home or residence, or original muster into the service, at the rate of 5 cents per mile, was amended by the act of September 22, 1922, 42 Stat., 1021, providing, in part, as follows:

Hereafter an enlisted man discharged from the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, except by way of punishment for an offense, shall receive 5 cents per mile for the distance from the place of his discharge to the place of his acceptance for enlistment, enrollment, or muster into the service:

*

This act, applicable to all discharges of the character mentioned therein, occurring on and after September 22, 1922, took away the election or option to receive travel pay to one of two places granted by the previous law, and limited computation of the allowance to place of acceptance for enlistment, enrollment, or muster into the service.

The "place of acceptance of enlistment, enrollment, or muster into the service," relates to the current enlistment or enrollment period, the discharge from which is the basis for the claim for travel allowance, and not a man's original entrance into the service. 5 Comp. Dec., 488; 7 id., 606; id., 648.

Accordingly, in the present case claimant had no right to travel allowance by reason of his discharge of October 10, 1922, because the place of acceptance for enlistment, Camp Travis, Tex., was also the place of discharge.

Upon review of the matter the settlement is reversed and the sum of $105 certified due the United States.

RETAINER PAY-NAVAL RESERVE FORCE-CHANGE OF ADDRESS. The fact that checks for retainer pay mailed to a member of the Naval Reserve Force at the various addresses furnished by him were returned by the postal authorities as being incorrectly addressed raises the presumption that he has not made such reports concerning his movements and occupations as required by the act of August 29, 1916, 39 Stat., 588, as a condition precedent to the payment to him of retainer pay. Decision by Comptroller General McCarl, January 25, 1923.

Obe Franklin Hall, former seaman, second class, United States Naval Reserve Force, applied November 28, 1922, for review of settlement N-274401, dated November 11, 1922, by which was disallowed his claim for retainer pay for the period June 29, 1918, date of enrollment, to September 30, 1921, date of discharge.

The records show that claimant was enrolled in the Naval Reserve Force June 29, 1918, as seaman, second class, was confirmed in rating November 24, 1918, reported for active duty July 26, 1918, ordered to inactive duty January 29, 1919, and discharged September 30,

1921.

The Navy allotment office advised claimant by letter dated October 20, 1922, in part as follows:

1. Checks covering payment of your retainer pay from 29 June, 1918, date of enrollment, to 30 June, 1921, at the rate of $12.00 per annum, the amount

due one holding a provisional rank or rating in the Naval Reserve Force, were mailed to Pinelevel, Fla., Arcadia, Fla., and Box 225, Brewster, Fla., and returned to this office for incorrect address. After numerous attempts to locate your new address these checks were canceled.

In his application for review of the settlement, claimant states:

Am in receipt of your letter of November 11th, disallowing my claim for retainer pay on the grounds that I had not kept you advised as to my movements. When I was released in Virginia I was instructed to report my movements to the 7th naval district at Key West to Captain K. C. Palmer. This I have done as follows:

1st, when I went to Penbrook, Fla.

2nd, when I left Penbrook for Brewster, Fla.

3rd, when I left Brewster for Arcadia, Fla.

It is true that I enlisted from Pinelevel, Florida, but when I was released I notified the releasing officer at Norfolk that I was going to Arcadia and he gave me a card to fill out and mail to 7th naval district upon my arrival in Arcadia, which I did. The R. R. fare furnished me was to Arcadia, Fla. I have done everything requested of me and have held myself at all times subject to call, and respectfully request that my retainer check be sent me to Arcadia, Florida.

The act of August 29, 1916, 39 Stat., 588, provides:

Retainer pay shall only be paid to members of the Naval Reserve Force upon their making such reports concerning their movements and occupations as may be required by the Secretary of the Navy.

The claimant asserts he notified the Commandant 7th Naval District of several changes of address. It is evidenced that upon the information furnished the Navy allotment office mailed the checks for retainer pay to claimant at the several places named. These checks were not delivered but were returned to the Navy allotment office for better address.

Under such circumstances it is not established that claimant has complied with the law and regulations requiring him to keep his commanding officer advised as to his address and occupation. This requirement is mandatory and it is incumbent upon the reservist that accurate, reliable information be furnished the proper authorities to the end that communications may be addressed to him with a reasonable degree of certainty that they will be delivered. The Navy Department has reported the failure of the reservist to so do and there is no authority upon the present record for allowing the retainer pay. Upon review the settlement is sustained.

LAUNDRY.

In view of the prohibition in the act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat., 631, as to the allowance of traveling expenses in excess of those actually incurred while traveling on duty away from his designated post of duty, an officer of the Coast Guard is not entitled to reimbursement for expense of laundering clothes soiled while traveling when such expense is not incurred until after return to his duty station.

Decision by Comptroller General McCarl, January 25, 1923.

H. R. Searles, lieutenant commander, assistant inspector, United States Coast Guard, by letter dated November 13, 1922, applied for

a review of settlement dated November 9, 1922, disallowing his claim (No. T-1251) for laundry bill, in amount $1.57, withheld by Special Disbursing Agent S. S. Yeandle, in his October, 1922, account (claimant's voucher for traveling expenses, September 19 to 25, 1922, in amount $45.93). The laundry was claimed for a period of five days from September 20 to 24, 1922, both inclusive, while claimant was in actual travel expense status, but the laundering was not actually done and paid for until after claimant had returned to official headquarters.

It appears that claimant protested to the commandant of the Coast Guard against the deduction of the amount of the laundry item from the amount of his traveling expense account as rendered, and was advised by the commandant to submit the daim to the General Accounting Office for direct settlement. The Coast Guard administrative office forwarded to this. office a prepared voucher therefor with an indorsement stating its disapproval of the item for the reason it was thought that an officer was not entitled to expenses for personal laundry incurred after returning to his permanent station.

In his request for review claimant states that as during his absence on official travel September 19 to 25, 1922, there was no opportunity to have laundry done, his stay in different towns being limited to a few hours only, the expense in question was incurred after his return to his permanent station, the laundry itself being delivered to the laundry company within one hour after his arrival at his permanent station; and in support of his claim refers to paragraphs 10 and 11 of Treasury Department Circular No. 127.

The Regulations for the United States Coast Guard, 1916, as amended by General Order No. 21, dated October 9, 1922, provide, in part:

ART. 593 (1). Officers when traveling under competent orders, which entitle them to actual necessary traveling expenses, shall not be allowed or paid any sum in excess of expenses actually incurred for subsistence, nor any sum in excess of $7 per day. Until receipt of changes in the regulations relating to this feature, the charges shall be confined to necessary expenses actually incurred and in accordance with the instructions contained in Treasury Department Circular No. 127, dated March 29, 1922, except as to the maximum allowance for subsistence.

Treasury Department Circular No. 127 (Travel Regulations) specifies in paragraph 10 the various expenses included under subsistence, among which is expense for laundry, and specifically provides in paragraph 11 that

Expense of laundering and pressing clothes may be prorated for the number of days which it covers; but the days shall be specifically stated. The act of June 10, 1922, effective beginning July 1, 1922, 42 Stat., 631, to readjust the pay and allowances of the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast

Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Public Health Service, provides, in part, in section 12:

Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, no officer of the services mentioned in the title of this Act shall be allowed or paid any sum in excess of expenses actually incurred for subsistence while traveling on duty away from his designated post of duty, nor any sum for such expenses actually incurred in excess of $7 per day.

Although the need for the laundering here in question may have arisen while the claimant was in an official travel status, the actual expense of the laundering was not incurred until after he had returned to his permanent station, when the clothes were sent to the laundry company. The regulations do not provide for reimbursement of such expense.

Upon a review of the matter the settlement is sustained.

MILEAGE OFFICERS OF THE ARMY ON RETIREMENT.

An officer of the Army retired and ordered to proceed to his home, who because of ill health delays traveling to his home for over three and one-half years, is not considered as performing travel under orders or on public business, and is not entitled to mileage therefor under the act of June 12, 1906, 34 Stat., 246.

Decision by Comptroller General McCarl, January 26, 1923.

Maj. John L. Jordan, United States Army, retired, requested July 20, 1922, review of settlement No. W-227519, dated July 16, 1921, by which was disallowed his claim for mileage, San Francisco, Calif., to College Grove, Tenn., for travel performed April 7 to 20, 1921, under order dated September 5, 1917, announcing his retirement from the Army and directing him to proceed to his home. The order, paragraph 22 of War Department Special Orders, No. 206, is as follows:

Major John L. Jordan, 1st Infantry, having been examined for promotion by a board of officers and found physically disqualified for the duties of major of Infantry, by reason of disability incident to the service, his retirement by the President from active service with the rank of major, under the provisions of an act of Congress approved October 1. 1890, and section 32 of an act of Congress approved February 2, 1901. is announced. Major Jordan will proceed to his home. The travel directed is necessary in the military service.

The act of June 12, 1906, 34 Stat., 246, provides:

Hereafter officers, active and retired, when traveling under competent orders without troops, and retired officers who have so traveled since March third, nineteen hundred and five, shall be paid seven cents per mile and no more;

Mileage is a reimbursement of traveling expenses, and public business is the foundation on which it rests; it is not an emolument. It is payable only for travel on public business pursuant to directions contained in a competent military order. Military orders are to be obeyed at once or within a reasonable time according to their character, and what is a reasonable time will depend on the nature of the order and the facts of the particular case.

In the case of orders to officers on retirement directing them to proceed to their homes, great latitude has been allowed in carrying them out, but all the cases are to the effect that where the orders have not been extended by some appropriate action of the department issuing them and travel was not performed within a year of the issuance of the order the travel was not within a reasonable time and the order was no longer "competent " to authorize mileage. 4 Comp. Dec., 175; 6 id., 24; 9 id., 819; 13 id., 112; 49 Ct. Cls., 703; 23 MS. Comp. Dec., 169, October 18, 1902; 28 id., 690, February 19, 1904. The order to an officer on retirement to travel to his home can not be regarded as an open order for travel to be complied with at any future time suiting the pleasure or convenience of the officer to whom it is issued. 6 Comp. Dec., 25. If an order to an officer on retirement to proceed to his home is not obeyed within a reasonable time, under the circumstances of the particular case, it loses its character as an order to travel on public business; and if the travel is subsequently performed, it is at the officer's pleasure or convenience and not under orders within the meaning of the statute. 9 Comp. Dec., 822.

The accounting officers have heretofore ruled that there was no authority to pay the mileage account of a retired officer who did not obey the order to proceed to his home for five years after retirement; and also that an officer who did not perform the journey until nearly four years after retirement because of his ill health did not perform the travel under orders within the meaning of the mileage laws. 23 MS. Comp. Dec., 169; 28 id., 690. The facts of this latter case are identical with the present case; there, as here, retirement became effective on the Pacific coast, and the officer, because of ill health, delayed the journey to his home nearly four years. In the present case, it appears from papers filed that between the date of retirement and date of travel the officer was in hospital, in sanitariums, or under the care of a physician, September 6 to December 12, 1917; January 1 to February 28, 1918; May 18, 1918, to January 30, 1919; July 1 to December 23, 1919; and January 29 to June 20, 1920. But however meritorious the case may otherwise be, the mere illness of the officer could not of itself operate to extend the period within which the order to travel was effective, otherwise obedience to a military order may be indefinitely delayed, at the pleasure, convenience, or necessities of the officer. Such delay the mileage laws do not contemplate when requiring that the travel shall be under competent orders, and it makes no exception in favor of officers traveling to their homes on retirement. The law is intended for travel in the active military service, and it is only on the theory that a retired officer is still in the military service and is traveling under an order issued to him before his retirement, and to be effective with his re