, we favor more protection for the Marines in the present bill, though Admiral Zacharias is on disputatious ground when he gives the Marines sole credit for developing the technique of amphibious operations. Perhaps the greatest operation of this nature was the Normandy landing. Here there was not a Marine present, nor, we understand, in any of the other exploits under General Eisenhower's command. There were 40 amphibious operations of division size in the Pacific, and 25 of them were under Army command.

Again the phantom of military domination is introduced in connection with the proposed National Security Resources Board. This would function directly under the President. But the chairmanship is specifically slated for a civilian, and it is intended that with him there should serve the three under secretaries of the three service arms, also civilians. Power is likewise given for the cooperation on this board of any other civilian head of a Government agency which has knowledge to contribute.

It has been proved beyond any doubt, in our opinion, that the status quo has to be changed for the sake of our national security. The present bill does not constitute unification. But it is a step in that direction which may be described as integration. Obviously, if there isn't a single Secretary to harmonize the common efforts of the three departments, there can be neither integration nor unification. What would remain would be the status quo. And in our present arrangement there is no viability-as shown by the lack of decision for 2 years past on the President's request of the Joint Chiefs for a war plan.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Thursday, June 19, 1947]

ROCKET RESEARCH-EXPERTS PROJECT HUGE PROGRAM TO OUTMODE BOMBERS IN 5 TO 15 YEARS-GIANT ATOMIC MISSILES TO FLY 5,000 MILES WITHOUT PILOTS AT 3,000 MILES PER HOUR-GENERALS SAY IT'S PRACTICAL

(By Robert Brundage, staff correspondent of the Wall Street Journal) WASHINGTON.-Long-range rockets, guided from distant ground bases, will replace bombers as a major military weapon in 10 to 15 years. That's the studied

opinion of men who maintain this Nation's peacetime war machine.

A big long-range rocket program will be big long-range news for industry, which must perform the production-and for taxpayers, who must foot the bill. It would take at least a quarter of a billion dollars a year to develop this sort of weapon within the next decade. With "unlimited funds," the experts think they could produce it by 1952. This year the Army plans to spend around $40,000,000 for "guided missile" research and development.

Whether Congress will be disposed to set aside huge appropriations for military research over the next few years remains to be seen. Much will depend on events in Europe. But Army and Navy officials consider the present Congress very favorably disposed toward research projects. The Armed Forces got all the research money they sought in their 1948 appropriations request.

IT'LL ZOOM AT 3,000 MILES AN HOUR

When the rocket finally emerges from the laboratories, it will make modern bombers look as old-fashioned as the Wright brothers' first plane The new missile will have a range of 5,000 miles-as far as from Berlin to New Orleans. It will span this distance in less than 2 hours, moving at 3,000 miles an hour. It will, presumably, have an atomic war head of indescribably destructive force. Many of the biggest names in aviation are already deep in rocket research and development. Boeing, Douglas, North American, General Electric, and Bell are among the biggest prime contractors. Consolidated Vultee and Northrop are getting their feet wet.

The 5,000-mile jumbo rocket these companies are working toward won't be the sleek projectile-like missile the German's V-2 rocket was. That's because

the V-2 was "set" before it took off. Its course was prearranged.