into the normal roles of the other two services. Such a wartime practice should not be considered as a cogent reason for perpetuating this assumption of mission on the part of the sea forces. I recommend, therefore, that the size of the Marine Corps be limited to small, readily available and lightly armed units, no larger than a regiment, to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries and to provide interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments.

The CHAIRMAN. At the last meeting there were put into the record, I think, 10 proposed amendments, each seeking to safeguard the status of the Marine Corps.

Have you seen those, sir?

Admiral SHERMAN. I have not seen those.

The CHAIRMAN. You will see them in the testimony of the Secretary of War. I would like to have your testimony on those. They were put in during the Secretary of War's testimony. They were put in the record. If you will give us your opinion on what the effect of the adoption of those amendments would have on the bill, I would appreciate it.

(The information is as follows:)

Hon. CLARE HOFFMAN,

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington 25, D. C.

House of Representatives.

MY DEAR MR. HOFFMAN: I have given careful consideration to the effect General Vandegrift's proposed amendments to safeguard further the status of the Marine Corps would have on H. R. 2319 if adopted. In reply to your request for my opinion may I submit it as follows:

The proposed amendments to sections 103, 112, and 202 (b) are designed to insure that Marine officers may serve as military assistants to the Secretary of National Security, as members of the Joint Staff, and as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I did not consider it necessary to make such specific reference to the Marine Corps in those sections since it was my belief that the word "Navy" as used therein included the Marine Corps. Since it now appears necessary to clarify the status of the Marine Corps as outlined in sections 103, 112, and 202 of H. R. 2319, I recommend that those sections be redrafted to conform with sections 203, 212, and 102 in the S. 758 as approved by the Senate Committee.

General Vandegrift's proposed amendment to section 106 sets forth the functions (roles and missions) to be performed by the Marine Corps. If the functions of the Marine Corps are incorporated into H. R. 2319, I believe it would become necessary to incorporate similarly the functions of all the other components of the armed forces. Such a procedure would have the undesirable effect of making static the functions (roles and missions) of our armed forces, whereas the War and Navy Departments have agreed that they should be prescribed by the President. It is my opinion that the wording of section 206 (a) and (b) of Confidential Committee Print No. 7, S. 758, will provide effective safeguards for the Marine Corps without resort to the undesirable expedient of prescribing detailed technical operational functions by statute.

I should be glad to be of further assistance at any time.
Sincerely yours,

FORREST SHERMAN,
Vice Admiral, United States Navy.

Admiral SHERMAN. Since you have referred to those papers of March 5, 1946, may I make one further statement: In my view, the very fact that the divergence of opinion on the future of various parts of the services reached the critical state that it did in March 1946 is a rather forceful demonstration of the need for some form of coordination of the military departments rather than an argument against it. In other words, those violent differences of opinion existed in March 1946. As the result of very earnest efforts, we were able to resolve them and reach agreement on the statement of the functions

of the services in January 1947, which is progress associated with the work on this question of over-all coordination which resulted in this bill before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say to the members of the committee that those papers are available in the office of the committee; and if any of you desire to look them over before General Eisenhower testifies, you will then be able to form your own conclusion and what, at least, they thought at that time.

Mr. WILSON. You do not have copies of it?

The CHAIRMAN. No; they are there for examination in the office. Then the committee will meet at 2 o'clock this afternoon to hear General Norstad.

Mr. LATHAM. Mr. Manasco, did you have a further question?
Mr. MANASCO. Yes.

Admiral Sherman, section 102 describes the powers and duties and authority of the Secretary of National Defense.

Now, some people say that he does not have any power. Other people say he is a czar. What is your opinion on that?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think he has a great deal of power. I think those powers have to be exercised under the direction of the President, that they are powers that the President now has, but I think that in this legislation, a very large amount of power would be given to this Secretary of National Defense to exercise under the President.

Mr. MANASCO. Is it your interpretation, under provisions of this bill, that the Secretary of National Defense has authority to abolish the functions of either one of the three agencies set up under him?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I find nothing in here which would permit him to do so.

Mr. MANASCO. Is it your interpretation that he does have authority, though, under the provisions of this bill to transfer functions from one department to another?

Admiral SHERMAN. Not insofar as the Navy Department is concerned, sir.

Mr. MANASco. Where in the bill is the transfer of functions from one department to another prohibited?

Admiral SHERMAN. It is not specifically prohibited.

Mr. MANASCO. If it is not specifically prohibited, what would prevent his transferring them?

Admiral SHERMAN. Referring to section 106, it sets up the Department of the Navy for the provisions of this act, and that refers back to 102, which says that the Department of the Navy should be administered as an individual unit, and this blankets into the Department of the Navy to be administered as an individual unit, the headquarters of the Marine Corps, the entire operating force of the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and parenthetically I might state there is existing law that says naval aviation shall control all air operations from, I believe it states, the ships of the fleet, and from shore bases for various naval purposes, which are listed in that law of 1926, so that nails that down.

In other words, under the law of 1926, naval aviation does certain things. This says naval aviation is part of the Department of the Navy for the purpose of this bill.

Then we come to the Marine Corps. There is a considerable body of law about the Marine Corps, and everything that existing law says

the Marine Corps shall do is nailed down here as being under the Department of the Navy. Reference is made also to such components of the Coast Guard as will operate under it.

The existing law reads as follows:

Naval aviation shall have control of all aerial operations attached to a fleet, including shore stations, whose maintenance is necessary for operations connected with the fleet for construction and experimentation and for the training of personnel.

Now that statute, as I see it, stays in force. This language under Department of Navy says that naval aviation shall be continued under the Department of the Navy.

Mr. MANASCO. Do we not under section 102 give the Secretary for Defense the authority to say the Navy does not need shorebased aviation or shore-based facilities? Could we not take those shore air bases away from the Navy, under the provisions of this act, section 102?

Admiral SHERMAN. If is not my belief he could, sir, but in the opinion of the committee, if that is possible, then I would recommend that the committee put additional language in here to safeguard naval aviation.

Mr. MANASCO. If he does not have that power, Admiral, what power does he have? That is the reason I am trying to find out. Some people say he is a czar; some people say he is just a figurehead. Admiral SHERMAN. What he could do, sir-and it is a very practical problem that is going to be with us, in my opinion, to an increasing degree, in the next 2 or 3 years-what he could do is to say, as the Secretary of the Navy now does, when he finds one agency under his control wants X million dollars, and the next one wants Y million, and the next one wants Z million dollars, and the total will be more than is available under any reasonable concept, he has to bring those quantities down to a reasonable total.

Within the Navy Department, each year, every bureau and every office turns in the estimates as to each of their requirements.

Mr. MANASCO. A little more than they think they can get by on? Admiral SHERMAN. They asked for something like $8,000,000,000 and the Secretary of the Navy cut it down on the order of $6,000,000,000.

Mr. MANASCO. The Secretary cut you down to $6,000,000,000, and the Bureau of the Budget cut it down, and the President if he so decides can cut it down another billion.

Admiral SHERMAN. Then it eventually comes to Congress and there is a decision made.

Mr. MANASCo. But is it not true that each bureau asks for a little more money of the Secretary, knowing that he is going to cut them. some, and they know that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget will have another cut to justify the existence of the Bureau of the Budget.

Admiral SHERMAN. I think the process intellectually is on a little higher plane than that, sir. They say if we are going to make war any time soon, we must have so much money to discharge our responsibilities. It is up for us to lay this on the line and for somebody else to see what they think we should get.

Since the coordination and supervision of the over-all establishment is going to be along those lines, you do not get very far in safeguarding

any particular agency by giving them a function, because they may perform that function with three battalions, or with one battalion, a regiment, or a division.

Mr. MANASCO. You do not give the Secretary of National Defense supervisory authority, do you, in this bill?

Admiral SHERMAN. He has under this bill the responsibility for coordination and supervision, and he has power and authority with which to get the job done.

Mr. MANASCO. Then you turn over to another section, though, and say that the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces are to be operated as autonomous entities, sir.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MANASCO. How can they so operate when the Secretary of National Defense has authority to cut down their activities, or say how many men you should have on a certain battleship?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is what he should not do, sir.

He should say that the Department of the Navy can have so much money to do their over-all job. All he should deal with is totals. It is the same problem that I would have if I were in command of a division of three carriers.

I would have authority over those three carriers, but each one has a captain. I cannot be on all bridges at all times. Each one of the three must run his own ship. I must have authority over the three.

It may be that there are not enough aircraft to give them all a full complement, and I fight with the people above me to get the total number that is available and then I allocate them as between the three ships, but from there on the captain goes ahead and operates them. Mr. MANASCo. Under the provisions of this bill, though, the Secretary of National Defense could say the Marine Corps will be composed of five men and still comply with the provision of this bill, would he not?

Admiral SHERMAN. I suppose in an extreme abuse of power, the Secretary of National Defense could say that, and then I would assume the Secretary of the Navy would complain, then if the President agreed with the Secretary of National Defense, then the problem would be right back with the Congress.

Mr. MANASCO. We say that he is to be a civilian, but of course there are very few civilians that know enough about the operations of our Military Establishment to be in there, who knows how to intelligently effect the cuts and allocations of funds.

Then I say that we then say we must have one man who has power to make decisions.

Then you will ask the Secretary of War, "What establishments will be abolished where we have duplication?"

He says, "You will have to ask Kenneth Royall about that." Then you will ask the Secretary of the Navy what naval establishments will be abolished and merged with the Army and Air Forces. He will say, "You must ask Mr. Kenney." Well, if the Secretaries of War and Navy now do not know the answers to those questions, how do you expect one man to know the answers to those questions?

Admiral SHERMAN. The way a problem like that would be resolved, I believe, sir, would be this: The Secretary of National Defense would find he must effect economies along certain lines. He would probably get the Secretaries of the three people in the Departments to try to come to an agreement on it.

There would then be

They would then agree on a certain area. certain points upon which they were still disagreed and he would have to settle those.

It might be the question of whether we should have two temporary flying fields on Okinawa. Each might say he needs his own, and the Secretary of National Defense would say, "That is too bad; by decision you only have one."

Mr. MANASCO. You think, Admiral, one of the things we could expect out of this bill would be economy?

Admiral SHERMAN. I think by better management you would inevitably get greater economy.

Mr. MANASCO. Would that not apply, tais same argument, to all departments, and put them all under one Cabinet head, all our civilian agencies, the Departments of the Interior, Labor, Commerce, and Agriculture, because they certainly send up a budget here without each other knowing what is in the budget recommendation, and we finally get it down to a one-man dictatorship if we do that, do we not?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, this is getting pretty far out of my field. I notice that the number of these executive departments has increased very materially since the early days of the Republic, and it may be that without going to just one department, that some regrouping may be necessary in other areas, as we find ourselves that is it necessary in ours, but just how that would be worked out would be a problem for them, I hope.

Mr. MANASCO. Of course, it might be admitted in some particular fields that a dictatorship is more efficient than a democracy but in the long run I think most of us would rather have a democracy with all its inefficiency and weaknesses.

Admiral SHERMAN. That is what these military departments are supposed to preseve, sir.

Mr. MANASCO. The democracy?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANASCO. A few months ago some questions were asked about placing a seal on the mouths of anyone in these departments who might be opposed to the bill.

I have heard ground officers, men who were connected with divisions in World War II, who were disturbed over the provisions of this bill creating an autonomous air force, and leaving under the control of the ground officers, the grasshoppers, I believe, the artillery observations planes.

They seemed to think they should have control over the tactical bombardment groups.

Of course you're a Navy man. What would be your opinion about that? They will not testify, because they want to be lieutenant generals some day.

Admiral SHERMAN. I want to answer that under two headings: First, on the question of willingness to testify. There are some officers who are worried about coming up here and saying what they think, but I certainly believe that you can expect people who have become lieutenant generals and vice admirals, and so on, who have been through two wars, who have gotten pretty well along, to come up and do their duty by giving you the benefit of their honest convictions. Mr. MANASCO. You do not think they would run the risk of meeting the fate of the late Billy Mitchell by coming up here?