NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 1947 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 1501 of the New House Office Building, Hon. Clare E. Hoffman (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. We will have at this time the statement of Mr. Melvin J. Maas, the president of the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association. STATEMENT OF MELVIN J. MAAS, MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE AND PRESIDENT OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION Mr. MAAS. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am representing an association of men and women all of whom took part in the last war and many in World War I, as well. Hundreds of our members carried the Reserve burden during the years between the two wars. They did this out of a sincere desire to make this Nation strong. They took their own time at their own expense, for the most part, to acquire military training. They did this at the expense of the contempt of their neighbors, with little encouragement from even the service itself, and with no thanks from anyone. They learned the hardest of hard ways. But they did learn. Our association is the spokesman for some 30,000 Marine Reserve officers. The position of the association in this proposed legislation was determined by a direct referendum of the membership itself. We are not at all satisfied with what we found either in the beginning nor at the ending of World War II. Most of our members are in favor of genuine military unification. That is why we are opposed to this bill. We are convinced that this bill is in no sense military unification or integration. What it really is, after all is said and done, is a political consolidation of the control of the armed forces. That is not what we are seeking nor will we be satisfied with it. Gentlemen, after the tragic mistakes, waste, errors, duplications, service jealousies, and after bickering in combat which we civilians in uniform witnessed during the war, we have strong feelings on the subject of military reorganization. Unification suggests marriage, but this bill, while labeled "Unification," is, in actuality, a divorce. Even involving the eternal trianglein this case, the Army, Navy, and the little lady who grew up to be Air Corps. We cannot see where the military unification takes placed under this bill. The things which we saw and with which we became thoroughly disgusted and which are crying out for unification are not even touched in this bill. This bill fails to merge or unify such duplicating functions as purchasing, medical services, Army-Navy hospitals, paymaster, recruiting, warehouses, recreation fields, and officers' clubs. It fails to provide a common basic education for either officers or enlisted men of the various services. It fails to even set up a common transportation system or to consolidate the repair and servicing of ArmyNavy vehicles in the same area. There is no provision for a common promotion system nor for equal opportunities to reach the top in the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. It does not provide for a common training, indoctrination, or even integration of the policies of the three services in such matters as personnel, decorations and awards, separations from the service. It still leaves each branch with its own individual and competing public-relations department. There is nothing in this bill which corrects one of the most glaring faults to come to light in the recent war; that is, that sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen do not even speak the same language, militarily speaking. Mr. Chairman, just what is meant by unification, in regard to this bill? What is unified? We consider this bill ill-advised and, in fact, dangerous for a number of reasons. First, we fear that if this bill is passed, all concerned will feel that they have dealt with the subject of unification and that they can forget it thereafter. This bill certainly does not provide unificat'on. We fear that its passage in anything like its present form will delay real and necessary unification until perhaps after the next war; in all probabliity it will be too late then. We object to this bill because we think the approach has been entirely wrong and unworkable. Our members feel that both the concept and method of arriving at this answer to the problem have been wrong. To us, this whole thing was done backward. Somebody has attempted to jam our present military-Army, Air, and Navy-set-up into a preconceived mold and force them to accept it. The problem was worked on by professional military men with a lifetime background of a particular service, and all of them with service careers involved in the outcome. The approach inevitably was one of perhaps sincere scrambling for advantage for a particular service. Everyone struggled to gain or preserve as much advantage for his particular branch. as possible. The outcome was a series of expedient compromises. That is not a good way to arrive at military decisions. It seems to us that the study should start from the ground up. We should first of all ascertain what our future military problem will be. Then a most careful and objective study should be made of what will be needed in the way of military forces to carry out the policy that has been adopted. Then, a detailed study should be made of how best to organize such military forces as are determined to be essential. These were most certainly not the steps or methods taken in the present case, nor do we believe that they can ever be done by those who are themselves involved; that is, the professional officers with careers at stake. When aviation was struggling for recognition following the First World War, the matter finally had to be taken out of the hands of the professional military men and taken over for study and solution by a commission of disinterested civilians, the Morrow Board. Only then did military and naval aviation begin to develop. We advocate the same principle in the pending matter of reorganization of our military forces. The group with the greatest stake in any future war have not been consulted in the present studies at all, that is the great body of Reserve officers. We have a considerable fund of information and knowledge about military matters and gained in the acid test of war itself. We constituted over 95 percent of the officers in the last war. We bore the major share of the burden of the fighting. We Reserve officers have, among our numbers, men with vast experience in the problems of organization, supply, procurement, administration, and finance. We have men with the knowledge and practical experience and yet who do not have the prejudice of a lifetime spent in a particular branch nor with a professional military career at stake. We are citizens and pay taxes and usually in the brackets that hurt. Yet we are voluntarily devoting a considerable part of our lives to preparing ourselves, militarily, to defend the security of this country. We are the ones who will have to bear again the major share of the burden of any future war. We believe that we have a right to participate in making an unbiased study of this whole matter before the Congress acts upon it. Give us a modern Morrow Board to study this merger situation and let there be a generous representation of Reserve officers upon such a board. We have been the victims of duplication, lack of coordination, often lack of cooperation in the military services. Let us contribute our experience to this problem. Let the professional military leaders testify as to their needs and problems but let the solution be a civilian proposal as was intended by our form of Government. In view of our present national situation no new legislation which costs any additional money should be enacted now unless it is absolutely essential to the national welfare or security, or is a genuine emergency of a most urgent nature. The only justification for passing the proposed merger legislation now would be either an imminent threat of war or the assurance that such legislation would result immediately in great economy and vastly increased efficiency. No such showing has been made on this proposed legislation and it seems to us that on a matter of such far-reaching importance and with such great implications as this bill, which, incidentally, seems to be very little understood by anyone, should not be hastily rushed through Congress without a very much fuller study than this has had. Few proposals pending in Congress are as controversial as this bill. We feel that there has been a grossly inadequate study of the matter and that such study as has been made was confined to a small group of professionals who have little understanding of the far-reaching implications to our social, political, and economic system that this proposal would involve. Why the hurry on a matter of this importance? Every indication so far is that the enactment of this bill will result in a very substantial increase in costs, all administrative, not 1 cent of which would go to increasing the combat strength of the Nation. It just does not make sense to say that adding two new executive departments will not increase the cost of government. The executive department of the Air Force will duplicate the War and Navy Departments, and you know how much they cost. On top of that, there will be created the super-duper Department of National Defense. You know that once you create an executive agency, it grows and grows and from then on costs more and more year after year. Gentlemen, either you are going to increase appropriations for the national defense establishments, if you pass this bill, or you are going to meet the increased costs involved by taking the money out of the fighting force to support the added administrative burden. If you do that, you will not have added to our national security, but will have actually weakened our military defenses. Every desirable feature of the proposed legislation, every announced objective, every alleged economy, can be obtained without this socalled merger, or unification. No matter what you call it, it does not change the results any. Gentlemen, I firmly believe you can obtain all the benefits desired better by not attempting at this time to scramble the departments, but by dealing directly with the military problems that need urgent at tention. The members of our association feel very strongly that Congress should take definite action in defining the mission and roles of the Marine Corps and in providing that marines should be members of every joint military staff, commission, council or board, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Marine Corps is now an independent military organization. This legislation proposes to incorporate it into the Navy. We think that is proper, but we also think that when it is done, the mission and status of the Marine Corps should be clearly defined by law, and not left to administrative interpretation. The CHAIRMAN. I think that the committee has reached a conclusion that the Marine Corps will be protected, is that not right, gentlemen? Does anyone think otherwise? Mr. WADSWORTH. The Senate Bill contains a provision which has been accepted by General Vandegrift. Mr. MAAS. We consider that those are weasel words in that compromise. It says "relative status," and it does not say relative to what, to whom, or to when. The CHAIRMAN. I think the committee has agreed practically that the Marine Corps will be protected, and as to the language, we will be glad to hear you on that any time. Mr. MAAS. Mr. Chairman, this deals not only with the question of protecting by legislation the status of the Marine Corps, but also we are asking your consideration on much more than that. My statement deals with the demand that the Marines be represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all other military commissions, staffs, boards, councils, and committees. The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps I should not interrupt, but I thought you were concerned about that question. I think that we are past that question. Is there anyone on the committee who is not in favor of writing in whatever protection may be needed for the Marine Corps? Mr.WADSWORTH. I would never consent to writing into the statute the roles and missions of any branch of the armed services. Mr. MAAS. I understand perfectly what Mr. Wadsworth has in mind, but the Marine Corps is a completely independent military organization. Today, it is not a part of any executive establishment. It operates with the Navy only by Executive order of the President. Its mission and roles have never been defined by law. Now, when you take an independent organization and put it into an executive department, then its status should be defined by law. Mr. WADSWORTH. For that reason, then, we should define the status and the roles and missions of the infantry, the field artillery, the battleships, the submarines, and any and all branches. Mr. MAAS. It is not parallel at all, because they have been established parts of the Army or the Navy. This is an independent military organization that has never had its status defined. The CHAIRMAN. Apparently, I should not have brought up the question, because that is a question when we come to write the bill. Mr. MAAS. May I proceed? The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Mr. MAAS. If there is a genuine need in the scheme of our national security for a Marine Corps, we believe that the Congress should say so in unmistakeable language. Until such time as there is genuine merger and unification of the military services, we believe that there is an essential need for marines. We would like to have you, the Congress, define the mission and status of the Marine Corps, not only in such clear language that it can be understood by all, but so clearly that it cannot be misunderstood by anybody. The Marine Corps pioneered and developed the strategy and tactics of amphibious operation. The Marine Corps had worked out and was carrying out amphibious exercises for 10 years before the Navy adopted it. And it was not until 20 years after the Marine Corps had produced a manual on amphibious operations that the Army took it up. In fact, the Army did not adopt amphibious operations until this war. Incidentally, the marines taught all the Army divisions that participated in amphibious operaions the techniques of this new development in warfare. If there is a need for a Marine Corps it is to be the Navy's amphibious force and to continue to study and develop amphibious tactics. The Army, heretofore, has been unwilling to concede to the Marine Corps any other missions than guarding naval properties and providing ship detachments on capital naval vessels. In plain language, this means being the policemen in navy yards and orderlies for the captains and admirals at sea. We want to be certain that we are not going to be reduced to that ignominious status. We Marine Reserves certainly do not propose to support a Marine Corps merely for the purpose of being policemen and orderlies and to look pretty in parades. If we are not needed in the fighting forces of the country, we want to know if now, so we will not waste any more time from our busy civilian lives for any such purpose. We are more than willing to take our own time to prepare ourselves to defend this Nation, but we have a right to know that we are going to be used in its defense and not merely dressed up for parades. If there is to be a Marine Corps, most certainly the Commandant of the Marine Corps should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. |