considered the devil to have only a tyrannical right. Others thought man to be only in the power of the devil. Some, as Theodoret and Hilary of Poictiers, spoke of redemption as a battle, in which Christ has conquered the devil, and set free his prisoners. The notion of a contract, however, was more usual, and it was accurately explained how the devil was deceived into accepting the life of Christ as a ransom. Gregory of Nyssa tells us that he was attracted by the sublimity of Christ's works, and did not perceive the divinity under the veil of the flesh. "Under the bait of the flesh," he says, "the hook of the divinity was concealed." This figure of the hook and bait runs through many of the Fathers down to Peter Lombard.

Objections were made to this view, from time to time, by one and another, and even those who held it seem often inconsistent with themselves in their statements. It was opposed by Gregory Nazianzen, John Damascene and others. But it had taken such strong hold of the mind of the age, that it continued the prevailing view. And even after it had been rejected by Anselm and Abelard, and its inconsistencies fully pointed out, the famous Orthodox teacher, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, defended it with extreme bitterness against its opposers.* Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris, A. D. 1164, whose "Four Books of Sentences was the text book of every student, and commented upon by every great theologian, holds to a certain right in the devil over the souls of men.† In fact, so long as they clung to the literal idea of redemption, they were compelled to return to the view of an atonement offered to the devil.

The second period is that of Scholasticism. But what

* Abelard said "Ego vero dico, et ratione irrefragabili probo, quod diabolus in hominem nullum jus habuerit. Neque enim qui eum decipiendo a subjectione domini sui alienavit, aliquam potestatem super eum debuit accipere, potius si quam prius haberet, debuit amittere." But Bernard replied with truly orthodox loftiness of tone, "Discat diabolum non solum potestatem, sed etiam justam habuisse in homines, ut consequenter et hoc videat, venisse utique in carne Dei Filium propter liberandos homines. Diaboli in hominem quoddam jus, etsi non jure acquisitum, sed nequiter usurpatum, juste tamen permissum." These quotations are by Hase," Evangelische Dogmatic," p. 246, third edition.

LOMBARD. Sentences 3. 9. "Injuste Diabolus, quantum ad se, tene-, bat hominem, sed homo juste tenebatur, quia diabolus nunquam meruit potestatem habere super hominem, sed homo meruit per culpam pati diaboli tyrannidem.”

was scholasticism? Baumgarten Crusius says, "The school separating itself from the Church, and endeavoring to gain an independent existence." Hegel, going deeper, says, "First come the Church Fathers, then the Church Doctors." First come those who give life to the Church, then, life needing light, there arise those who shall teach it.

In the first period of the Church, the direction of its activity was to produce the contents or substance of doctrine; in the second, or scholastic, to give arrangement and form. To systematize and reconcile the various doctrines which had come to be regarded as Orthodox; to harmonize the whole into a complete system of theology; by innumerable distinctions, and the most subtle definitions, to enfold and penetrate every theological question with the sharpest thought; such was the work of the dialectic scholasticism of the middle ages. But at the very beginning of this pe riod appears a book, which was destined, by the power of its author's genius, to make an epoch in theology, and especially in the history of this doctrine.

Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, born 1034; scholar and successor of Lanfranc, the opponent of Berengarius ; in his celebrated book, "Cur Deus homo?" lays the foundation of the Church doctrine of substituted punishment. A realist in philosophy, proving the existence of God by assuming the reality of general ideas, in an argument which has been commended by Leibnitz and Hegel; he carries into theology the same strong confidence in necessary truths, and endeavors to found the doctrine of the Atonement on a basis of absolute necessity. He sweeps away, with the boldness of an independent thinker, the whole doctrine of the rights of the devil, declaring that the devil has a right to nothing but to be punished.*

Anselm begins his treatise by asking, Why was it necessary that God should become man in order to redeem mankind? His answer is, Because only so could the guilt of sin be atoned for. He defines sin to be, not giving to God his due. But man owes God all that comes within the sphere of his free will. Whenever he omits to pay this debt, he dishonors God, and commits sin. How can satis

* "Diabolo nec Deus aliquid debebat nisi pænam."

↑ "Non aliud peccare, quam Deo non reddere debitum.”

faction be made to God for his dishonor? It cannot be made by us, since at any moment we already owe God all that we can do. All that we can do, therefore, only fulfils our present duty, and prevents us from falling into new sin, but cannot satisfy for past sin. Since the gift of a universe ought not to tempt us to omit a single duty, it is evident that each duty outweighs the universe, and for each omission of duty we owe to God more than a universe. Evidently, therefore, we cannot ourselves satisfy God for our past sin. But satisfaction must be made, or punishment inflicted; for only by punishing sin, or receiving satisfaction for sin, can God's honor be maintained. That it ought to be maintained is evident; since as there is nothing in the universe greater or better than God, to maintain God's honor is most just, and the best thing for the whole universe. If God were to forgive sin without satisfaction being made for it, it would be a disorder in his kingdom. Sin, in that case, being subject to no law, would enjoy greater freedom than goodness. Now, as God's honor can be preserved in two ways, either by punishing sin, or receiving satisfaction for it, why does God choose satisfaction instead of punishment? Anselm gives two reasons, first, because so sublime a work as man's rational nature should not be created in vain, or suffered to perish; second, because the number of the redeemed being absolutely fixed, and some of the angels having fallen, their number must be supplied from among men. Man must,

therefore, be enabled to satisfy God for his sin, in order that he may be saved. But to satisfy God, we have seen that he must give God more than the universe, that is, more than all that is not God. But only God himself is this therefore God himself must make the satisfaction. But it is man who owes the debt, therefore God must be man to make satisfaction. Hence the necessity of the Incarnation of the Son of God, or of the God-man. To make satisfaction, this God-man must pay something which he does not himself owe on his own account. As a man he owes perfect obedience for himself; this then cannot be the satisfaction. But being a sinless man, he is not bound to die; his death, therefore, as the death of a God-man, is the adequate and proper satisfaction. In return for so great a gift, the Father bestows what the Son desires,

namely, human redemption. These are the essential steps of the famous argument of Anselm.*

Many serious objections may be urged against this theory, and the same scholastic acuteness which Anselm showed in building it up was manifested by other scholastic Doctors in criticising it. Their minds were too penetrating not to discover its main defect; namely, that the idea on which it is based, of the absolute preponderance of the Divine Justice over the Divine Love, is a mere supposition. Peter Abelard, born 1079, the great Rationalist of the middle ages, criticises and opposes it in his Commentary on Romans. He places the reconciling power of the death of Jesus in its awakening in us an answering love, which conquers our sinfulness. Those who foresaw this revelation of the goodness of God were influenced by it also. † Robert Pullen, teacher at Oxford, 1130, agrees with Abelard. So also, on the whole, do Peter Lombard and Hugo St. Victor.

With Peter Lombard begins the period of Summists, or system-making Doctors. Their object was totality. They attempted to give a solution to every theological question which could be asked. Their usual course is to state the question, then adduce the arguments from Scripture and the Fathers in favor of each side, then the conclusion, in which they endeavor to find a way of reconciling the opposite views. On these great theologians, overrated once, underrated now, we would gladly dwell, did our limits permit. Bonaventura, the Seraphic Doctor, (born 1221) handles this subject with great clearness and simplicity. He almost adopts Anselm's theory, and then lets it fall by denying the absolute necessity of satisfaction. God, he says, being omnipotent, might have chosen some other

* It will be seen that, according to Anselm, Christ's death was not vi carious punishment. He did not endure punishment in the place of sinners. On the contrary, the idea of satisfaction excludes that of punishment. God is satisfied either by satisfaction or punishment. "Necesse est ut omne peccatum satisfactio aut pæna sequatur." The death of Christ satisfies God's holiness, because it was a free act of goodness which was equal to all the good acts which men had omitted to perform. The notion of vicarious punishment was introduced afterward by the Lutheran Reformers, when they distinguished between the active and passive obedience of Christ.

In proof of which he quotes the text, "The multitudes which went before, and that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna to the Son of David."

way. But when the reason has seen a thing to be necessary, it is absurd to place above this necessity the abstract notion of an Omnipotence which may make it unnecessary. For in this case, the notion really uppermost is that of the entire incomprehensibility of God, which of course overthrows every theory founded on a supposed knowledge of his attributes.

The theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor, (born 1224) is chiefly distinguished by its doctrine of satisfactio superabundans." Christ has restored to God more than was taken from him by human sin. This surplus became afterward a stock of merit belonging to the church, and was the ground on which it based the right of selling indulgences. In the main Aquinas agrees with Anselm, nevertheless he also gives up the absolute necessity of satisfaction.

Opposed to St. Thomas stands Duns Scotus, (flourished 1300) the Subtle Doctor, whose view directly contradicts that of Anselm. He denies the infinite guilt of sin and the infinite merit of Christ, declaring that guilt and merit take their character from their subject not their object. He declares that the belief of the infinite character of sin, involves Manicheism. Sin, however, though not intensively infinite (in itself) is extensively so (in its results.) By thus denying the infinite nature of sin Anselm's theory is cut up by the roots. He denies the necessity of the death of Christ, and even asserts that it is possible that a mere man might have atoned for us. Anything which God chose to accept as an atonement would be so. In other words God's will is not conditioned by any necessity, but is absolutely supreme. And here is the radical difference between the Scotists and Thomists, the one attributing to God an unconditioned will, the other a will conditioned by the laws of his nature. From this point the scholastics divided into these two parties, though the majority were Scotists. The church however decided for the doctrine of Thomas, as seeming most to favor church authority. It was adopted by the Bull Unigenitus. The idea of acceptatio is found however in a great variety of systems, from the time of Scotus down.

And now we come to the third great epoch in the history of our doctrine, which commences with the Reformation.