You mentioned that they combine and can use the agencies within the Treasury, I believe, within the Department of Commerce, and the like. Secretary FORRESTAL. I said they had available to them, and should have available, and should gather all information that bears upon our national security, from every agency of Government. Take, for example, the question of raw material. Mr. BROWN. Do you limit it to national security? Secretary FORRESTAL. I might read from the paper that created the authority. Mr. BROWN. As I understand, this original authority was created by directive of the President? Secretary FORRESTAL. That is correct, sir. Mr. BROWN. Rather than a law passed by the Congress of the United States. The provisions of this bill dealing with Central Intelligence would, I assume, supplant this Executive Order? Secretary FORRESTAL. May I respond to your question thusly: The purpose of the Central Intelligence Authority was directed solely to the necessary intelligence activities that dealt only with our national security. Mr. BROWN. I understand that. Please look on page 21, line 17, or line 13 of the bill; you will notice by statute you transfer the function of the National Intelligence Authority to the National Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence, and the functions of the Central Intelligence group are transferred. However, the functions are set up nowhere that I have knowledge of in the statutory law of the land, and your statute refers back to some Federal Register of February 5, or some other date, and some directive issued by the President of the United States, under what I still think is questionable authority. Nobody can tell from that statute, from this bill, if enacted into law, what power or authority this fellow had. Secretary FORRESTAL. While it is not specified in this bill, Mr. Brown, the intent is, should this bill become law, to implement specifically, by statute, that part of it that deals with the reference to the Central Intelligence Authority. Mr. BROWN. Do you not think it should be done all at once before you pass a thing like this? Do you not think this should be set out in the statute? Intentions are fine things, but intentions make good paving blocks, too. Secretary FORRESTAL. Well, it could be done simultaneously. I would rather not try to have that bill incorporated as a part of this bill. Mr. BROWN. Do you not think this bill should come first, then, and have an agency legalize and authorize the law and put it in here? Secretary FORRESTAL. There is no reason why you could not have it a part of this bill, and I think General Vandenberg, as a matter of fact, is now preparing a statute which could either be incorporated in this bill or dealt with as a separate act. Either way would be quite all right, as far as I am concerned. Mr. BROWN. This Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director, should he decide he wants to go into my income tax reports, I presume he could do so, could he not? Secretary FORRESTAL. I do not assume he could. I think he would have a very short life-I am not referring to you, Mr. Brown, but I think he would have a very short life. Mr. BROWN. Well, he probably would, if he sent into mine, but I was wondering how far this goes. This is a very great departure from what we have done in the past, in America. Perhaps we have not been as good as we should have been, and I will agree with that, either in our military or foreign intelligence, and I am very much interested in seeing the United States have as fine a foreign military and naval intelligence as they can possibly have, but I am not interested in setting up here in the United States any particular central policy agency under any President, and I do not care what his name may be, and just allow him to have a gestapo of his own if he wants to have it. Every now and then you get a man that comes up in power that has an imperialistic idea. Secretary FORRESTAL. The purposes of the Central Intelligence Authority are limited definitely to purposes outside of this country, except the collation of information gathered by other Government agencies. Regarding domestic operations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is working at all times in collaboration with General Vandenberg. He relies upon them for domestic activities. Mr. BROWN. Is that stated in the law? Secretary FORRESTAL. It is not; no, sir. Mr. BROWN. That could be changed in 2 minutes, and have the action within the United States instead of without; is that correct? Secretary FORRESTAL. He could only do so with the President's direct and specific approval. Mr. BROWN. I know, but even then it could be done without violation of law by the President or somebody who might write the order for him and get his approval, and without the knowledge and consent or direction of the Congress. Do you think it would be wise for the Congress of the United States to at least fix some limitations on what the power of this individual might be, or what could be done, or what should be done, and all these safeguards and rights of the citizen may be protected? Secretary FORRESTAL. I think it is profitable to explore what you need for protection, and I am in complete sympathy about the dangers of sliding into abrogation of powers by the Congress. On the other hand, if you had limited Mr. Hoover, for example, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to operations only domestically, he might have been very greatly hampered in this last war. Mr. BROWN. I am not talking about domestically, and internationally alone, but I am talking about how far he can go in his studies and investigations, especially of individuals and citizens, and for what purposes he can conduct his investigation. Now, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is under certain restraints by law. Secretary FORRESTAL. That is correct. Mr. BROWN. The Secret Service has certain duties and responsibilities written out, word by word, in the statutes. Secretary FORRESTAL. It is a problem for the Congress and the Executive Departments, Mr. Brown. As I say, exploration certainly could be profitable. However, there is not the slightest question, and I can assure you from my own experience and knowledge that you need someone in this Government who is going to be charged with that aspect of national security. The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, but my attention has been called three times to the fact that we have run 15 minutes overtime, and we are violating the rule of the House under the 5-minute rule. In addition, the whip has called us on the floor. We are adjourned to Tuesday morning, at 10 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Tuesday, April 29, 1947.) NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1947 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment, in the Main Caucus Room of the Old House Office Building, Hon. Clare E. Hoffman (the chairman), presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Is there anyone on my right who has not asked all of the questions he wished? Is there anyone on the left who has not finished? I wonder, Mr. Secretary, if we can have those papers; that 1478 series? STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. PATTERSON, Secretary PATTERSON. They were mentioned at the last hearing, Mr. Chairman. Those are Joint Chiefs of Staff papers, and they are not War Department papers. I have never seen them, and they are not in my files. I have no right to turn them over to you. The CHAIRMAN. I wrote Admiral Leahy, and I put the letter in the record later; but I have not received any answer. Personally, I think that we ought to have the background of this thing before being asked to write a bill. I should think we should have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary PATTERSON. I have no objection at all. The CHAIRMAN. That fact is that we do not get them. Secretary PATTERSON. The papers are not my papers and are not in my department. The CHAIRMAN. In whose department are they? Secretary PATTERSON. You did the correct thing in writing to Admiral Leahy. The CHAIRMAN. I will never be able to make up my mind until I get a look at those papers. Mr. RICH. I want to ask a question. If the Army has some secret papers in which they have determined that it was the right process to consolidate the Army and Navy and Marine Corps, and the Navy might have reasons why they wanted to consolidate, and the Marine. Corps had reasons why they wanted to consolidate, I could not see any reason why, if they had reasons of their own, they should not submit those reasons to us. It is up to us to determine, in consolida tion, what is the best after we hear these men discuss the consolidation, and I am going to make up my mind at that time, after we hear these witnesses, as to what is the best thing. The CHAIRMAN. What are you asking me? Mr. RICH. I do not know why you want the secret papers. The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the Army and Navy and Air Corps have considered this thing before, this plan or some plan of this kind, and these gentlemen have expressed their views about it. I have been advised that some of them thought that they ought to get rid of, in a way, or perhaps the more accurate term is cut down the size of, the Marine Corps. Mr. RICH. I have not heard so much about that, but from what has been said, I am ready to make up my mind on it. The CHAIRMAN. If you want to argue with me, we can do it afterwards, and we will not take up the time of the witness. I am not able to make up my mind until I find out what the Joint Chiefs have been writing and saying about this, this last year. I want to know why they changed their minds? Secretary PATTERSON. If you want a Joint Chiefs of Staff paper, you did the correct thing in writing to Admiral Leahy. The CHAIRMAN. I thought so, because I followed your advice. Secretary PATTERSON. That is right. The CHAIRMAN. Now, if I understood you correctly the other day, you said what you wanted was more efficiency and more economy. Secretary PATTERSON. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything in this bill, or is there any power given in this bill to anyone to do anything that those in charge of the services now could not do if they wanted to? Secretary PATTERSON. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. What is it, and where is it; what section of the bill? Secretary PATTERSON. Section 102, page 3 of the bill, the Secretary is given power to establish policies and programs and to exercise direct authority and control over the departments and agencies, and to supervise and coordinate the preparation of budget estimates. The CHAIRMAN. On the one that you have right there, if I may interrupt you, you are speaking of the Secretary of National Defense? Secretary PATTERSON. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, cannot the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the members of the Staff do that thing now if they so desire? Secretary PATTERSON. It cannot be done effectively, Mr. Chairman, under the present system. The CHAIRMAN. Why cannot these men get together and do just exactly what you say this man should do or can do? Secretary PATTERSON. You never can get as good action in an executive department or departments by committee action as you can where the responsibility is squarely placed with one man. The CHAIRMAN. That is to say, in order to get the greater efficiency and the greater economy, we must have one boss? It that what you mean? Secretary PATTERSON. Yes, sir; that is right, one man that Congress may hold accountable and responsible rather than a group of four. The CHAIRMAN. Is that what Stalin and Hitler and Mussolini had? Secretary PATTERSON. I do not know about that. All power in their states, of course, went up to them on civilian, military matters, and |