USE OF AIRPLANE MAIL SERVICE APPROPRIATIONS FOR

BUILDINGS.

The operation and maintenance of airplane mail service between New York and San Francisco via Chicago, Ill., and Omaha, Nebr., having been authorized by a special appropriation therefor in the act of June 19, 1922, 42 Stat., 657, such appropriation must be held available for expenditures absolutely essential to such service, and if it is a fact that it will be impossible to maintain and operate the airplane mail service via Chicago during the year for which the appropriation was made without the erection of hangars, shops, and storehouses on the landing field at Chicago, the erection of such facilities is authorized notwithstanding the general restriction on the erection of public buildings and public improvements not specially appropriated for. (2 Comp. Gen. 14, modified.)

Comptroller General McCarl to the Postmaster General, August 19, 1922: I have your letter of August 10, 1922, requesting a reconsideration of my decision of July 12, 1922, 2 Comp. Gen., 14, to the effect that the appropriation made in the act of June 19, 1922, 42 Stat., 657, for the operation and maintenance of airplane mail service between New York and San Francisco via Chicago and Omaha is not available for the erection of buildings (hangars, shops, and storehouses) of a more or less permanent nature on one or more of the landing fields established in connection with said airplane mail service.

Your letter of August 10 partakes more of the nature of a new submission than of a request for reconsideration, as it relates only to the landing field at Chicago and sets forth material facts which were not before me when the decision of July 12, 1922, was rendered. The new facts are that the landing field at Chicago, which was established under authority of the act of April 24, 1920, 41 Stat., 579, and on which the necessary buildings were erected, was on rented land; that by reason of the sale of said land the department recently has been required to vacate the field; that a new field is being established on Government-owned land on which there are no hangars, shops, etc.; that facilities at Chicago for the housing, conditioning, repairing, and reconstructing of airplanes are absolutely necessary to the practical maintenance and operation of an airplane mail route between New York and San Francisco via Chicago; and that at the present time there are no such facilities available at or near Chicago.

It is understood from your letter that in view of the facts set forth in the preceding paragraph it will be impossible to maintain and operate airplane mail service between New York and San Francisco via Chicago during the current fiscal year as contemplated under the appropriation hereinbefore mentioned unless the necessary hangars, shops, etc., can be erected on the recently acquired landing field at Chicago. If such be the fact, the use of the appropriation in question for the erection of the necessary facilities at the new landing field at Chicago is authorized under

the rule that when a special appropriation is made to accomplish a specific purpose, as in the case here presented, said appropriation must be held to be available for all expenditures absolutely essen tial to the accomplishment of the specific object for which it was made, notwithstanding the provisions of any general statute which otherwise would prohibit such expenditures. 22 Comp. Dec., 317.

TRANSPORTATION OF MEMBERS OF COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY—LAND-GRANT DEDUCTIONS AND MILEAGE OF OFFICERS. Members of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, when operating under and at the expense of the Department of Commerce, are not troops of the United States within the meaning of the land-grant laws, and payment for transportation furnished by railroads on Government transportation requests should be made without deduction for land-grant.

When officers of the Coast and Geodetic Survey are furnished transportation requests covering travel for which they would be entitled to mileage the deduction from the mileage allowance is fixed by the act of June 12, 1906, 34 Stat., 246, at 3 cents per mile, and the fact that the cost of the transportation to the Government may be greater does not authorize any greater deduction.

Comptroller General McCarl to the Secretary of Commerce, August 22, 1922: There has been received your letter of July 17, 1922, citing section 12 of the act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat., 631, which fixes the mileage allowance of, among others, commissioned officers of the Coast and Geodetic Survey when traveling under competent orders without troops, and extending to these officers the provisions of law, 34 Stat., 246, applicable to officers of the Army for the issuance of transportation requests when traveling on a mileage basis, and requesting decision

(1) Whether or not travel performed by commissioned officers of the Coast and Geodetic Survey is subject to land-grant deductions, and (2) shall a flat rate of three cents per mile be deducted from the mileage account regardless of the amount charged by the railroad company, as provided in the act of June 12, 1906, 34 Stat., 246, or shall the actual sum paid for such transportation be deducted?

You add that

The prevailing rate charged by the railroad is 3.6 cents per mile, whereas the act of June 12, 1906, supra, provides for a deduction of only three cents per mile for all transportation furnished on Government requests.

The Coast and Geodetic Survey normally operates under and at the expense of the Department of Commerce, and not as a part of the military forces of the Nation, except as provision is made in section 16 of the act of May 22, 1917, 40 Stat., 87, for the temporary transfer when a national emergency exists of such personnel thereof as the President may deem to the best interest of the country, to the War or Navy Department, the cost of such personnel after transfer to be borne by the department to which transferred.

It was held by the Supreme Court in decision of April 10, 1922, re Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. United States, that the

members of the Coast Guard, although by the act of January 28, 1915, 38 Stat., 800, constituted "a part of the military forces of the United States," are not troops of the United States within the meaning of the land-grant acts when the Coast Guard operates under and at the expense of the Treasury Department, although otherwise when it operates under and at the expense of the Navy Department. See 1 Comp. Gen., 657.

Applying the reasoning of that decision to the Coast and Geodetic Survey as established by law, your first question is answered by saying that when the Coast and Geodetic Survey is operating under and at the expense of the Department of Commerce the members thereof do not constitute troops of the United States within the meaning of the land-grant acts and payment for transportation furnished by railroads on Government transportation requests should be made without deduction for land-grant as for troops of the United States.

With respect to your second question, the act of June 12, 1906, 34 Stat., 246, so far as here material, provides

That officers who so desire may, upon application to the Quartermaster's Department, be furnished under their orders transportation requests for the entire journey by land, exclusive of sleeping and parlor car accommodations, or by water; and the transportation so furnished shall, if travel was performed under a mileage status, be a charge against the officer's mileage account, to be deducted at the rate of three cents per mile by the paymaster paying the account,

The deduction to be made is fixed by the statute at 3 cents per mile, without reference to what the cost to the Government will be, whether more or less than 3 cents per mile. To deduct more than the amount fixed in the statute would in effect be a reduction of the statutory mileage allowance, which under present mileage laws, where landgrant is not involved is, in effect, 8 cents per mile, or if the officer so desires, 5 cents per mile and transportation requests.

Your second question is answered accordingly.

SPECIALISTS' RATINGS.

The acceptance, after July 1, 1922, of a specialist's rating by an enlisted man of the Army does not constitute a change in grade within the meaning of the saving clause in section 16, act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat., 632, and such enlisted man, during his enlistment current on June 30, 1922, and without change of grade, may continue in receipt of the total pay and allowances to which entitled under laws in effect on June 30, 1922, if greater than the total pay and allowances provided by said act. (See 2 Comp. Gen., 196.) Comptroller General McCarl to Capt. A. E. Sawyer, United States Army, August 23, 1922:

There has been received, by reference, your letter of July 31, 1922, with accompanying voucher, wherein decision is requested as to the amount you are authorized to pay Paul A. Michaels, private, Thirtyfifth Company, Coast Artillery Corps, for the month of July, 1922,

who has had less than five years' service and who was given a sixthclass specialist rating on July 5, 1922. The question presented resolves itself into whether the acceptance of a specialist rating is a change in grade within the meaning of section 16 of the act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat., 632.

Michaels first entered the military service on May 26, 1920, for a period of three years, and, as a private, was in receipt, on June 30, 1922, under the act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat., 761, of pay at the rate of $30 a month. Section 9 of the act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat., 629, provided that on and after July 1, 1922, the base pay of an enlisted man of the seventh grade, private, should be $21 a month. The same section fixed the pay of a sixth-class specialist at $3 a month. If the acceptance of the specialist rating constituted a change in grade, Private Michaels is entitled to $30 a month for the period from July 1 to 4 and to $24 a month for the period from July 5 to 30, 1922.

The rating of specialist first appeared ir. the Army by reason of the act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat., 761, and it was held that the acceptance of a specialist rating did not constitute a change in grade within the meaning of the proviso contained in section 4b of the act, 27 Comp. Dec., 393. Section 9 of the act of June 10, 1922, refers to only seven pay grades for enlisted men of the Army and the rating of specialist is not included therein but is referred to separately.

It is clear from the language used that the acceptance of a specialist rating by an enlisted man of the appropriate grade does not constitute a change in grade. The effect of the saving clause in section 16 of the act of June 10, 1922, is to grant to an enlisted man of the Army in case the total of his pay and allowances under prior laws is greater than the total of his pay and allowances under the act of June 10, 1922, the right to continue to receive the pay and allowances as prescribed by prior laws until termination of the enlistment in which he is serving on June 30, 1922, while he continues in the same grade. It does not give him, however, the right to the items of pay and allowances that may be greater under prior laws and also to those that may be greater under the act of June 10, 1922. Decision of Comptroller General to the Secretary of the Navy, July 17, 1922, 2 Comp. Gen., 21.

The voucher forwarded by you is returned herewith and you are advised that the acceptance by Private Michaels of a specialist rating did not constitute a change in grade and he should continue to be paid during his current enlistment and while he hold his present grade at the rate of $30 per month.

VERIFICATION OF EXPENSE ACCOUNTS OF EMPLOYEES OF

PANAMA CANAL.

The verification of expense accounts under oath or by affirmation has long been recognized by the accounting officers of the Government as a necessary accounting requirement, and such verification of all expense accounts of employees of the Panama Canal will hereafter be required by the Comptroller General under the authority conferred upon him by sections 304 and 309 of the act of June 10, 1921, 42 Stat., 24, 25.

Comptroller General McCarl to the Governor of the Panama Canal, August 24, 1922:

I received July 27, 1922, a communication from the chief of office, the Panama Canal, Washington, D. C., reading:

The disbursing clerk of this office is in receipt of a letter from the General Accounting Office, War Department Division, dated June 13, 1922, a copy of which is inclosed herewith.

In this letter the disbursing clerk is advised that it will be necessary for all officers and employees traveling on official business to support their expense accounts with affidavits. On June 30, 1905, the Comptroller of the Treasury decided that it would not be necessary for officers and employees of the Panama Canal to support traveling expense vouchers by affidavits. See decision of June 30, 1905, copy of which is inclosed herewith. Since the rendition of this decision vouchers for reimbursement of traveling expenses of officers and employees of the Panama Canal have not been supported by affidavits.

Section 5438 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of May 30, 1908 (35 Stat., 555), makes it as great a crime to certify falsely to any voucher or expense account as to swear falsely to such voucher or expense account. This section as amended provides a punishment by imprisonment for not more than two years and by a fine not exceeding $500 for making a false certificate.

It would seem, therefore, that there is no necessity of requiring expense vouchers to be sworn to, as it would frequently happen that it would be very inconvenient for inspectors to secure affidavits to their expense accounts and they would frequently have to pay out of their own funds the cost of having such affidavits administered.

It is requested that you review the decision of the General Accounting Office, War Department Division, and advise this office whether it can continue the practice that has heretofore prevailed under the decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury, dated June 30, 1905.

In the decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury of June 30, 1905, 11 Comp. Dec., 812, it was stated:

There is no requirement of law that such vouchers shall be verified by affidavit, each department determining for itself what evidence it will require as to the correctness of such accounts rendered by its officers and employees.

By his order of April 1, 1905, the President acting under the powers given him by the act of June 28, 1902, 32 Stat., 483, charged the present Isthmian Canal Commission, under the supervision and direction of the Secretary of War and subject to the approval of the President, with the construction and maintenance of a waterway across the Isthmus of Panama and with all matters incident and necessary thereto. If, therefore, that commission, acting in pursuance of the powers thus delegated, does not require affidavits to vouchers for traveling expenses, such affidavits will not be required by the accounting officers of the Treasury.

But in 14 Comp. Dec., at page 15, it was said, upon a submission of the Post Office Department, that

Before closing this opinion, I desire to refer to an unhappy dictum found in a decision signed by me on June 30, 1905 (11 Comp. Dec., 812), the closing day of a fiscal year-a time when, because of the stress of business, mistakes of fact and law are liable to creep into decisions. The language referred to is: