Now, in order to make full use of our industry's resources, there are two major sources of additional production which must be immediately brought into operation. First are the mines which were shut down during the depression and never reopened; second are work places in the mines now not being exploited. Now, according to the Bureau of the Census, which I think has a fairly good definition of what a copper mine is, there were 180 operating copper mines in 1929; by 1939 there were only 49 mines producing copper-49 copper mines, so-called, and the total output of recoverable copper had dropped 28 percent below the 1929 figure.

In lead and zinc, the mines had dropped over the same period from 375 to 254.

Incidentally, in iron ore the same was true; 208 iron-ore mines in 1929; only 174 in 1939.

Certainly it is worth while surveying this particular field to determine how many of the 131 copper mines that have been shut down since 1929, how many of the 121 lead and zinc mines, how many of the 34 iron-ore mines, stopped because of depletion; how many stopped because of the general economic collapse, but are still potentially productive.

Now, obviously, Senators, a certain amount of capital expenditure may be necessary to bring these mines back into productivity-we may need new equipment, we will have to reopen shafts and do other things. But it would not be correct to assume merely because the mines closed down during the depression when prices were low and there was no demand for their raw materials, that they cannot operate or that they are marginal mines or high-cost mines. They may be very good mines but simply haven't gotten back into production. Their production wasn't needed.

FAILURE OF CERTAIN MINES TO OPERATE AT PRESENT CAPACITY

Mr. RISKIN. In addition to this problem, there may be found throughout the industry specific instances of failure to operate at capacity in the mines which are operating. Now, we have had our members in the field submit to us, our national office, instances of where there are mines operating not at capacity, and I will give you two or three.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you ought to give us a large number of those if there is a large number. We want those for the record.

Mr. RISKIN. The Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., an important lead and zinc producer in Idaho, owns the Bunker Hill mine and operates on one shift. This was as of a week or two ago when I received the report. This mine has 23 levels, of which levels 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 16 are not being worked. Developmental work is being carried on in levels 13, 17, and 19.

Ore reserves, according to a public statement by the president of this corporation about a couple of years ago, are indefinite. The levels mentioned have stopes, drifts, and numerous work faces that carry rich ore bodies. This company has two mills, the south mill and the west mill. The south mill, with a capacity of 600 tons per day, is now idle. The west mill, with a capacity of 1,200 tons a day, has added a new department which is supposed to increase the capacity of

the mill by some 600 tons per day. This mill is not working at capacity.

The same company has one smelter with a capacity of 350 tons of lead per day. It is now turning out about 195 tons of lead per day. The company operates at capacity when all three of its blast furnaces are working full time. Its No. 3 blast furnace has about the same capacity as No. 1 and No. 2 combined, but the No. 3 furnace is not operating.

The Douglas mine, owned by the Douglas Mining Co., has four levels.

Senator MURDOCK. May I interrupt you there?

Mr. RISKIN. Yes.

Senator MURDOCK. You spoke first of Bunker Hill Mining Co., and now of the Douglas Mining Co. Have you any information whatever on the interest, if any, that your big copper companies have in the particular mines that you have mentioned there?

Mr. RISKIN. You mean interlocking directorates, and so on? Not in this specific case, Senator Murdock. We do, of course, have the financial break-downs of the major corporations in the field which. have been made available to Government study, and so on, but not in this particular instance. I don't know, myself, of any direct relationship between Bunker Hill, for instance, and Anaconda, or Phelps-Dodge, if that is the point.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is this Bunker Hill mine?
Mr. RISKIN. In Idaho.

Senator MURDOCK. May I ask this? Just what is their system of mining? Is this a fissure vein that they are working on?

Mr. RISKIN. Senator, I couldn't tell you that. I don't know the mine at first hand. My report from the men was along these lines: Do you have in your mine, regardless of the mining technic, available levels that are not being used, available work places on levels that are not being used, available reserves that should be exploited now? That was the way in which I went at the problem.

Senator MURDOCK. The reason I asked the question was this. In our hearings at Salt Lake City about a month or 6 weeks ago, it was stated by Mr. Snyder, of Salt Lake City

Mr. RISKIN. I know Mr. Snyder.

Senator MURDOCK (continuing). That he expected in the near future many fissure vein mines to close down, and pointed out at the fixed price at that time, mines like the Utah Copper would be able to carry on at the price fixed for copper, but fissure vein mines would of necessity have to close. Have you any information on that?

Mr. RISKIN. Oh, yes; I see the question now. In that sense, the Bunker Hill & Sullivan is an underground operation rather than an open-pit operation. I am sorry I misunderstood your question.

I would like to go into that part of the question in some great detail. I think here, if I may be so bold, is where the union has a contribution, the question of the relationship of price to purchase and production problems, and I deal with that at some length later, if you don't mind.

Senator MURDOCK. That is all right. I do think that is important, however, to make that distinction.

Mr. RISKIN. I agree with you.

311932-42-pt. 10-5

Senator MURDOCK. And if it is true that we have many fissure mines in this country that can't operate at the present price, that certainly we should look into that phase of it.

Mr. RISKIN. I will take that up.

The Douglas mine, which I just mentioned, has four levels which are said to contain the best zinc-ore bodies in that district. It has all the necessary equipment and a camp for operations. Today there is a watchman taking care of an idle camp. We should know, it seems to me, if the Douglas mine is being kept as a future reserve for the company instead of operating for our national victory today. The Federal Mining Co. owns and operates the Morning mine with two shifts. It has four levels currently operating and producing lead and zinc. The miners assert that in levels such as 2,400 and 3,000 feet, the company is employing only enough men to keep the places open, producing almost no more, even though these places carry good commercial grades of ore and production could easily be increased substantially.

The Morning mill currently averages 18 trains a day with about 20 tons of ore per train. A year ago, according to the men, the mill averaged 22 trains a day, or 80 tons a day more than it now handles.

In the rich Butte, Mont., mines of the Anaconda Copper Mining Co., monthly copper production has declined about 2,000 tons a month in the last few months as compared with the average monthly output during the first half of this year, our local leaders report. Senator HATCH. May I interrupt you again?

Mr. RISKIN. Yes.

Senator HATCH. What explanation do you have for that decline! Did you go into that?

Mr. RISKIN. I am glad you asked that question because from labor's viewpoint there have been no stoppages, no slow-downs, no strikes, no labor trouble whatsoever that would have warranted or explained, from that easy way out, a cut in production. Now, Senator, I have a number of ideas about why there is a slow-down in production throughout the industry that you referred to. These, however, are interpretations on my part and not factual, and I think in a body of this sort perhaps such interpretations should be kept rather than expressed as facts, because the things I give here are not personal interpretations, they are factual statements of what we think can be done.

Senator HATCH. Do any of your facts, aside from the interpretations, give any explanation of that?

Mr. RISKIN. Yes. I have an over-all industry picture which I personally feel-but that doesn't enter this problem.

Now, I would like to mention one more shut-down or one more lack of production which I think is very important for this committee's consideration. It is a different example entirely, but it is equally valid as an instance of failure to produce in the face of our needs. and that is the shutting down of the Walker mine in California by the Walker Mining Co. directors, because the company couldn't show profit at 12-cent copper.

Now, our union does not dispute the facts of the losses incurred by the company, but it does want to point out this: This company lost money in 1935, 1936, 1938, 1939, 1940, but it operated all but 6 months in all these years.

The average price of copper in 1935 was 8 cents a pound; in 1936, less than 912 cents; in 1938, 11,296; but in 1941, with copper constantly about 12 cents (Connecticut Valley), the company shut down.

In 1940, when copper was 11.296, the Walker mine was willing to work at capacity and lose money. The price was lower than today when Walker shut down. Now, we are not questioning the company's losses. We do say it is interesting to note that in Poor's Industrial Manual for 1937, Walker's cost of production of copper per pound sold, after credit for silver and gold in the ore and with the cost of smelting, freighting, and refining added, was estimated at 9.399 cents a pound. This is mentioned because we have been advised that Walker's cost of production is estimated at 20 cents a pound.

Now, frankly, Senators, I suppose that any company can say that its costs are anything, because I sat here a year ago when Senator O'Mahoney's committee was holding hearings on cartels in copper1 and when Mr. Cornelius Kelly of Anaconda Copper said in his testimony that, well, you can't tell what the costs of production are; it all. depends upon the bookkeeping system you use in that particular company. I am merely reviewing this fact, that here is a mine that is closed down when we need copper.

Now, in 1940, Walker produced more than 10,500,000 pounds of copper. That mine is shut down. Our Nation needs that 10,000,000 pounds of copper now. We feel that that mine should be put back into operation. The paramount thing is copper production.

USE OF MULTIPLE SHIFT OPERATION

Mr. RISKIN. Now we get to the point that you raised. What is the answer to the question of drops in production instead of capacity production, and how can we change this trend in the industry?

The union has this dynamic approach to the problem. We feel that today we shouldn't be talking in terms of putting labor to work 6 days a week, for reasons I will explain. We feel that today every single production unit in the industry must operate 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, and anything that is under that is less than maximum capacity. We start with that fundamental approach, with that objective, with that goal, and we see how we can try to reach it and what interrupts this goal.

Inseparably bound to the question of capacity production is the need for unbroken operations and for putting an end to conditions which result in the astonishing turn-over in the working staff. We hold that our national crisis requires drastic overhauling of views and technics and that industry, government, and labor should work together to bring about that continuity of employment and production which will eliminate not only week-end black-outs but day after day black-outs in our industry.

Now, I think it is fair to say that mining operators and defense officials have repeatedly brought pressure on our union and our membership to work a 6-day week.

Our union cannot understand why employers should want to pay for 12 hours' work for only 8 hours' production on the overtime day; nor why Government officials should support that position.

1 Hearings before Temporary National Economic Committee.

Payment of 12 hours' pay for 8 hours' production will not mean bringing 12 work-hours' more copper, lead, or zinc to the surface. This will not produce for our Nation, therefore, the metals which we must have. It merely means that the operators will be able to use this increased labor cost as (a) an excuse to win exemptions from the penalties of the Wage-Hour Act by getting permission to work 48 hours without overtime (still, it won't produce more); or (b) an excuse to get O. P. A. to agree to higher prices for the metals for 6-day, overtime production.

Now, why should the United States Government be forced to pay more for metals without getting more metal for national defense? Why should the Government be party to paying higher prices without increased production-a price based on 12 hours work for only 8 hours output?

Countering this illogical and unproductive measure is our proposal that the basic 8-hour day and 5-day week be maintained, with over-all operations expanded not to a mere 6 days, but to 7 days, 24 hours a day. And I want to repeat here that we realize this is a goal, that it cannot be achieved immediately. It can be adopted and realized only after certain of the measures we are discussing now have been taken into consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you would increase the shifts, have more shifts of 5-day workers?

Mr. RISKIN. That is right. Under present conditions in most mines. we can't work on a 3-shift basis, for reasons I will explain. In some cases, the 3-shift technique may be used in a modified form, as in three 6-hour shifts to permit the air to clear; or in two 8-hour production shifts and three service shifts so that the production men may work at top speed while they are working.

Now, in making continuous operations possible, two problems are interlocked and inseparable-the essential technical, engineering needs and the improvement of working conditions.

In one of the world's largest mining camps, a recent survey revealed the amazing fact that half of its 5,000 workers on the pay roll worked less than half the month. These are regular employees, mind you, Senator. These are not men who come and leave the camp. Of the regular pay roll of 5,000 men, more than half the men worked less than half the work-month.

Yet in this camp, the management's major campaign has been to put its workers on the 6-day week-apparently indifferent to the fact that even under a 6-day week, if the same turn-over continued, the company would actually be getting an average of 3 days' work per man, more than 50 percent of the men working less than 50 percent of the time.

The same solutions which would bring about a greater continuity of employment in the regular and present work-shift would make possible the complete operation of the camp on a full time 24-hour-a-day, 7-daya-week basis. Under no other conditions is an unbroken production schedule possible, and under no other conditions is efficient production possible even under our present single-shift basis.

So then we come now to our practical proposal. Is this too lengthy? The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. Go right through. This is information. we want in the record. I don't care how long it takes; give it to us so that we can understand it.

Mr. RISKIN. We urge first the use of multiple shifts.