Senator DONNELL. I quote from the opinion of the Court itself at page 284, where it says this: Section 3 of the War Labor Disputes Act calls for the seizure of any plant. mine, or facility when the President finds that the operation thereof is threatened by strike or other labor disturbance and that an interruption in production will unduly impede the war effort. Mr. Chairman, that is exactly what the President said, as the Court quotes on page 289: In the Executive order which directed the seizure of the mines. The Court says: The President found and proclaimed that 'the coal produced by such means is required for the war effort, and is indispensable for the continued operation of the national economy during the transition from war to peace; that the war effort will be unduly impeded or delayed by interruptions in production, and that the exercise of the powers vested in me is necessary to insure the operation of such mines in the interest of the war effort, and to preserve the national economic structure in the present emergency. So, Mr. Chairman, obviously this action taken by the President in taking charge of these mines was not a case which might happen at any time in our national history outside of war. This was a war situation, and so interpreted by the President, and so interpreted by the Court. Now, in this case, the Mine Workers' case, the defendants contended that the restraining order, and a subsequent preliminary injunction, were issued in violation of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. The Court says at page 278: Here we are concerned only with the Government's right to injunctive relief in a dispute with its own employees. Obviously, Mr. Chairman, that vitally differs from the ordinary normal case outside of the war when a strike is threatened, not by Government employees, but by employees of private owners, and the Court says at page 289: We hold that in a case such as this, where the Government has seized actual possession of the mines, or other facilities, and is operating them, and the relationship between the Government and the workers is that of employer and employee, the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply. The convictions were affirmed. Now, Mr. Chairman, it is thus obvious that the decision in the Mine Workers' case is, in the first place, based on the power of the President as President and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy to seize, under a war statute, facilities necessary for the war effort. Second, that the case holds that it may, that the Government may, obtain a restraining order against its own employees who are operating those war facilities; and in the third place, that this case does not, by any manner of means, or any stretch of the imagination, establish that the, to quote the Attorney General, Mr. Clark's letter inherent power of the President to deal with emergencies that affect the health, safety, and welfare of the entire Nation is exceedingly great. The President was acting in the Mine Workers' case under a statute passed by Congress. He was acting as President and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. He was acting in a war situation. He was acting against employees of the National Government which, ob iously, is far from the case which would arise were there to be a naional, Nation-wide strike under circumstances other than these. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the chairman and the comnittee for its indulgence, the Nation, notwithstanding the interpretaion that has been so easily placed, and I am not criticizing the press or placing it, so easily placed because anybody is apt to draw this nference as it appears in this morning's papers, I say that notwithtanding this inference that is doubtless all over the United States to he effect, as Mr. Albright says in the Washington Post, "The President can enjoin national emergency strikes," I take it the Nation should not draw a conclusive sigh of relief, relying on the assurance that even though the Thomas bill omits the right to injunction in time of national emergency, the President has an omnipotent inherent power to obtain such an injunction anyhow. But, Mr. Chairman, I think this is equally important. On the other hand, while the Nation should not draw this sigh of relief and say, "Well, everything is all right", because, as the headline in the Post says, "Truman can halt strikes," or any future President can; on the other hand, may I suggest this, that labor leaders who oppose inJunctions cannot be too sure either that such injunctions will not be sought by the President, nor can they be too sure that such injunctions will not, perchance, be secured from the courts. For the Attorney General has in his letter expressed his belief, not opinion, for that would violate tradition, his belief that the United States would under appropriate circumstances have access to the courts to protect the national health, safety, and welfare. So, Mr. Chairman, on the one hand, the Nation, I say, should not take assurance of safety without such a provision as this in the bill. On the other hand, the labor leaders might just as well face the facts that should a situation arise, which the Attorney General or the President thinks is one for an injunction, that they will seek it, and that the Attorney General will take the position that the courts should give it. Now, Mr. Chairman, finally may I say that if the proponents of this bill, who have obviously sought to please labor, and the Secretary who sits here before us as the head of a department the duties of which are to promote and aid the welfare of labor, as we have noted in the record, if the proponents of this bill who have sought to please labor by omitting the injunction feature from this bill, think from Attorney General Clark's letter or other reasons that although the injunction feature has been carefully deleted from the bill-if they think, these proponents, that the President nevertheless has the power to obtain the injunction, and will use that power, let those proponents so state it to labor, and let them state it in the bill. Moreover, if they do think it will, why not put the injunction provision in the bill, so that there can be no doubt that an injunction will be available? In any event, Mr. Chairman, I submit this: That on a matter of such tremendous importance as this, we should not have merely a written report by the Attorney General; that we should have him in person here before this committee so that we may discuss with him and hear his ideas, and ask him our questions with respect to what his opinion is, and, perhaps, in as important a matter, ask him what are the authorities and precedents on which he bases that opinion. I thank you, gentlemen, for your courtesy. Senator NEELY. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator NEELY. According to the clock I have been here 29 minutes. During that time the witness has been asked no question nor has he had an opportunity to answer a question. A Republican member of the committee has consumed the entire 29 minutes in making a speech. If no Republican member wishes to question the Secretary, he should be excused. I do not think it is fair to compel him sit here during these senatorial arguments. Senator TAFT. I am sure the Secretary was interested in Senator Donnell's statement, as I was. I should think he would be interested in the statement he made. Senator NEELY. I think anybody who helped give the country the Taft-Hartley law would be interested in anything that would delay its repeal. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Douglas. Senator DOUGLAS. I listened with great interest to Senator Donnell, not for 29 minutes, but for 49 minutes. Senator DONNELL. I am glad the interest continued during that entire time, Senator. Senator DOUGLAS. And if I may ask a question of the Senator, now that he is finished Senator DONNELL. Yes. Senator DOUGLAS. I find myself unable to determine just what position the Senator is taking. Is he saying that the President has no emergency powers in the case of grave national crises, or is he saying that if he has those emergency powers that they should be spelled out in detail in a labor relations act? Could the Senator briefly state his position on that point? Senator DONNELL. Mr. Chairman. I am not stating here what my opinion is as to the powers of the President. We have the Attorney General of the United States, who is amply qualified, I assume, to present to us the authorities which would enable us to arrive at a conclusion on that question. But I do say this: That if it be true, as the inference has been drawn by the press, that the President has the power to secure injunctions under some inherent rights of the President, there is no harm in putting that into the bill. On the other hand, in addition to that, there is a decided merit in putting it into the bill so that we may know with finality and decisiveness what the law is, rather than rely upon vague generalities and upon authorities which do not substantiate the proposition asserted or suggested in the letter of the Attorney General. Senator DOUGLAS. Do I understand, then, that you want to have precise procedures spelled out in any labor relations act? Senator DONNELL. Yes, I would say this: That if it is the desire of this committee, and personally it is my desire-it is my desire that we have the injunctive provision, and I do not share, Mr. Chairman. the views intimated by Mr. Herzog yesterday when he referred to the smell of the courts. I see no reason in the world why labor, as well as management, should not come into court-we have our courts for e determination of rights, and I would say that I am in favor of ving a provision in this bill so clear that no human being can sunderstand it, a provision giving to the President the right to cure an injunction. Now, as to the details of it-I mean in the event of national emerncy, as to the details of the procedure, I do not know how much in tail it would be necessary to set forth the procedure, but certainly ere ought to be enough in the bill to make it clear beyond peradenture of doubt that the right to secure the injunction is provided r and specified in the bill. If on the other hand we do not desire to have an injunctive right, we do not like it, if we do not want to have it, that should be put the bill, so that the people of this country will know conclusively nd finally whether or not the President has the right to secure this junction. Senator DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman, may I say something? Senator DOUGLAS. I will be very glad to yield to the Senator from Vermont. Senator AIKEN. I wanted to direct a question to the witness. Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I was going to ask the witness, if he President has had these broad inherent powers referred to in the Attorney General's letter all the time, why did he ask the Congress for special legislation to give him authority to control strikes affecting the national security and safety in critical industries? Secretary TOBIN. Senator, I do not feel quite qualified to answer that question after the long interpretation of the opinion of the Attorney General by Senator Donnell. I would be in no position to answer that question. The Senator is à constitutional lawyer, and I do not happen to be a one. Senator AIKEN. You and I are on even terms, Mr. Tobin, or hardly even terms because you had some days at law school that I never had. Senator DOUGLAS. Since so much time has been consumed in the interesting declaration by the Senator from Missouri, I should like to take about 5 minutes in a statement, disguised as a question, if I may, to the Secretary. Mr. Secretary, do we not really have two conflicting points of view in this discussion: There are those represented by my good friend. from Missouri, and possibly by other representatives on the other side, who say that we should have in a national labor law every conceivable situation dealt with specifically by statute and that every possible point that might arise should be covered by a statutory provision. If you adopt that idea, you get a statute, do you not, of interminable length, arousing many conflicting interests, and on the other side, do you not have those of us who believe that you should set up machinery whereby employers and employees may deal with each other freely through the processes of collective bargaining in the belief that if you do that, the vast majority of disputes will be settled by the parties themselves? But, of course, in the background there are always these powers of the Government to preserve the health and safety of the people. Now, the Senator from Missouri would like to have these powers explicitly defined. Is it not possible that one of the virtues of the American system is that they are not precisely defined? Is not perhaps their vagueness one of the sources of strength, that they are in the background, and people do not know precisely what they are: but each side is afraid to go too far or press its interest too far lest they run up against these powers? In this connection I would like to read into the record, and ask if you would generally approve it, Mr. Secretary, a statement made by a very distinguished lawyer, and I believe, a very wise man, Mr. William H. Davis, who has had a fine career at the bar, who was head. I believe, of the National War Labor Board, and served with our distinguished Senator from Oregon on that Board, and who, in an address at the University of California in March of 1947 said this, and I quote-I do not say that I approve of this statement or disapprove it, but I would like to have the Senators have the benefit of the comment of this experienced and wise man: Somebody is going to say, "Yeah, but suppose they don't work it out?”—that is, suppose the processes of collective bargaining do not. "Suppose in the last analysis they shut down the railroads?" Well, I say— that is Davis speaking "The President will do what the President has always done. He will come in and keep the railroads running." I said that one of the virtues of our Constitution was that the President's powers remain undefined although ample for the emergency. The result was that in our history, and we have had emergencies since we began, each time we have had a President with the courage to act and save the Union and I would include Abraham Lincoln in it-that is my comment, the comment of Davis usually unconstitutionally or extraconstitutionally. That is the comment of Davis. not Then after the Union is saved and the emergency is over, the thing gets into the Supreme Court and they say that the thing is unconstitutional and thereby save the Constitution. If I may interject, the President saves the country, and then the Supreme Court saves the Constitution. That is not so facetious as it seems. Let me put it another way. We have these undefined powers of the President which are ample for the emergency People say they ought to be defined. All right. By whom? By Congress within limits. Suppose Congress says, "In such an emergency the President is authorized to do so-and-so." The first thing would have to be seizure, just because you can't make people work for a private employer. So it would be seizure. The fifth amendment of the Constitution says that Congress shall pass no law depriving the citizens of the United States of life, liberty, or property without due process. So the first thing Congress has to do is to set up due process, And the second requirement of the amendment A is, if you take a man's property you must make just compensation for it, and the Supreme Court has said that a man's labor is a property right. So I say, if Congress is going to pass any law on the subject it should be a law which does not become effective until there |