Admiral SHERMAN. I think that we have progressed past that point, sir, but on the question of air support of ground troops, as far as I am concerned, I believe that there has to be a very firm, local, unified command in any joint operation.

All of us in the Navy believe that the Marines have to have their own own organic aviation. Wherever we set down marines outside country now, they have their own aircraft with them.

Mr. MANASCO. You would be opposed to giving the carrier forces autonomy and not having them under the direct supervision or the task-force commander?

Admiral SHERMAN. As we conceive it, the task force is a group of aircraft, of carriers that carry them, and of ships that operate with them.

In other words, the naval aircraft is now the primary offensive weapon of the fleet, so it is all one.

Mr. MANASCo. Defensive and offensive?

Admiral SHERMAN. Defensive and offensive; yes, sir; but primarily a weapon of offense.

I believe under any normal legislation there must be adequate provision to see that the troops get the air support they need.

Whether that can be done best by peeling off part of the large air force or giving them a small one of their own is a question I am not prepared to go into. It is without my area of responsibility.

Certainly, inside the Navy we feel the need, which we have satisfied over a period of years, to build up an integrated force.

Mr. MANASCO. The reason I brought up that question is that some writers have made observations in the papers. Of course you have much greater military experts in the cloakrooms of Congress than you have in the armed forces, and some of the radio people are greater experts than you have in the armed forces.

One of these people said that one of the reasons the British almost lost north Africa in the first part of that north African campaign was due to the fact that the field commander could not call air support. The RAF had all their fighter craft up in the British Isles, protecting the home island.

Have you read that?

Admiral SHERMAN. I was not in that theater of the war, and I would rather not comment on their problems.

Mr. LATHAM. It is true though, is it not, that many American. lives were lost by our own forces, largely because of a lack of integration right down on the field of battle and the field operations?

For instance, in the Pacific there were some Air Corps men shot down by naval forces, men who did not understand naval operations and automatic fire control, and so on.

On the other hand, the Army itself, I think in Sicily, shot down quite a few of its own planes, and why was that? Because there was a lack of coordination right down in the fighting unit.

I am very much concerned by the subject of naval aviation. The whole basis of it is close integration with its sea forces, is it not? Admiral SHERMAN. That is true.

Of course, undoubtedly unfortunate incidents have happened. I know ships have fired into each other in night fighting, and at times aircraft have bombed friendly submarines, and I know in World War I of one incident I was very closely associated with, from a rather de

tached point of view, fortunately, in which yachts on our side shot up friendly submarines. I saw a British yacht machine-gun the crew of a French submarine one morning in World War I.

These things happen because people get confused. There should be the best intergration and coordination, of course.

In this particular bill, we have attempted to establish that by the requirement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish unified commands in the field, and those unified commands exist now.

Everything that we know, all of our military knowledge, comes down to this, that wherever there is tactical coordination of forces there must be unified command.

Mr. LATHAM. We had unified command in many of these areas where these things did happen in this war just past, and they happened because, as I understand it, a large amount of close integration and training was not done right from the very beginning, between these various forces.

Now, as I see it under this bill, you introduce a completely new element in the air force.

For instance, suppose they are all engaged in one operation: We have marines, we have the Navy, and we have the Army; we have marine aviation, naval aviation, and the Air Corps, perhaps, which is going to move in right behind the marines; we have the Army Air Corps and new uncertain factor, a third group.

Admiral SHERMAN. I do not think that is a real change, sir.

All this does, really, is recognize the autonomous status the Army Air Forces achieved really before we entered hostilities in this war, and there is no doubt that the complexity of war is increasing; with all of the various developments, the increase in speeds, the complexities of tactical coordination are greatly increased; and we feel this structure has for one of its purposes to do the best we can for those very difficult problems.

Mr. LATHAM. It is a little past 12 o'clock.

Thank you very much, Admiral.

The committee will stand adjourned until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:10, the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 o'clock the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2 p. m., upon the expiration of

recess.

Mr. BUSBEY (presiding). The meeting will come to order, please. I want to apologize for the small attendance here this afternoon. The Rules Committee has a very important meeting which has taken six of our members away, and I am sure some of the other members will be in very shortly.

General Norstad, did you want to start this afternoon?

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. LAURIS NORSTAD, DIRECTOR OF
PLANS AND OPERATIONS, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
General NORSTAD. I have a statement I would like to make.
Mr. BUSBEY. You may give your statement at this time.
General NORSTAD. Since 1918, many studies have been made with
a view to developing a workable plan for integrating the armed forces

into an efficient and economical machine for the preservation of peace, or, as a last resort, for the successful prosecution of war. Since 1921 there have been at least 60 bills introduced in the Congress pertaining to this subject. During the same period, there have been some seven congressional committees who have studied the problems and submitted reports.

During World War II, a committee composed of Army, Navy, and air officers of long experience were appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the reorganization of national defense.

The committee reported that the majority of the leaders in the field recommended an unified system of organization of the armed forces, and considered it to be essential.

In 1944, the Committee on Postwar Military Policy of the House of Representatives, after conducting hearings extending over a period of several months, rendered a report to the effect that the time was not then opportune, because fighting was in progress, to undertake to write the pattern of the proposed unification of the armed forces.

They did recommend, however, that when the war was over the question of reorganization of the armed forces should be followed through, with a view to giving to the Congress the results of the study conducted by the committees appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Prior to World War II, the real necessity for the integration of our armed forces was not so readily apparent. I am convinced, however, that one lesson which has been most clearly demonstrated by the costly experience of this last war is that there must be unified direction of land, sea, and air forces at the seat of government, as well as in all parts of the world where our armed forces are serving.

With your permission, I would like to read an extract from the summary report of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. This group was established by President Roosevelt in the latter part of 1944 to conduct an impartial study of the effects of the air attack on Germany.

The findings of the survey were to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating air power as an instrument of military strategy for planning for the future development of the United States armed forces, and for determining future. policies with respect to the national defense.

The Survey consisted of civilian leaders in the scientific, business, and educational fields of our Nation, with Mr. Franklin D'Olier as Chairman. It operated under charters from both the Secretaries of War and Navy. I quote from pertinent passages of the Summary Report of the Survey published July 1, 1946:

The Survey has been impressed with the need for concrete and prompt action to encourage adequate research and development; to assure adequate intelligence during peacetime; to integrate our military establishments; and to increase the national appreciation of the necessity for continued strength of the United States as a force for peace.

Even though the United States did not achieve unity of command in the Pacific as a whole, each theater commander used the air, ground, and sea forces assigned to him as an integral or coordinated team. Coordination and compromise among theater commanders was largely achieved in all major respects. Such lack of complete integration as existed was in a large measure traceable back through the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the basic structure of our prewar military organization.

The lesson of the Pacific war strongly supports that form of organization which provides unity of command, capable of clear and effective decision at the top, strengthens civilian control and thus provides closer integration of military policy with foreign and domestic policy, and favors a high degree of coordination_in planning, intelligence, and research and development.

Such unity of command should, however, decentralize administrative burdens and permit specialized training and the free development of the component forces, even at the risk of some duplication.

Within a department of common defense which provides unity of command and is itself oriented toward air and new weapons, the survey believes that, in addition to the Army and the Navy, there should be an equal and coordinate position for a third establishment.

To this establishment should be given primary responsibility for passive and active defense against long-range attacks on our cities, industries, and other sustaining resources; for strategic attack, whether by airplane or guided missile, and for all air units other than carrier air and such land-based air units as can be more effective as component parts of the Army or Navy.

I have quoted from the conclusions reached by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey because substantially identical conclusions are the basis of the bill you are considering, H. R. 2319.

It is my opinion that this bill, if enacted into law, will accomplish three fundamental objectives. It will provide a means for the integration of military policies with foreign and domestic policy; provide for a military establishment with a single civilian head; and recognize the fact that our fighting forces comprise a team of three coequal members, the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

With these fundamental objectives accomplished, I am convinced that the process of welding these great fighting arms into a smooth and efficient operating machine will continue rapidly and will present no difficulties that cannot be overcome by concerted action.

I know of no better way to insure the maximum security for each dollar appropriated for national defense than by the enactment into law of H. R. 2319.

Admiral Sherman has discussed most of the provisions of this bill. I would like, however, to comment briefly on some of the provisions not fully covered by him.

From the title of the bill under consideration it is clear that the purpose of this act is to provide for a national defense establishment, to establish three major service departments within this establishment, and to provide for the coordination of the activities of the armed services with the departments and agencies of the Government which are concerned with the national security.

It leaves administrative and organizational changes within these components, which may be deemed necessary at any time, to be accomplished progressively. With one exception, there is no change in the status of any major service or component of such a service. The one exception is in the case of the United States Army and the War Department.

Under the provisions of this bill the position of the Army itself— that is, the ground and service elements-remains substantially unchanged. The War Department becomes the Department of the Army.

The Air Forces, however, which during the war enjoyed autonomy in many respects, is divorced from the Department of the Army and established under a new Department of the Air Force. The Department of the Army will continue to provide support to the Air Forces as determined by the Secretary of National Defense.

Since the bill under consideration provides for a new Department of the Air Force, I would like to discuss this subject in some detail. On March 9, 1942, the President, within the limits of the powers granted to him under title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, recognized the necessity of organizational parity for air by Executive Order No. 9082.

Under this order, the functions, duties, and powers of the Commanding General, General Headquarters, Air Force, and of the Chief of the Air Corps were transferred to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Within the War Department, the Army Air Forces are now organized under the authority of this Executive order. It may be pertinent to note that title I of the First War Powers Act, on which the existing organization now depends, will terminate 6 months after termination of the present war or at such earlier time as the Congress or the President may designate.

On December 18, 1945, the President in his message to Congress stated:

Air power has been developed to a point where its responsibilities are equal to those of land and sea power, and its contribution to our strategic planning is as great. In operation, air power receives its separate assignment in the execution of an over-all plan.

These facts were finally recognized in this war in the organizational parity which was granted to air power within our principal unified commands.

Section 107 creates within the National Defense Establishment an executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force with a civilian Secretary as head thereof, and a civilian Under Secretary and two civilian Assistant Secretaries.

Under the Department and the Secretary, there is established a United States Air Force under the command of a Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

This section provides initially for the transfer to the United States Air Force of officers who now hold commissions in the Air Corps of the United States Army and of enlisted men enlisted in the Air Corps or Army Air Forces.

There are thousands of officers, enlisted men, and civilian employees now assigned to the Air Forces and performing duties for the Air Forces who are not to be included in this initial transfer.

For example, officers commissioned in the Corps of Engineers and assigned for duty with the Air Forces will continue to perform the same duties for the United States Army.

The extent to which this personnel may be transferred later from the Army to the Air Force is left to the discretion of the Secretary of National Defense, who may direct such transfers any time within 2 years from the date of enactment of this act. It should be noted, however, that the authority of the Secretary of National Defense to make transfers of personnel relates only to transfers between the Army and the Air Force and must not to Navy or Marine personnel. This same plan has been followed with respect to property, installations, and activities now under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

These will remain under his jurisdiction until such time as the Secretary of National Defense shall determine and direct a formal transfer of those necessary for the operation of the Department of the Air Force and the United States Air Force.