NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1947

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment in the main caucus room of the Old House Office Building, Hon. Clare H. Hoffman (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. We will come to order. Mr. Chenoweth, you may proceed.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Let me preface my opening question by this observation: I have observed that the military branch of the Government, the War Department which you have the great honor to head, has been doing pretty well under our present set-up. If the other branches of the Government were to do equally well, I think we would avoid many of the problems confronting us today.

I think everyone recognizes the brilliant leadership you provided in the last war. Perhaps the organization was not perfect, but I think everyone recognizes the tremendous job that was done, General. We recognize the fact that you played a most important part in the great victory that was achieved."

STATEMENT OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY-Continued

GENERAL EISENHOWER. Thank you very much.

Mr. CHENOWETH. I am very much interested, General, in the fourth paragraph of your statement about the conditions you found upon returning to America, and the disappointments that you suffered when finding some argument and controversies between the different branches of the service.

You make the statement, "It appeared that all men wearing one color of uniform had one conviction while those wearing another color developed opinions to the exact contrary."

I would like for you to elaborate on just what this situation was that you found which caused you such concern.

General EISENHOWER. Mr. Chenoweth, if all of us in the fighting services are in the uniform of the United States and not in a particular Navy, Army, or Air uniform, I can think of no greater error than to engage in a public fight because we are all working for the same thing, presumably.

I was not astonished that there were different convictions on these things and the questions now at issue, because our experiences in the war were not the same. You will recall my experience was that of a

unified single commander, having all services under my command, and the services of various nations.

The team that I saw developed in that area, in my conviction, was the only kind of team that could have won the European war.

I think that lesson is so clearly understood by all of us that there is no one of the services that objects or would tolerate any other solution except the single command in a single theater of war. We have believed that so much that we have attempted to carry that into our peacetime practices in attempting to set up a single commander in the Western Pacific, the Central Pacific, in the Caribbean, and so on. No matter from what service he comes, he commands the operations, the defenses and strategic concerns in those areas.

From that experience I believe that the same system should be largely transmitted and translated to Washington, where we would not only have the certainty of this kind of command in a future war in any particular theater, but where we would have the example to the services, where everything about it would bring us together and lead us, so that this integrated warfare could be handled. It would grow with us and would be developed among us that we could all work as friends.

I can see that someone with a different type of experience, another Army officer or Navy officer, might have somewhat different convictions, but where my astonishment and dismay came from was the fact that suddenly it seemed that everybody who happened to wear one type of uniform had a particular conviction and someone else had another.

There developed, therefore, a fight before the public as an Army and Navy fight. There is where I retired from the scene. I gave my testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee and I kept my mouth shut.

Mr. CHENOWETH. That was last year?

General EISENHOWER. Yes, sir.

I would not be a party in public to any kind of thing that showed a fight between the two departments of Government.

I am wearing the uniform of the United States and the uniform of the Army.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Would you care to elaborate on these varieties of opinion?

What was the fundamental issue that the different branches of the service could not agree on? You mentioned a single command.

As I recall it, under the original bill, or the original proposal, it was provided that the Chief of Staff of the Army would be the top commander. Was that what the Navy objected to?

General EISENHOWER. In the original bill, it was my own feeling at that time that the single Secretary should have a single military Chief of Staff, but to make sure everybody understood I was talking along the lines of principle and not from any idea of service advantage, I went both to the President and the Secretary of the Navy, and I told them that if that bill passed, then, insofar as I could bring my influence to bear, the first Chief of Staff, during the initial period, would be a naval officer and I would consent to no other arrangement because of this fact, that there had seemed to develop an unwilling bride in this marriage that I was proposing.

Now just exactly what were the bases for these differing opinions, I am not prepared to say, Mr. Chenoweth, I do want to explain this point, sir:

When a man believes in anything so seriously as I believe in the value of this, it is difficult for him really to get at the fundamentals of the opposition's reasons. That is the way I feel about it.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Does the Navy object to the single command? Is that their principal objection? Were they afraid that the Navy would be absorbed into the War Department and they would lose their identity?

General EISENHOWER. Well, sir, I am not sure. It may have been just a matter of actual principle, that they believe that each service should be completely free to come separately to Congress every year to present its particular ideas. I am not sure, sir, and I certainly would not want to be misunderstood as putting thoughts in their minds. They are perfectly capable of telling their own story.

Mr. CHENOWETH. They felt very sincerely, then, that they were giving up some jurisdictions, some authority or some rights which they now enjoy which they might be deprived of if this legislation was adopted?

General EISENHOWER. They apparently felt it would be more difficult for them to maintain something for their service on the same basis that they do now.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Did I understand you to say, General, after you saw that situation, you more or less kept your hands off.

General EISENHOWER. I was directed to come down and testify before a committee of Congress. I have forgotten now whether it was in the House or in the Senate. When I found this out, I went to my Navy friends and said, "As far as I am concerned, in public I keep my mouth shut. From now on we talk about this among ourselves."

I have earnestly tried to follow that. Only since we have agreed to a program that we all believe is a step forward, and only on that premise, have I again begun to speak about it in public.

Mr. CHENOWETH. You mentioned here that this is a compromise measure, and I think everyone recognizes it as that. It is not in any sense a merger. Would you call it coordination and unification to provide some system of cooperation?

General EISENHOWER. Yes, sir.

Mr. CHENOWETH. I am just wondering, General, where each party has compromised and given up some of its final convictions, I wonder just what type of legislation will result, and whether it is going to amount to anything at all. My observation is that about all this bill does is to arrange for the different services to speak to each other in the morning and appear friendly.

How far do you think this legislation goes and what benefits will result from its passage?

General EISENHOWER. I think there is a tremendous advance. There is a tremendous advance represented in this legislation.

There is set up by Congress a single civilian to whom we are all responsible, as we are now in fact responsible to the President. However, as everybody knows, with the President's tremendous preoccupations, these problems cannot be discussed in front of the common civilian head all the time. It just cannot be done.

Now, here is a man to whom we take our differences, and who, observing the limitations placed upon his authority by law, but with the responsibility for bringing to Congress each year a balanced program of national security, comes down and says, "Here is what we need," and gives you a balanced picture rather than the War Department coming down 1 month and the next month the Navy comes down, and so on.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Does the President not have Admiral Leahy now occupying that position, to advise him on military matters?

General EISENHOWER. He advises him, yes, but it is entirely a different thing. In one case you set up a civilian who is necessarily examining these things from all the angles, and in discharging his responsibility comes down and reports to the proper committees of Congress each year. He tells exactly what is going on, what he needs and explains why he needs it.

Admiral Leahy does not have that kind of responsibility.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Don't you think it is well, General, for the different branches of the service to have a certain amount of professional pride in their service and that it creates a spirit of competition between the branches that that may partially account for our outstanding military success?

General EISENHOWER. There is nothing in this bill, Mr. Chenoweth, that would tend to reduce the esprit de corps of any organization.

Mr. CHENOWETH. I am sure Congress would not want to pass any bill that would have that result.

Let me ask you this, General: I have the impression gained partially through conversations with Army and naval officers with whom I have come in contact, that these officers, or most of them, are opposed to this measure.

What is the background of that? I am wondering if Congress is wise in passing legislation where an overwhelming number of officers in both branches of the service are hostile to its enactment.

General EISENHOWER. I cannot conceive of it, sir. I know of none, and if there is any officer who has tried to live his life on the basis of drawing out from his subordinates down to the last man, his honest opinion, I have tried certainly to live that way.

If you know of any officers in the Army who are opposed to this as a matter of conviction I should advise you, sir, to get them down here, and I will tell you that they are perfectly free to give their own convictions and they will never suffer for it as long as I am sitting where I am.

Mr. CHENOWETH. I am sure they would at least be embarrassed to state a position different from yours.

General EISENHOWER. If they think they know something about it, it is all right. I do abhor a man talking about something of which he has no experience and knowledge, and just wants to exhibit prejudice, but as a matter of fact, I do not see where the ordinary army officer is affected by this thing, except that it brings him closer to the other service and gives him an opportunity to understand them better, so that he can do his own job better.

I do not see how the prospects of promotion, the dignity of his service or anything else could possibly damage his esprit de corps.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Do you think it might be stronger among the Navy officers than the Army officers?