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Mr. WILSON. Now, did you read Colonel Maas' statement made before the committee a few days ago?

General EDSON. Yes, sir; and I disagree violently with it, sir.
Mr. WILSON. He disagrees with General Vandegrift, too.
General EDSON. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. He goes much further than this bill; does he not?
General EDSON. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. He winds up and says, to put it all in one service and assign a few to the Navy, a few to the Army, and so forth. You do believe in some kind of unification?

General EDSON. There is urgent need for it, sir.

Mr. WILSON. You do not believe in a merger of the services, do you?

General EDSON. No, sir; it has never proven workable wherever it has been tried. Because in such a merger, one service is bound to predominate to the detriment of the other two and to the detriment of national security. Where it has been tried, every national has suffered defeat eventually.

Mr. WILSON. I agree with you.

The main objection you have to this bill, then, as I take it, is to the predominant status of the Army on the boards, the commissions, and the various bureaus set up by the bill; is that right?

General EDSON. I would like to go a little further than that, sir. One major objection is that I believe this bill permits the military, and when I say "military," I mean all the armed forces

Mr. WILSON. All the armed forces; yes.

General EDSON. To have a predominant position on the National Security Council-that because of that predominant position, the military will be making foreign policy rather than supporting it. They will have a predominant position in determining our economic policies.

In the realm of the Military Establishment alone, when we create a national general staff we are setting up a clique of military officers who will, if we read history correctly, not continue to confine themselves to military matters only, but will reach out to control all of the elements of Government in favor of the military.

Mr. WILSON. I agree with you that there is a fine line of demarkation that must be drawn so as to keep the military subject always to the will of the people.

You do not think this bill does that?

General EDSON. No, sir. This bill is patterned after the same steps that have taken place in Germany and Russia and Italy, and even back in France under Napoleon, in which all the services are brought together to form a coalition of the military, and eventually-in such an organization headed by a single secretary and an over-all high command, the joint staff-that combination has worked to the detriment both of the government and the national defense.

Mr. WILSON. And you think this bill goes that far?

General EDSON. It has the framework for it, sir. I do not say that will happen today or tomorrow, but the framework is there. Mr. WILSON. You mean in time this is a step in that direction? General EDSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Do you have any written, concrete suggestions to make as to how this bill might be limited in its scope by Congress so that that could not happen?

General EDSON. I can submit those and I would be glad to do so, sir. Mr. WILSON. Personally, I would like to have your suggestions about it. I do not know how the committee feels. I like your suggestion about the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee being on this Board in both the upper and lower House. Mr. BENDER. Correction, please, Mr. Wilson. and lower House.

Mr. WILSON. The Senate and the Congress.
Mr. BENDER. We are all on the same footing.
Mr. WILSON. That is commonly referred to.

There is no upper

That is a misnomer.

If the chairman has no objection, or the rest of the members, I would like to have your suggestions about how this bill could be limited in its scope so as to thoroughly protect this country from the very thing you speak about,

General EDSON. I would like to submit those amendments on the Senate version as it came out of the Senate committee.

numerous changes in the bill.

Mr. WILSON. From this bill?

General EDSON. From this bill.
Mr. WILSON. Yes.

There are

General EDSON. And it would take fewer amendments to bring that into line, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Yes; I believe you mentioned a minute ago that you thought the addition in the Senate bill with regard to the Marine Corps was not sufficient?

General EDSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. What do you think in that regard?

General EDSON. Personally, I can see little advantage to be gained by including this additional clause which is in the Senate bill.

This says:

The provisions of this act shall not authorize the alteration or diminution of the existing relative status of the Marine Corps (including the Fleet Marine Forces) or of naval aviation.

The status of the Marine Corps and the status of naval aviation are protected in section 206 (a) of the Senate bill. This in no way protects the existing functions of those two branches. It simply says that it places in the Department one group where it already is now. That is alrady taken care of in the first section.

Mr. WILSON. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BENDER. Mr. Chairman, following your rule that the last shall be first, which I think is a very commendable rule, we have allowed Mr. Wilson to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

Mr. BENDER. The next in line would be Mr. Jenkins.

Mr. JENKINS. General, I find a little difficulty in understanding just what your theories are. In one breath you say you object to the Secretary of National Defense being the head of a single-and you emphasize the word "single"-military establishment, and in the next in reply to Mr. Wilson's question you say you believe in unification.

I wonder just how you reconcile those two statements.

Let me say this: If I understand correctly what you mean by your original answer, you would leave the Military Establishment just about as it is now, is that correct?

General EDSON. That is correct.

Mr. JENKINS. In other words, you would not attempt to do as this bill does, have a single Department of National Defense, but would leave the Army and Navy autonomous joint units as they are at present?

General EDSON. Mr. Jenkins, under the bill as it is now written, I can see no use for the War Council. The War Council simply brings together, in a certain part of the bill, the single Secretary and the three Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Forces, and the three Chiefs of Staff, all of whom are the Secretary's subordinates anyway. Actually they must do the same thing in their day-to-day work within the single department as they would do in the War Council.

If there should not be a single department, or in other words, no single Secretary at the head of a single establishment, then the War Council, headed by the Secretary of National Security upon a higher level as chairman, and including the Secretary of Army, Navy, and Air Forces, would perform the function of bringing together those things of common concern to the services.

The Secretary should have, I believe, the powers of decision with respect to things of mutual interest to the three services.

Another agency which unifies and does not merge is the Munitions Board which is now functioning and which decides such questions as which service will procure certain items, such as lumber, coal, and so on and so forth.

It drafts common specifications and allocates material which is made available to the services. It sets up priorities.

The Research and Development Board, another agency in this bill, would continue to do what it does now-consider recommendations for new development and assign it to the proper agency for development, so that it will eliminate the overlap and duplication.

I believe under such a set-up with the War Council at the head, where these things are brought together, that we would have true unification. We would get just as much benefit as we do if we make it a single establishment.

Mr. JENKINS. To see if I understand you correctly, General, you would completely divorce the Secretary of National Defense from any control over the military establishments.

In other words, he would have nothing whatsoever to do with the military establishment in the way of any authority over it or control over it or direction of it, but you would set him up as a separate executive department, entirely apart from the Army and Navy.

I assume you would leave the Secretary of the Army and Navy still in the Cabinet as they now are, and the Secretary of National Defense would be the head of a separate executive department which would, in effect, be the adviser of and possibly a coordinator of matters of common interest to Army and Navy, but with no authority other than the President now has to direct the carrying out of those policies?

General EDSON. The President has that authority now, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. Yes. This man would simply be in effect an assistant to the President?

General EDSON. Concerning himself purely with national security matters, and in that capacity I think that he should have the authority over the military establishment which the Senate bill, as amended, provides-that he shall establish general policies and have general direction over them.

Mr. JENKINS. Then would he still not be advised by his military advisers?

General EDSON. No, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. I cannot quite see the distinction.

General EDSON. This is the difference he would be representing the President and the people in relation to the military.

In other words, if the military could not get together in a war council, they would submit their diverse recommendations to him and he would do what the President desires, decide one way or the other.

Mr. JENKINS. Yes.

General EDSON. But he would not be the spokesman for the military service for the joint staff. I think there is a great difference in that, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. I must confess I find it a little hard to understand, the theory as you outline it in these two answers, because I think that you are coming around to the same thing.

You believe, do you not, in the principle of unanimity of command in the military establishment?

General EDSON. In the field; yes, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. Why not some unanimity of command here in Washington where the policies are formulated that are to be carried out in the field?

General EDSON. That should be retained under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where the three elements of the military establishment, the Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Naval Forces, have an equal vote.

Mr. JENKINS. All right. Assuming that they do, then should there not be some person or some head of some department who can put into effect, with respect to all three of them, the advice and the decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General EDSON. They do that right now, sir. They did it during the war. When a decision was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each chief of the Army, Air Forces, and Navy, then put the corresponding part of that into effect, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. You and I both know, General, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as it was set up during the war and as it operated during the war, was a cumbersome outfit. It required unanimity of opinion for a decision, and that sometimes took months to get.

Do you not feel that there should be some authority some where that could resolve differences of agreement among the Chiefs of Staff? General EDSON. Those differences can be resolved in the War Council, sir, under this set-up.

But I would like to say this about the Joint Chiefs of Staff: It is my opinion, sir, that during the war, because they were joint chiefs, although it may have taken a little longer to arrive at a solution, the solution which they reached was the proper solution. It was not dependent upon one man's decision, who did not realize or give value or weight to the capabilities of the other services.

Mr. JENKINS. Would not your Secretary of National Defense, as set up under this act, assuming that there was a difference of opinion, have the benefit of the advice of those who, let us say, disagreed with the majority opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

In other words, he does not have to accept the majority opinion. He might accept a minority opinion.

Certainly, it seems to me that somebody should have the power of deciding these things.

General EDSON. In the field of operations, certainly there should be unified command. It would carry out the strategic plans of the Joint Chiefs.

I do not think it is desirable that we have a supreme Chief of Staff-military commander of our armed forces in this country. It has never proven satisfactory wherever it has been tried, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. I must say that I completely disagree with your theory, General, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not have some head that should decide when there is disagreement among them.

I think it is equally important that there should be somebody who would decide what the strategic conceptions are going to be, so that the unified command could carry them out in the field.

General EDSON. That is correct. That is done now by the President. Only the President, in my opinion, as Commander in Chief of all the armed forces, can decide national strategy. You cannot delegate that, sir.

Mr. JENKINS. Of course.

Now, I notice that one of the things you say in your testimony here is with reference to the establishment of the three separate Departments.

There has been some testimony here as to the necessity for the establishment of a separate Air Force, and there has been disagreement with respect to that.

Do you feel that there should be a separate Department of the Air, coordinated and on equal status with the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Army?

General EDSON. It may well be that public opinion

Mr. JENKINS. Let us leave public opinion out.

General EDSON. All right.

Mr. JENKINS. Let us talk about it from the standpoint of what is best for our military establishment.

General EDSON. Let me answer it this way, then, sir: If we must have a separate Air Department and a separate Air Force, then in my opinion that separate Air Force should consist only of the strategic bomber command, of the fighter defense command, and I believe, antiaircraft artillery.

In other words, that embraces that part of the Air Force which can carry on an air campaign as differentiated from a naval or Ground Force campaign.

Now, the close-support air, in my opinion, is a vital arm of the Army. That is just as vital to the success of an army in battle as your artillery or your tanks. And that part of the Air Force should remain with the Army.

It is the same way with the Navy. The retention of naval aviation or the counterpart thereof is essential.

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