Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and IdentityStephan Blatti, Paul F. Snowdon What are we? What is the nature of the human person? Animalism has a straightforward answer to these long-standing philosophical questions: we are animals. After being ignored for a long time in philosophical discussions of our nature, this idea has recently gained considerable support in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. It has also, amongst philosophers, occasioned strong opposition, even though it might be said to be the view assumed by much of the scientific community. Essays on Animalism is the first volume to be devoted to this important topic and promises to set the agenda for the next stage in the debate. Containing mainly new papers as well as two highly important articles that were recently published elsewhere, this volume's contributors include both emerging voices in the debate and many of those who have been instrumental in shaping it. Some of their contributions defend animalism, others criticize it, still others explore its more general implications. The book also contains a substantial introduction by the editors explaining what animalism is, identifying leading issues that merit attention, and highlighting many of the issues that the contributors have raised. |
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Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity Stephan Blatti,Paul F. Snowdon Limited preview - 2016 |
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accept according action actually animalist answer appeal approach argue argument become believe biological body brain capacity causal cease cerebrum Challenge chapter claim concept concern conscious consider constitution defend deny developed discussion distinct earlier entities essentially example exist experiences explain fact first-person function future given grounds head human animal idea important individual instance intuitions involves Johnston kind knowledge least living Lockean material matter mean mental merely metaphysical mind moral nature objection Olson one’s operation organism original overlappers Oxford persistence personal identity Philosophical physical plausible possible practical concerns present principle problem proper properties proposal prudential concern psychological continuity question reason refer relation relevant remnant person removing requires response result Righty seems sense separate share simply single sort stages substance sufficient suggests suppose theory thesis thing thinker thinking thought tion transplant true unity University Press whole