distinct but parallel beneficial activities, which came into existence with World War II:

(a) Public Law 16, to provide vocational rehabilitation to veterans having service incurred or service aggravated disabilities which resulted in a vocational handicap.

(b) Public Law 346, to extend institutional education and training to eligible veterans irrespective of disabilities.

(c) Public Law 377, which embraced extension of education and training to apprenticeships refresher or institutional on-the-farm training courses. The basic philosophies covered by the above enactments have been altered or amended by several laws subsequently enacted, but it will suffice for the purpose of this report to limit discussion to those benefits just mentioned.

As of December 1951, approximately half of the veteran population from World War II, totaling 15,200,000, have entered into training under Public Law 16, 579,000; Public Law 346, 7,533,000.

With some exceptions, benefits under Public Law 346 expire in 1951, but it is not so limited under Public Law 161.

The personnel engaged in the Vocational Rehabilitation Service on the two dates is shown:

The distribution of their personnel by organizational element is given as:

It is, of course, true that the veteran-in training load has declined steadily as eligibility has expired. This is shown by the number of cases on:

In this case the Citizens Committee believes that the reduction in force within the Vocational Rehabilitation Service has been of doubtful justification in that it has been much sharper than the reduction in load would justify. The heavy curtailment of personnel who are responsible for training supervision may in part explain many of the abuses that have come to light with regard to proper control of these veteran benefits. The Trundle report pointed out the danger incurred in providing inadequate supervision of the training programs, particularly on page 156 in Paragraph 12, House Committee Print No. 14, and in following paragraphs that discussed the operations of the Vocational Rehabilitation Service. Repetition of the findings is unnecessary here but it should be added that very seldom was it found that the abuses noted were the fault of the veterans themselves.

More probably, the bad condition was chargeable to the institution which he was attending and to the State authority who presumably provided endorsement and inspection.

These abuses found by the Trundle Task Force were nearly all substantiated by the Bureau of the Budget, and reemphasized in the later Teague report and General Accounting Survey. Basically, the conditions and abuses stem from ineffective control of the educational and training programs in particular, and scrambled lines of authority throughout the agency in general. The VA was given close control of education and training of disabled veterans, but the Act of 1944 eliminated giving equal control to the education and training of non-disabled veterans. The States were presumed to provide this latter element, but basically failed to do so in a large number of instances. The Teague report remarked that each State certified the institutions in which the veterans enrolled and was paid for this certification in periodic examination. Therefore, the State should be held responsible for unwarranted certification and abuses arising therefrom. No institutions should be allowed to charge larger fees for veterans of residents of a State than is charged a non-resident. The VA should take this differential in rates into account when fixing the "fair and reasonable rate." Payments should be made direct to the veteran student and not to the institution. This would make the veteran personally concerned as to the validity of the accrued charges. The provision would act in much the same way as direct and personal contacts do concerning insurance, disability allowances, etc.

Provisions of both Public Law 346 and Public Law 16, as well as later laws of the same tenor, were recommended to be identical as to the VA's dictates of the institutions to be attended and the training to be applied. There appears to be no valid reason why a veteran under all beneficial laws should not be counselled in selecting a source for his education under identical guidance provisions.

The agricultural training program obviously should be more closely supervised as to the quality of instruction and its application value to the individual veteran. It should be discontinued entirely to veterans employed by another, when such VA benefits serve to subsidize the employe". Likewise, it should be discontinued when veterans have no farm enterprises that supply full support for himself and family, and it should under no conditions be extended to a presently fully qualified farmer.

Most certainly the VA should police its benefits to prevent payments to subversive elements, to veterans of criminal tendencies, to those making false claims, or in any other manner where the intent of Congress is circumvented. The personnel involved in vocational rehabilitation and education ought to be carefully screened to insure proper qualification as counselors, instructors, or supervisors of program applications. In substance, the Trundle Report recommended, and the Teague Report confirmed, that the Administrator exercise the authority, by amended legislation if necessary, to see that the veteran is given full measure of the benefit of the Federal education and training program, whether this supervision involves the quality of the education, the amount of instruction, or the suitability of the environment.

Other substantial recommendations contained in the Teague Report and the General Accounting Office Report are worth reiterating for they confirm most positively that much remains to be done in perfecting the operating procedures of the VA.

The Citizens Committee has summarized the reports accordingly:

(a) They found the Rehabilitation and Education Service is inadequately staffed, numerically and qualitatively.

(b) The competency of training personnel to supervise the operations, particularly of education, is inferior.

(c) Abuses stem from mismanagement and chicanery of low grade institutions, rather than from the veteran participants themselves.

1 Study of Special Problems Arising Under The Servicemen's Readjustment Act, Bureau of the Budget, February 9, 1948.

(d) The states failed to exercise adequate judgment in certifying institutions or providing inspection after certification.

(e) Finally, the statement is made that examination showed that over two-thirds of the participating schools received overpayments from the VA, due to irregular practices and noncompliance with existing VA regulations. (f) New legislation should be had to clarify and to more sharply define relations between the States and the VA with reference to State approved agencies.

(g) Educational institutions should be defined.

(h) The VA should not provide subsistence for veterans, but should confine their benefit to tuition, cost of books and tools, etc.; the idea being that the veteran should make some contribution to his own welfare and not be wholly dependent on Federal funds.

(i) Benefits should be limited to boys whose education was interrupted by service in the Armed Services.

(j) Any new legislation should provide punishment for violation of VA regulations and prosecution should be possible with help from the Department of Justice, FBI, etc.

(k) Trade-type schools should not be allowed to do "live" work, thereby competing with private business. The practice of State-supported institutions charging the VA non-resident costs for enrolled veterans when said students are residents of the State, should be prohibited.

1. All payments should be made to the student direct and not to the college or institution.

In this Chapter, the Citizens Committee has attempted to show the general chaotic operating situation prevalent in the Veterans Administration today. In order that the Veterans' Affairs Committee may visualize the matter, the Citizens Committee has prepared Chart 3. This has as its basis the organization chart prepared by the agency for its official releases as to conduct of a typical regional office. One for a hospital or district office would be similar, however. Observe one very significant point. Instead of a clear line of authority extending directly down from the Administrator to such a field station, executive directives must percolate through a barrier of twelve assistant administrators. By the same token, communications coming from the field station level must stumble through the fence of bureaucratic immobility. What started out under General Bradley's administration to be a general policy forming staff of competent advisers to the Administrator of Veterans Affairs has deteriorated into an independent and loosely associated level of officials, each promoting his own interpretation of a single functional responsibility, with little regard to the major issue—the most efficient conduct of veteran benefits. What more need be said?